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Abstract 
Parliamentary committees have become a key factor in the running of the European 
Parliament, considerably influencing the entire decision-making process of the 
institution. This thesis argues that with the EP constrained to increase its efficiency 
and legitimacy, the institution has seen the emergence of a strong committee system. 
In its attempt to consolidate legitimacy through increased legislative output, the EP 
has developed powerful committees that lead legislative debates, explaining why a 
largely consensus-based policy process dominates the institution. The findings 
contrast with existing theories that only place political groups in the EP at the centre 
of the decision-making process, responsible for passing all legislative acts through the 
chamber. Moreover, the research is based on a methodological approach that 
challenges existing ones on the EP, mainly quantitative and relying ostensibly on roll-
call vote data gathered from the voting sessions. This approach uses process tracing as 
a method to track the interactions and the processes present inside the EP, forming 
and informing the decision-making  at  committee  and  plenary  level.  The  committees’  
powers are tested with the help of the main argument, which stresses their influence 
over the full chamber, the space where the final decision of the EP is reached. This is 
done by an analysis of: 1. rapporteurs and their work in committees and the chamber; 
2. amendments tabled to reports; and 3. political group debates related to them. These 
channels are identified as facilitators for the transfer of decisions from parliamentary 
committees to the full chamber, where they become the official EP position. In testing 
the main argument and with the help of the methodology, the thesis expands the 
existing understanding of the EP and its committee system, as well as verifying the 
potentiality  of  legislatures  from  federal  or  ‘divided  government’  systems  developing  a  
strong system of committees. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The European Parliament (EP) is a legislature defined by characteristics different to 
others in Europe and yet, it has been founded on a structure and set of principles 
drawn from the experience of other Parliaments in the European Union (EU). It 
differs from other legislatures in Europe due to its multinational nature, its 
predominant consensus and its separation of powers. It has, nevertheless, replicated 
the principles of parliamentary democracy in Europe. Its members come from 28 
Member States and for each of them the understanding of the EP is based on their 
national experience. Overall, it is a supranational body, with weak political groups 
and strong parliamentary committees. In the past decade, it has become an institution 
relying on a cohesive, sometimes confrontational, closed set of committees, whose 
influence has not yet been fully investigated and may evolve following the election of 
the eighth European Parliament (EP8) in 2014. Every month, the EP holds plenary 
sessions in Strasbourg and sometimes in Brussels. It is on this occasion that Members 
of the EP (MEPs) vote on all committee proposals and hold debates in order to create 
a unified view of the Parliament vis-à-vis the other EU institutions: the Commission 
and the Council.  
 
Ever since its first direct elections in 1979, the EP has portrayed itself as a legitimate, 
efficient institution and, as a consequence, has gained more powers requiring it to rely 
increasingly on a strong and organised system of parliamentary committees. This 
thesis argues that the system of parliamentary committees has taken centre stage in 
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the EP, to the detriment of the full plenary session of this legislature. Moreover, due 
to institutional practices and procedural modifications that have been introduced in 
the last ten years, political groups have sometimes chosen to fall in second place, after 
committees, in the decision-making process. In spite of being key actors leading the 
decisions in the Parliament, due to increased policy competences, technicality of acts 
and the necessity to specialise in order to control the legislative process, political 
groups  have  had  to  rely  more  often  on  the  parliamentary  committees’  decisions  and  
on the opinion of their members assigned in the respective committee, lacking the 
resources to exercise control over committee output. Because they are able to 
distribute committee assignments, as well as appoint influential committee posts such 
as the Chair or Vice-Chair, political groups have an ex-ante control of decisions 
issued by parliamentary committees. However, they have less ex-post control in 
respect to the committee decision. Due to a high degree of specialisation needed for 
European legislation and an increasingly significant tendency of MEPs to assimilate 
policy preferences of their colleagues assigned to the responsible committee with their 
own,  the  political  groups’  lack  of  disciplining  measures  has  created  an  opportunity  for  
committees to take centre stage in the legislative process. A clear illustration of this 
influence is the similarity of voting results between committees and EP plenary; the 
replication of committee debates in the plenary sessions, where the same speakers 
take the floor; as well as the limited number of amendments that are submitted to the 
text of a report once it has passed committee stage. All of these aspects advance an 
image of the EP decision-making system where parliamentary committees no longer 
serve just the role of informing the decision of the full plenary. Instead, the 
committees may structure and define it, while the plenary sessions are only left with 
the option of sanctioning it.  Based on a theory of committee precedence in the EP, 
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where parliamentary committees impact on the decision-making process of the 
Parliament, this thesis uses empirical evidence from part of EP7 – from 2010 to 2011 
– of parliamentary committee influence in order to verify its validity. The findings of 
this study contribute to a body of literature analysing the activity of parliamentary 
committees in the EP, which rely significantly on a political group centred 
perspective. The principal aim of this study is to provide evidence of the significance 
of interactions, negotiations and debates to the entire legislative process of the EP and 
highlight the difficulty of identifying one set of actors, mainly the political groups, as 
the main source of influence exerted over the decision-making process. The complex 
nature of the EP legislative process constitutes proof of the existence of multiple such 
sources that impact on the final EP position and amongst those, parliamentary 
committees have become pivotal. 
 
The next section of this introduction provides an overview of the institutional 
developments that this Parliament has witnessed, together with the increase in 
importance of its committees. It describes the place committees hold within this 
legislature and tracks the changes in the influence they exert over the decision-making 
process, coupled with the increase in the field of policy competences of the 
Parliament. This introductory chapter then goes on to present the main body of 
literature on this subject, highlighting some of the theoretical background on which 
this thesis relies, in order to frame the arguments of the study. This will help to 
establish the grounds of the hypothesis for the research, as well as those contained in 
each section. Finally, it details the plan of the thesis and the empirical aspects covered 
by each chapter, setting the foundations for the interpretation of the findings, which 
have resulted not only from descriptive data drawn from committees, but also from 
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extensive fieldwork observations carried out in EP7 from May 2010 to June 2011, 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This will provide an overview of the 
entire research contained in the thesis and how the findings contribute to the existing 
body of work on the EP, and more precisely, on its committees. 
 
 
1. 1 EP parliamentary committees and their influence 
 
Political institutions develop over long periods of time, shaped by the will and force 
of agents and circumstances. They evolve with the demands imposed on them by 
political agendas and policy requirements, depending on the will of State actors. 
Based in a supranational setting devised for economic reasons, the EP has, in recent 
times, provided a particular example within the framework of the study of legislatures 
in Europe and the entire world. It is dynamic, resourceful, constantly preoccupied 
with its image and is always trying to appear efficient in order to legitimise its 
growing powers and representativeness. This institution has turned out to be one of 
the most powerful legislative bodies in the world (Hix, 2005), but this was not evident 
at the time the Common Assembly was first created in 1953.  
 
What  was  once  referred  to  as  a  ‘democratic  window-dresser  and  talking  shop’  
(Rittberger, 2005: 73) in the 1950s and 1960s has evolved to such an extent that it has 
attempted to obtain from national governments concessions that would situate it on an 
equal footing with the Council, where the latter are represented. Some scholars refer 
to  this  evolution  of  the  EP  as  the  result  of  a  ‘democratic  reflex’  (Costa,  2001)  of  the  
people of Europe who felt they needed some form of representation in order to 
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balance the power of national governments. However, an outcome where this 
institution would be judged as one of the three main bodies in the institutional triangle 
(together with the Commission and the Council) was not envisaged when the six 
founding Member States set out to create the governing bodies of the European 
Communities.  
 
Today, the EP votes on all EU legislation. Its roles and functions are codified in the 
Treaties of the EU. It is an entirely supranational body, working in 23 official 
languages, amending and passing legislation that not only affects the policies the EU 
Member States, but also those of other continents. This is even more significant when 
all these developments are viewed in the light of the beginnings of European 
integration. Indeed, it is understandable why the evolution of the EP has caused a 
growing number of political scientists to analyse it in recent years. 
 
However, in spite of the legitimacy it has gained from being the only directly elected 
decision-making body at EU level, it is still viewed as a distant, expensive and 
intricate body, maintaining little contact with the electorate that it represents. This is 
in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  in  line  with  the  development  of  the  EP,  the  citizens’ 
perceptions of how this institution should respond and function have also changed, 
leaving them to hope for an EP that acts and interacts with its electorate just like a 
national parliament in their country. Such perceptions of the EP are hindered by the 
reality of the limitations that this institution has: being a supranational body, grouping 
members from 28 different Member States, with different political systems and 
without a single electoral system, with different parliamentary traditions and 
democratic ambitions.  
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One of the main reasons for its efficiency in debating and passing legislation, while 
contesting the separate positions of governments of Member States represented in the 
Council,  stems  from  Parliament’s  ability  to  organise  its  work  in  a  manner that allows 
it to quickly form a common position even on matters of a highly technical and 
controversial nature. This organisation relies on an important system of parliamentary 
committees, which has grown in strength at the same time as the Parliament has 
obtained more powers. Given the particularity of the EP as already presented, the 
current research focuses on the functioning of this institution, on the internal activities 
that take place and that form the decision-making process of this body. More 
precisely, it analyses the structure set at the centre of this legislature: the committee 
system and its functioning, the processes and rules that govern it, as well as the 
interactions that make up an intricate decision-making web. 
 
As scholars have already recognised, parliamentary committees in the European 
Parliament  are  the  ‘legislative  backbone’  of  this  institution  (Neuhold,  2001)  and  the  
core functioning mechanism. They have helped transform the EP from an assembly to 
a co-legislator. Like committees in some powerful national legislatures (such as the 
German Bundestag) the EP committees amend the proposed legislation forwarded by 
the Commission and provide a source of expert knowledge of European policies. 
They could thus be considered as serving an informational purpose (Krehbiel, 1991) 
to the entire Parliament. What is more, the committees are instrumental in the entire 
decision-making process. Interviews conducted for this thesis show that MEPs 
(Appendix: List of interviews) see them as a stage for the most important part of their 
work. Other political institutions, most notably the Commission and the Council, 
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follow their work closely and send delegates to all committee sessions who then 
report on the proceedings. Most importantly, these committees pass all legislation 
relating to the single market, creating the regulatory system for the EU economy, the 
largest in the world that implicitly affects the entire world economy.  
 
In EP7 (2009-2014) there were 20 committees (plus two sub-committees and one 
special committee) which cover all policy areas of the EU. According to Corbett, 
Jacobs  and  Shackleton  (2011:  144)  they  have  been  ‘a  central  part  of  Parliament’s  
work  from  its  inception’  since  what  was  then  known  as  the  Common  Assembly  of  the  
Coal and Steal  Community  (CA)  ‘had  already  set  up  seven  committees  by  1953’.  
They  were  modelled  after  the  US  Congress  committees’  example,  which  explains,  to  
an extent, the similarities that exist between them. However, they also hold 
organisational characteristics from other legislatures in Europe, such as Germany or 
Switzerland, especially when it comes to their strength, their number of members and 
high degree of specialisation.  
 
From the first EP elections, the parliamentary committees (16 at the time) - covered 
policy areas where the EU had competencies, but not necessarily where the 
Parliament had significant influence in the legislative process. This was and still is the 
case, to some extent, with the Foreign Affairs Committee or the Development 
Committee. Some committees have always held a certain level of prestige amongst 
MEPs, the former committee being an example, while others, like the Budgets 
Committee, were considered more important because of the extensive powers that the 
EP holds over the EU budget (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 145; c.f. 
Benedetto and Hoyland, 2007). So far, committees have dealt with: legislative 
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proposals coming from the Commission; recommendations to the Council; resolutions 
that were later on voted in the full plenary of the EP; and increasingly, in recent years, 
they have had to deal with own-initiative reports, where the Parliament had the 
initiative of issuing an opinion on a specific topic, sometimes following a 
communication from the Commission, in an effort to signal its position to the other 
institutions, but also to put forward an issue that would require additional 
consideration from them. Moreover, committees work on opinions for lead 
committees – the main responsible for the policy that a proposal might belong to – in 
situations where the legislative act might touch on a number of aspects relating to 
different policies. These opinions may be drafted in respect to all series of acts, not 
just legislative, be it on initiative reports of the EP, recommendations, or all other acts 
that are not covered by the main legislative procedure, where the Parliament holds the 
most of its power: the ordinary legislative procedure in which the EP, alongside the 
Council, is the co-legislator. 
 
Since 1979, MEPs have received assignments in committees from their political 
groups according to the principle of proportionality of political group size. Their 
interests and those of their constituents, as well as specialisation and the level of 
expertise also play a part in this, but such assessments are more often carried out at 
the national delegations level, where the number of committee seats received can be 
negotiated inside each political group. Over time, a certain level of cohesion may 
appear  amongst  members,  an  ‘esprit  de  corps’  (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 
145) where MEPs share a common interest in gaining more prominence for their 
committee or resist being integrated in a larger one. This aspect is very well illustrated 
by Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (2011) who give the example of the Fisheries 
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Committee, which strongly resisted in 1999 the initiative of being reintegrated in the 
Agriculture and Rural Development Committee. And it is not only such instances that 
stand  to  prove  the  committees’  cohesive  nature  and  drive  to  obtain influential 
legislative assignments, but also the rather common instances where they come to 
fight over the quality of being the lead committee on a proposal debated in the EP. 
This is what British MEP Sharon Bowles, Chair of the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee, was referring to in an interview given to the EU Observer as 
constituting  ‘Committee  Wars’1. Indeed, over the past years, since 2004, the cross-
sectoral  nature  of  many  of  the  Commission’s  proposals  which  covered  several  policy  
areas, has rendered these confrontations more common. They are usually dealt with at 
the highest level of the EP organisational structure – the Conference of Presidents – 
who, after hearing from all the committee Chairs involved, decides which 
parliamentary committee shall be assigned the main task of leading the work on the 
report and which will be the ones delivering opinions on that same text. It is mostly 
amongst committees that are labelled highly legislative (those dealing more with 
legislation in policy areas in which the EU has extended competences), that such 
conflicts may occur, rather than amongst non-legislative ones, which receive a smaller 
number of these due to the policy they cover and the limited competencies that the EU 
holds in that field.  
 
EP committees have certainly grown in confidence and in their importance to the 
decision-making  process  alongside  the  Parliament’s  growth  in  powers.  This  is  
indicated by the great interest that they receive from the MEPs themselves and from 
the manner in which these view their work here. After the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, where                                                         
1 EU  Observer  Interview  ‘A  day  in  the  life  of  Sharon  Bowles’,  19  March 2012. Source: 
euobserver.com  
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the  EP’s  influence  in  the  legislative  procedure  has  again  been  increased,  the  
committees have had to consider even more legislative proposals. Therefore, this 
thesis analyses committees and their activity over the first two and a half year period 
of EP7, namely since 2009 until 2011, in an effort to establish if their decisions take 
precedence over the plenary sessions and if they shape the positions taken by the EP, 
more than the political groups do. This is not to say that political groups in the 
Parliament are secondary, but that the level of specialisation and the informational 
advantage obtained by the committees, puts them in a privileged position to influence 
the final decision of the Parliament very early in the legislative process. This 
institutional higher ground establishes them as key actors in the decision-making 
process, a position many political scientists have judged as being reserved to the 
political groups and not to parliamentary committees. 
 
The powers of the EP have grown rapidly under the influence of the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and more recently the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009), and so have the competencies and the influence of its committees. 
Under such circumstances it has become more important to establish how far the 
parliamentary committees impact on the final position of the EP and through which 
processes and mechanisms they manage to do so. Influence is thus understood as the 
committees’  ability  to  drive  a  decision  that  they  have  reached,  forward  until  its  
adoption in the plenary. 
 
A great part of the body of the literature on the subject has focused on the capabilities 
of committees to provide specialised knowledge to the full plenary of the EP before 
the final vote on a report. They have been analysed from a partisan perspective, 
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examining bodies formed of MEPs answering to the requirements set out by the 
political groups. Their capacity to represent the views of the entire House has also 
been tested in order to establish whether or not the high degree of specialisation might 
lead to the formation of committees of outliers rather than committees where the 
views held by the main political groups manifest themselves equally. However, their 
place within the institutional framework and the influence they exert can be explored 
further. 
  
Therefore, this thesis presents a more in depth analysis of the activity in the EP 
committees. At the same time it refutes the idea that committees only serve an 
informational role for the institution and it argues that alongside the political groups 
they impact on the decision-making in the Parliament, acknowledging that groups 
exercise little ex-post control on committees after the assignments have been decided. 
It demonstrates that parliamentary committees influence the decisions of the plenary, 
and  thus  the  EP’s  final  opinion,  through  an  institutionalised  series  of  interactions,  
negotiations and debates that take place amongst the main actors in committees and 
their political groups. The main argument of the study maintains that the EP, in an 
effort to increase its legitimacy through an increased legislative output, has had to rely 
on a strong system of committees. As a result, contestation in the EP has been 
contained and expressed in meetings and closed circles, an unwanted effect for the 
only elected body in the EU. Moreover, by examining the work of rapporteurs, the 
number of amendments made by MEPs on a report and the debates in the political 
groups linked to committee work, it will be demonstrated that the result of the final 
votes in the plenary can be influenced early in committee stage and that it is here that 
divisions are expressed and then resolved, and not in the full plenary session with all 
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MEPs. The principle that provides part of the explanation to such behaviour is the 
perceived preference coherence (Ringe, 2010), which understands this process as 
relying on the belief of MEPs that they share similar preferences with the colleagues 
who are members of the responsible committees. This illustrates, to an extent, how it 
can be possible for a committee decision, taken by a small number of members, to be 
later on supported by all MEPs in the plenary in spite of the weak political groups that 
have few possibilities at their disposal to discipline their members.   
 
Nonetheless, this particular principle only offers a partial image of the legislative 
process of the EP. I argue that, before reaching the point where MEPs perceive their 
committee members’  preferences  to  be  similar  to  theirs,  they  go  through  a  series  of  
interactions in group meetings and debates, where they internalise committee 
agreements. I test this aspect with the help of data issued from extensive fieldwork 
observation of committee meetings and preparatory meetings related to them, carried 
over a period of one year in the EP, which are analysed through process-tracing; as 
well as with data that are gathered from results of votes and amendment numbers 
from 545 reports in the first half of the parliamentary term of 2009. These are all 
supported by semi-structured interviews with MEPs and their staff, as well as political 
group staff and EP Secretariat staff, carried out over a period spanning from 2010 to 
2012. Concerning the quantitative data, I verify and correlate the proportions of yes 
votes between results of votes in committee and plenary, and perform correlations 
between amendments numbers in committee and plenary. These are then 
contextualised with the help of the qualitative information from the observations. In 
this way, this study portrays a more complex, but also more comprehensive image of 
EP committee activity compared to what has been researched up until now.  
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1. 2 Plan of the thesis 
 
The next six chapters of the thesis will be presented below. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the body of literature on parliamentary committees. 
It first presents the existing theories from the American literature on the purpose of 
committees inside a legislature, which take two different approaches, identifying 
committees as serving a distributional role, where members seek assignments in order 
to address their constituency interests and ensure their re-election; or as serving an 
informational role, which is limited to providing a specialised level of knowledge to 
the House. The chapter goes on to analyse the body of work on the EP committees 
that relies on the theories issued from the abovementioned American literature. It 
opposes the approach taken by such studies and highlights the particularities the EP 
holds as a legislature that differentiate it from the US Congress. All of this stresses the 
importance of a more integrated study of the EP committees that uses an adapted 
framework of the theoretical approach from the US literature, employing it in a 
manner that is conscious of the structural differences that exist between the two 
models. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the main argument of the study, which maintains that 
parliamentary committees impact considerably on the final position of the EP, even 
more than political groups at times. It is in committees that the decision is reached 
and then transferred to the plenary sessions of the full chamber where it is adopted. 
Three hypotheses are used in order to test the argument of the study and these 
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investigate whether rapporteurs have a significant role to play in the transferral of a 
committee decision to plenary; whether the number of amendments in committee is 
indicative of a consensus, signalling the adoption of committee decisions in plenary 
without additional amendments; and whether committee members form the linkage 
mechanism that ensures a committee decision is accepted and internalised by the 
political groups and therefore voted in the full chamber. Based on fieldwork 
observations, vote results and amendment numbers I test the validity of the main 
argument and the hypotheses and analyse a sample of committee reports in order to 
identify the aspects that would be central to a validation of this thesis throughout the 
next chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 presents in detail the activity of EP parliamentary committees and identifies 
the key actors that structure and guide it. Based on the main argument of this thesis, 
which places committees at the centre of the EP, defining and influencing its 
decisions to a greater extent than political groups can, chapter 4 investigates how a 
committee decision is constructed and then transferred to the plenary stage, where it is 
adopted by the EP. It isolates the actors and interactions that lead to the transferral of 
the defined decision from committee to plenary. These are the rapporteurs (MEPs 
responsible for the preparation of the report and passing it through Parliament), group 
coordinators (political group appointed members that streamline the group  members’  
activity in committee and act as whip) and committee members and the negotiations, 
meetings and debates associated with a report. The existing studies on the subject 
have so far focused on the support that EP committees provide for the plenary, 
considering them as a source of specialised knowledge, serving an informational role, 
where  members’  decisions  are  finally  dictated  by  political  groups’  preferences.  The  
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findings show a strong correlation between the voting results of committees in the EP 
and the plenary and indicate that rapporteurs are instrumental in achieving this 
outcome and the final transferral and adoption of a committee position in the plenary.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates the amendments that are introduced, discussed and then voted 
in the committee and plenary stages of the EP. It makes an observation and an 
assessment of the existing correlations between their initial number and the result of 
votes in the House on a particular report. It analyses what the number of these 
amendments can reveal about the legislative process in the EP and looks to identify 
the  stage  at  which  the  decision  is  in  fact  taken.  The  understanding  of  the  EP’s  internal  
structure has, until recently, caused many scholars to simply look at the amendments 
introduced by MEPs in plenary without considering the set up of the amendments 
system in committees. Therefore, as part of the three-chapter section investigating the 
different factors that are part of the daily committee activity – the rapporteurs, the 
amendments and the group negotiations – chapter 5 analyses the amendments system 
in an effort to establish if the final result of votes follows the initial pattern set out in 
the pre-legislative stage. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the activity and organisation of political groups that is related to 
committee workload. It looks at interactions inside the EP political groups during the 
monthly group meetings in order to reveal existing patterns of influence, inside the 
group, in the negotiations on legislative acts prior to the vote in plenary. The 
underlying argument is that committees constitute the main EP arena where decisions 
are reached. These are then replicated in the plenary vote through group mechanisms 
of voting alignment. Information gathered from the group meetings and field 
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observations indicate a pattern of exchanges and alignment of views inside the group 
with committee decisions, based on the input from the rapporteurs and group 
coordinators from each of the specific committees. Findings show that the influence 
exerted by the political groups is not externalised but rather internalised through 
group meetings and based on a position previously established and delineated by the 
members from the committee. 
 
Chapter 7 first summarises the findings from chapter 4, 5 and 6 and looks to 
committees and political groups as actors influencing the legislative process, not 
competing  but  complimenting  each  other’s  position.  It  analyses  the  significance  of  the  
findings that committees have become stronger in the first half of EP7. The 
theoretical implications of this study shed more light on the internal decision-making 
processes in the institution, an institution which has built a strong reputation of a 
highly technical policy-making actor. As a result, the EP has developed a powerful, 
specialised and influential committee system. 
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Chapter 2 
The European Parliament and its Committee System - Existing 
Research and Theoretical Models 
 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the literature this study is based on. It reviews existing studies 
on the EP and its committee system and the theoretical models that have been used to 
assess it. In the context of the thesis, chapter 2 aims to set the foundations for the 
theoretical, conceptual and methodological analysis comprised in chapter 3 and in the 
empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6. While each chapter relies on its specific literature, they 
are all grounded on the studies reviewed in this chapter. The first part of the chapter 
will cover the general literature on the EP and MEPs, the different angles that were 
used to analyse this organisation over the years; it will then look into the 
representation issues and present the literature on the US Congress. Finally, it will 
look at how the comparison with the US Congress has been used for the EP. 
 
In terms of legislative studies there has been a lot of interest in the creation and 
evolution of the EP in the European sphere. This has also been complimented by a 
historical approach to the development of this institution in comparison to the other 
institutional actors and by a documentation of its interactions within the decision-
making process. The EP has gained centre stage in terms of research interests in 
European studies and political science in general. One of the main reasons for this has 
been the fact that this is one of the EU institutions that has managed to increase its 
powers overtly and systematically in its attempt to grasp the limelight of the EU 
decision-making process. Ever since the first elections in 1979, this institution has 
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used the legitimacy given by the representation of the interests of all EU citizens as 
the only elected EU body in order to claim more powers and exert more influence 
upon the other two entities in the institutional triangle: the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers. 
 
The EP started off as a Common Assembly, which was meant to provide a counter 
balance to the creation of the High Authority. Since the beginning, the national 
governments of the founding Member States were preoccupied with the level of 
accountability of this newly created High Authority and were looking to avoid an 
instance where all aspects related to coal and steel would be ruled by a centralised 
number of experts (Rittberger, 2003). With the extension of policy areas that were 
decided at European level came the empowerment of the Parliament and along with 
the first European elections came the realisation of its members that this institution 
had the capacity to develop an increased amount of leverage upon the other 
institutions due, in particular, to the representation function that it was supposed to 
exert, unlike other European entities. This meant that in the years following the first 
elections of 1979, the EP tried, at great length, to use the powers that it had been 
awarded, most times even going against the expectations Member States had in mind 
for it when its institutional design and competencies were decided.  
 
From a functional point of view, the EP’s evolution can be explained by the will of 
any new institutional design to increase its potential and its capacities, especially in an 
environment where there was much talk about the lack of accountability of these 
European centralised institutions and their increased amount of power. That is why, in 
several instances, the EP has interpreted the attributions it had received in a broader 
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manner than expected, as it was, for example, in the instance of the decision on the 
members of the European Commission when an aspect, which only concerned an 
approval of the candidates chosen by the Member States, turned into an affair of 
accepting or revoking candidates based on the right the Parliament had gained to veto 
the Commission as a whole. This meant not only that Parliament could make a 
decision as to what should be the composition of the Commission, but also that during 
negotiations prior to the designation of the European Commission members, it could 
give strong signals as to which possible candidates are more likely to be accepted than 
others. An instance where this took place was during the nomination of the Barroso 
Commission where minutes before the announcement, the President had to withdraw 
the proposed set of Commissioners because the Italian candidate held what was 
thought of as too strong right-wing views on aspects relating to his designated policy. 
The Civil Liberties Committee in the EP, first rejected the appointment of Rocco 
Buttiglione with 27 votes to 26, due to the indignation that his views on single 
mothers and on homosexuality caused amongst MEPs. Buttiglione expressed his 
belief that  homosexuality  was  a  “sin”,  one  of  the  aspects  that  caused  anger  among  the  
MEPs, especially the Socialists in the Parliament, and prompted them to stress his 
unsuitability for a portfolio of Justice Commissioner and for any other portfolio 
within the Commission as a whole for that matter. On the morning of the vote in 
Parliament, Barroso, realising that the proposed set of Commissioners was in danger 
of being voted off in block, requested that the EP postpone its vote and the following 
day Buttiglione withdrew his candidacy. The Buttiglione affair is an illustration of the 
influence the EP has developed over the other institutions in recent years, as well as 
of the manner in which it has chosen to make use of its powers. In order to better 
understand  this  evolution,  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  will  present  Parliament’s  
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developments since the time of the Common Assembly and the historical aspects 
linked to the creation and construction of what later became known as the EP. Section 
2 will introduce the existing research on the EP, namely that on MEPs and political 
groups, while section 3 will present the foundations of the EP committee system. 
Subsequently, section 4 introduces the US literature on parliamentary committees, 
which is then followed in section 5 by an analysis of the existing studies on EP 
committees. Finally, section 6 investigates the applicability of the US model of 
committee analysis and the caveats this might pose for the study of the EP. 
 
 
2. 1 The EP – ‘History  in  the  making’ 
 
This section summarises some of the main developments in the EP evolution as 
presented in the literature.  
   
In the beginning of the European integration, when the founding Member States were 
convinced that a mutual endeavour, even if resulting in a certain loss of sovereignty, 
would benefit them more than a simple cooperation at governmental level, there was 
also talk of a form of institutional design that would be able to counterbalance the 
concentration of powers in the hands of a bureaucratic elite. Moreover, the times had 
shown that a deliberative institutional structure could bring along an important 
number of advantages that would contribute to the achievement of a supranational 
entity.  
This is how the Common Assembly came into being, mainly based on what some 
would qualify as being a democratic reflex of the Europeans (Costa, 2001), a fact that 
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can be better described in the statement made by Jean Monnet (quoted by Rittberger, 
2005:1), that: 
 
‘In a world where government authority is derived from representative parliamentary 
assemblies, Europe cannot be built  without  such  an  assembly.’  
 
However, it would seem that even from the beginning there were very different views 
as to how this Assembly should look and which should be the powers that it should 
hold (Rittberger, 2003). In its first instance, the Common Assembly was formed of 
designated representatives from the national parliaments of the Member States and its 
powers  were  limited  to  ‘only  few  negative  powers,  such  as  the  right  to  censure  the  
High Authority of the ECSC, and no positive powers, such as to actively influence the 
policy-making  process’  (Rittberger,  2005:  73).  Rittberger  emphasises  that  the  
Common Assembly’s  ‘main  function  was  that  of  scrutinising,  controlling  and,  if  
deemed necessary, censuring a supranational institution, the High Authority, 
forerunner  of  the  Commission’  and  indeed  it  is  the  only  purpose  for  which  it  came  
into being. Rittberger (2005: 74) argues that Member States were eager to ensure that 
this new supranational body of the High Authority was applied some level of scrutiny. 
In time, with the advance of European integration, Parliament evolved and managed 
to secure a more important role, up until the moment where it became a directly 
elected Parliament of the European citizens. From that point onwards, the Parliament 
made use of the legitimacy offered by its representation of EU citizens, in contrast 
with the other institutions, claimed additional powers and played a more important 
part in the decision-making process. At the same time, its inherent nature of an 
institution which can hold open debates on matters of public European concern that 
have not yet been resolved, even if this might be on issues where it does not have 
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extended competencies, has allowed it to ask for more powers. While doing so, it has 
avoided any possible critiques of inefficiency by shifting the blame towards other 
institutions, such as the Commission or the Council. To a certain extent, this has 
constituted an efficient way of maintaining an ever-stronger position within the 
European project and in the eyes of the European public.  
 
Nonetheless, the growing lack of interest the European public opinion has shown over 
the past years towards the European institutions, including the EP, cannot be 
neglected. This is clearly illustrated by the low level of support that citizens show 
towards the EU2, by the resounding rejections of the EU Constitution in 2005 in 
France and the Netherlands and then of the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland, as well as by 
the low-level of turnout in the European elections and the second-order character that 
these have constantly had. Reif and Schmitt (1980) explain that the first European 
elections, as a consequence of their organisation and reliance on national parties, 
ended up being fought on national issues rather than European ones and appeared to 
be a revalidation of national elections, rather than elections in their own right. Schmitt 
(2005) confirms in a more recent study of the June 2004 European elections that these 
remain second-order and display the same patterns as they did in 1979, the only 
differences being recorded in the New Member States.  
 
                                                        
2 In his book What’s  Wrong  With  the  European  Union  and  How  to  Fix  It, Hix (2008) makes the point 
of an extremely limited level of support awarded by the European citizens to the EU, by tracing the 
answers  contained  in  the  Eurobarometer  polls  from  the  1970s  to  the  question:  ‘Generally  speaking,  do  
you  think  that  your  country’s  membership of the EU is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, 
don’t  know’.  He  finds  that  if  the  percentage  of  support  started  off  at  around 60 % in the 1970s, 
registering a growth in the 1980s and another decline in the mid 1990s, since then it has been fairly 
low, around 50 %. This seems to continue to be confirmed by the August 2012 Eurobarometer, which 
registers as an answer to the abovementioned question a number of 50 % of the respondents judging 
the membership of their country to the EU as a good thing, while 31 % see it as neither good nor bad. 
 
 33 
Still, the EP remains one of the great points of interest in the field of European 
political science as well as for the lobbying community and industry associations 
active in Brussels. This is due to the increased legislative powers that this institution 
has gained through the extension of the former co-decision procedure, the now 
ordinary legislative procedure, and the high level of activity carried out within its 
parliamentary committees as a result of that. The addition in the number of fields that 
fall under EU competence, also as a result of the so-called spill-over effect, the 
continuous developments in the internal market and legal harmonisation efforts can 
account for the interest shown towards this institution and its members. Therefore, the 
next section will analyse the literature on the subject of the EP and its Members, in 
order to identify the perspectives and different approaches used to investigate this 
institution. 
 
 
2. 2 Existing research on the EP 
 
Considered one of the important institutions of the EU, from a legislative perspective 
and that of representation of EU citizens, the EP has been analysed from most 
political science aspects and even anthropologically (Abélès, 1992). Research has 
been carried out in regards to its legislative importance (Bowler and Farrell, 1995), its 
historical empowerment (Rittberger, 2005), its internal functioning (Costa, 2001; 
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011), its structure and organisation of its activity 
(Burns, 2005, 2010; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009), its legislative procedures (Burns 
and Carter, 2010; Jensen and Winzen, 2011; Judge and Earnshaw, 2011) the work of 
its members and the perceptions that they hold on the importance of their role within 
 34 
this structure (Scully, 2005; Hix et al., 2007). Having said this, there is an important 
amount of inside knowledge on how this institution functions internally, how it 
aggregates its views and its position towards other actors in the European sphere, and 
this knowledge can be built on in order to reveal a clearer picture of the EP. 
Therefore, in relation to the existing studies, the purpose of this research is to identify 
the overall interactions at work inside the institution, amongst its members and in 
particular amongst parliamentary committee actors. Apart from data analysis of vote 
results and amendment numbers, the approach consists of mapping the decision-
making process and establishing the occurrence of existing interactions first amongst 
its members, then between members and national parties and then EP political groups, 
as well as between national party delegations and political groups. I do this by 
focusing on the parliamentary committee activity.  
 
Following the increased legislative powers of the EP, all EU legislation has had to be 
established by the Council and the Parliament, and therefore in the parliamentary 
committees. The latter have accumulated an extended level of importance in the EP 
framework and are at the core of the decision-making output of this institution. As a 
result, this research seeks to analyse the influence of committees on the decision-
making process in the Parliament and, in the process of doing so, to reveal the type 
and level of interactions that take place in committees amongst MEPs and their 
domestic parties, represented by their national delegation, as well as between them 
and the EP political groups. In order to pin down these interactions and exchanges 
that are present in the decision-making process, the next subsection will identify what 
is already known about the actors active in this institution - the MEPs - their daily 
work and the existing literature in the field.  
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2. 2.1 MEPs – Individual or coerced units of action within the EP
Views on the MEPs and their influence in the decision-making process of the EU 
have been subject to different approaches. Hix and Lord are amongst the researchers 
who have  shifted  the  focus  from  an  understanding  of  MEPs’  function  as  nothing  more  
than representatives in a state of neglect and marginalisation from their national 
parties, to a status where they and their actions at European level became important 
(Hix and Lord, 1997: 60). Consequently, they have been regarded as an important tool 
capable of ensuring representation at European level and at the same time offering an 
insight to their domestic parties into the policy that is under way at supranational 
level. The decisions these representatives take at European level have always been 
presented as influenced by two different actors: either by the national parties that they 
represent, or by the EP political groups that they join once in Parliament. These two 
Principals, take steps to ensure that the agent – the Member of the EP – will act in
line with their instructions with a view to reaching the desired outcome. Most of the 
literature on this subject accepts that there is a clear line of influence from the side of 
the national parties and that might, in many situations, if in conflict with the EP 
political group’s opinion, overcome any obstacle (Hix 2005: 180). More precisely, the 
commonly accepted idea in the existing literature is that MEPs receive their 
 I refer here to the “Principal-Agent”  theory also used by Scully (2001) when discussing MEPs and 
national parties, and which conceptualizes the relationship between political parties and their 
representatives at EU level: Principal is  the  ‘individual or the entity that  delegates  the  power  to  others’, 
in this case being the Agent. The main part of these  theories  is  focused  on  the  ‘way in which these 
structures are established so that the Principal can ensure that the Agent will fulfil the requests of the 
Principal’  (Peters,  1999;;  Scully,  2001). Whenever these terms are cited in this chapter, they will be 
outlined in italics.  
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instructions from their national parties, especially when issues considered to have an 
immediate impact at domestic level are under discussion. A strong argument to 
support this view is that national parties can use a certain number of resources to 
ensure that their representatives follow the instructions without insomuch as having to 
monitor them or their activity. One of the main resources they hold is the power over 
their re-election, since they are the ones controlling the re-election procedure, or at 
least guaranteeing their presence on the party list. Hix (2005: 181) stresses this aspect 
in stating that: 
 
‘All  politicians  at  the  domestic  and the European level are party politicians who owe 
their current positions and future careers to the electoral success and policy positions 
of  ‘their’  parties.’   
 
In this manner they are sure to follow the line of decision-making that is desired by 
their national parties without having their activity monitored. Moreover, it has also 
been suggested that, as part of their selection process of candidates for European 
elections, parties are more inclined to follow a pattern where candidates who are more 
likely to be loyal to the party line are put forward (Scully, 2001). This is in 
accordance with an approach placing EP groups, and national parties in general, at the 
centre of decision-making, dictating the positions that their members take, 
maintaining a strong hold on their political decisions inside the institution and 
disciplining them whenever their preferences might stray from the desired agenda. 
This study questions this image of the legislative process in the EP and, without 
denying the important role played by political groups, argues that committees have 
become more influential within the institution, sometimes even more than political 
groups, but never without their tacit acceptance. This is explained by the legislative 
burden the EP is faced with and by its constant preoccupation with gaining legitimacy 
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through an increased legislative output. The result is a strong committee system 
running the Parliament. 
 
Regarding  parties’  changing  attitude  towards  MEPs, with time, this has developed and 
national parties have turned their attention to what decisions their MEPs take and the 
votes they cast. Both domestic parties, as well as EP political groups have manifested 
this type of interest. A situation, which highlights this particular change, is the 
nomination of Jacques Santer as President of the European Commission. In this 
respect, after studying the data and the information gathered during the parliamentary 
sessions, Hix and Lord (1996, 1997) conclude that given the importance of the 
decision and of the situation, the vote of the euro parliamentarians had been under the 
influence of the suggestions and the preferences of national parties. Moreover, these 
‘suggestions’  had  been  made  to  the  detriment  of  the  line  of  the  EP political groups, 
proving that MEPs had been more inclined to follow the instructions they had 
received from their domestic parties, rather than abide by the position taken by the 
groups they were part of in the EP. The reason for such a development in the 
decision-making process is that national parties  hold  the  ‘monopoly  of  control’  
through the re-election and the nomination powers that they have over MEPs (Hix and 
Lord, 1996).  
 
Some contentious issues arise from supporting the argument that the end result of the 
decision-making in the only elected institution of the EU is the result of an influence 
stemming from domestic parties. One of them would be that the entire legislative 
process carried out at supranational level becomes nothing more than a different 
setting for the national parties to exercise their power. One can even ask if this is not 
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another way of having national politics carried out through other means and channels 
(Carrubba and Gabel, 1998: 15). If this were the case, MEPs would be reduced to 
nothing more than national actors acting at a supranational level in view of defending 
national interests. Therefore, one argument resulting from these statements would be 
that the more influence is given to the EP in the decision-making process in the EU, 
the more interest national parties in the Member States will then take in them (Scully, 
1999). There are already examples that exist among parties, such as the British 
Labour Party that has established a system allowing for a close monitoring of the 
voting and the decisions that are taken by their representatives in the EP and which 
involves the nomination of a Secretary for the EP for each department, when the party 
is in government (Spiers, 1998). Another example can be that of Denmark that has 
ensured all decisions of main importance taken at EU level by its representatives are 
first analysed and debated at national level by the Folketing, the Danish Parliament. 
 
Nonetheless, Tapio Raunio (2000) argues that even if the interactions between the two 
sides have become more frequent, the neglect and marginalisation that were present in 
the beginning continue to exist. Only a small part of the parties that he questioned 
during the course of his study admitted to giving out instructions to their EP 
representatives (8.5%) – without actually using other means for control. Moreover, he 
states that: 
 
‘National  parties  pay  attention  to  the  EP  mainly  when  nationally  important  matters  
enter the legislative arena, however even on such issues it is still better to speak of 
consultation rather  than  control.’(Raunio,  2000:  221) 
 
Along the same lines Hix and Lord argue that: 
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‘There  have  been  some  notable  attempts  by  the  domestic  parties  to  instruct  their  
national delegations on how they should vote. This would seem to be fairly 
widespread on questions  of  fundamental  political  importance  […]  However,  there  
would seem to be only two major instances of domestic parties attempting to 
‘mandate’  MEPs  on  a  more  regular  basis:  the  French  Socialists in the early ’80s and 
the British Labour Party since 1984.’  (Hix and Lord, 1997: 89) 
 
Consequently, part of the existing literature on MEPs indicates that an analysis of 
interactions and parliamentary activity of MEPs in committee would only portray the 
results  of  actions  taken  according  to  ‘suggestions’  given by national parties when 
there are prevailing national interests and, when there would be issues viewed as less 
important to the latter, MEPs would then vote according to the indications of the EP 
political group or according to their own personal beliefs and political orientations.  
 
However, such views can ultimately simplify the argument too much, thus failing to 
grasp the real nature of the debate and the interactions that take part inside the EP. 
 
A more comprehensive account and analysis of the way MEPs, national parties and 
EP political groups interact in the EP have been provided by Hix, Noury and Roland 
(2007). When analysing the level of cohesiveness that exists inside the Parliament, 
they argue that the instruments that the political groups have at their disposal in order 
to  discipline  the  MEPs  ‘are  relatively  weak  in  terms  of  their  disciplining  power’  (Hix,  
Noury and Roland, 2007: 5). That is certainly true considering that national parties are 
the ones that can ensure re-election for their representatives, as well as prominent 
ministerial portfolios for their members to secure their careers. Except for instances 
where MEPs are driven by an ambition to secure a career at European level as high-
profile rapporteurs (MEPs in charge of drafting a report and ensuring its adoption in 
committee and plenary), or committee chairmen and vice-chairmen, or by personal 
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beliefs in regards to a particular policy, it is understandable why domestic parties 
stand to have a better chance at disciplining their members with the use of the 
resources they have available. Moreover, Hix et al. point out that: 
 
‘…  to  the  extent  that  it  is  national  parties  that  develop  common  positions  in  their  
European parties, it is national parties that play a key role in enforcing European party 
discipline. Individual MEPs nearly always vote with their national party delegation, 
independently of their own preferences. If one adds this to the fact that it is rare that a 
national party votes against its European party, one understands that national parties 
play  a  key  role  in  determining  the  cohesion  of  the  European  parties.’  (Hix,  Noury  and  
Roland, 2007: 6) 
 
There are, however, other aspects to consider apart from the voting instructions issued 
to MEPs by either one of the two Principals. Most data collected by researchers 
(Carrubba and Gabel, 1998; Hix et al, 2007) relies on the use of the roll-call votes 
cast in the EP ever since the first elections took place in 1979 and from it can be 
concluded that MEPs will vote according to the indications of their national 
delegations when the views of the latter are in conflict with the EP group line. Such 
conclusions are relevant in pinpointing the balance of power among the three actors 
concerned: MEPs, national delegations and EP political groups. But, instances such as 
these are less frequent when compared to the total amount of legislation and decisions 
on which votes are cast in the plenary sessions. Many questions remain to be defined 
as to what happens in all the other debates on legislation or future resolutions. The 
fact that there have been fewer instances where views held by national parties have 
been in conflict with those of EP groups points to a process of debate and bargaining 
that takes place within the institution between these three actors prior to the votes. 
One of the main points of this thesis is to illustrate that this process of debate takes 
place in the parliamentary committees.  
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2. 2.2 EP Activity and the Place of MEPs 
 
Moving onwards from the discussion on whether MEPs act on the instructions of their 
principals, existing studies have also looked at the roles MEPs take up within the EP, 
the framework of the different legislative procedures and the impact exerted on the 
legislative process.  
 
Quite early on, studies have identified the important role played by MEPs as 
rapporteurs in shaping the outcome of a legislative proposal (Kaeding, 2004; 
Benedetto, 2005; Høyland, 2006; Lindberg, 2008a; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; 
Costello and Thomson, 2010; 2011), concluding that this factor explains not only the 
different positions the EP might take towards the Council as a co-legislator, but also 
the outcome of the negotiations. Moreover, the procedure under which the EP decides 
on a report is another significant factor deciding its track through the institution. 
Reports under the ordinary legislative procedure, former co-decision, offer valuable 
opportunities for the EP, and MEPs implicitly, to leave their mark on a piece of EU 
legislation. The existing literature has looked extensively at case studies based on 
such reports (Kreppel, 1999, 2002b; Burns, 2005; Høyland, 2006; Jensen and Winzen, 
2011; Judge and Earnshaw, 2011) concluding that, in these instances, MEPs and 
political groups display an acute understanding of the role played by the EP and the 
impact that it can have on the decision-making process with the Council and the 
Commission.  At  the  same  time,  political  groups’  influence  in  the  EP  has  been  
investigated to establish their ability to impact the decision-making process 
(Lindberg, 2008a; Lindberg et al., 2008b), what the factors behind political group 
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membership in the institution are (Maurer et al., 2008), as well as the relation that 
MEPs have with their national parties and EP political groups (Rasmussen, 2008). 
The image resulting from this analysis is a complex one described through 
interactions between MEPs, political groups and national parties, with each of these 
actors sharing, at different points in the legislative procedure and in the decision-
making process, a similar array of policy preferences, either perceived (Ringe, 2010) 
or real preferences. 
 
Niels Ringe finds support for the informational feature of the EP committees in the 
framework  of  a  model  based  on  the  concept  of  ‘perceived  preference  coherence’  
(2010: 6).  Summed  up,  this  concept  implies  that  the  ‘critical  mechanism  explaining  
the  policy  choice  of  MEPs’  is  an  exchange  ‘between  expert  and  nonexpert  legislators’  
(Ringe, 2010: 6). Ringe argues that:  
 
‘nonexpert  legislators  make  decisions  on  the  basis  of  perceived preference coherence: 
They adopt the positions of those expert colleagues with whom they believe to share 
general preferences regarding the expected consequences of a policy once it has been 
enacted  and  implemented.  […]  The  best  that  legislators  can do in the absence of full 
information about the policy preferences and positions of their expert colleagues, 
however, is to rely on those with whom they share a common set of preferences about 
the  most  desired  political  outcomes’  (Ringe,  2010:  6).   
 
In practice this means that, depending on the policy nature of the issue under debate, 
an MEP with an informational deficit in relation to the subject will, in most cases, 
refer to the expert opinion of the colleague that is a member in the responsible 
committee. But, again, there are additional factors to consider in relation to this 
concept, related to the result of debates taking place in committee on the given 
subject.  More  precisely,  in  the  process  of  identifying  which  of  the  members’  
preferences might correspond to individual preferences on the matter, an MEP, as 
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chapters 4 and 6 will show, receives information relating to how much consensus 
there was in the committee concerned, how much lobbying there was at the time, as 
well as on the consensus amongst party group members from the specific committee 
during the debate and the vote. Thus, in the process of deciding whether an expert 
colleague might share the same policy preference on the matter, before making a 
decision, an MEP will also have to consider the outcome of committee debates and 
votes on the issue. Such factors can vary in terms of importance and significance 
depending on the legislative or own-initiative act concerned. But, in instances where a 
committee decision was reached with a broad majority, where committee members 
were united in their views, MEPs have no reason to question the agreement. For 
example, the observations carried out in one of the committees, the Culture and 
Education Committee, have revealed that on an own-initiative report on Unlocking
the potential of cultural and creative industries, on the basis of a full majority vote in 
the pre-legislative stage and on the eve of the plenary vote, strong lobbying from the 
industry organisations led the shadow rapporteur of the European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group (ECR) to take the initiative of tabling plenary amendments. The 
ECR group policy advisor was in contact with the other groups' policy advisors to 
inform  them  of  his  shadow  rapporteur’s  wish  to  table  plenary  amendments  to this 
report, thus going against prior inter-group agreements. This attempt was later 
abandoned because the shadow rapporteurs from the other political groups accepted 
some minor modifications to the text, thereby avoiding any more amendments being 
tabled for the vote in the plenary session, but they also rejected many of the other last-
minute changes that the ECR wanted to put forward. Such cases provide evidence 
 According  to  Rule  48  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  ‘In  the  areas  where  the treaties give the European 
Parliament the right of initiative, its committees may draw up a report on a subject within its remit and 
present a motion for a resolution to Parliament. The committee must request authorisation from the 
Conference of Presidents before drawing up a report’. The numbering of the Rule referred to here is the 
one corresponding to EP7. 
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that, regardless of the perceived coherence of preferences one MEP might have 
towards a committee member, good coordination inside the committee, an established 
position inside the political group, as well as a consensus amongst the members from 
different political groups shadowing the report, can prevent possible disagreements 
from coming to light in the plenary session through amendments tabled at this last 
stage. This can also help avoid exposure in the session of the full chamber of any 
divergent views MEPs might have on the matter. So, in addition to considerations 
derived  from  Ringe’s  model,  I believe that MEPs also make decisions based on the 
outcome of debates in committee. Ringe does uncover a very good explanation for 
group cohesion in the EP through perceived coherence but, when voting in plenary or 
even discussing inside the group, MEPs also draw conclusions on the basis of 
committee results. Therefore, members receive input before the vote from two 
sources: first, their expert colleagues, committee members or rapporteurs, and second, 
the committee process itself. If the committee debate was mainly uncontroversial, an 
MEP will not have any doubts on having shared policy preferences with his or her 
group’s  committee  member.  However,  if  the  committee  vote  adopting  a  report  was  
not done by a large majority and if divisions expressed in committee were strong, then 
a member will factor them in before deciding how to vote in the plenary session. Put 
simply,  committee  results  impact  on  MEPs’  choices  and  political  group  ones  in  the  
plenary final vote. There are, of course, other factors that contribute to the manner in 
which a decision is reached, as in documented cases such as the Biotech Directive, 
where lobbying from interest groups clearly influenced the vote in the full chamber. 
But, as shown in chapter 4, there is a general pattern of replication of committee votes 
in the Parliament. 
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Therefore, such processes and interactions are impossible to overlook and have been 
acknowledged but they need to be analysed in more detail. They take place at the 
committee stage, during the political group meetings and in national delegations 
meetings and, except for committee debates, are difficult to document during the first 
discussions on the legislative proposals forwarded to the EP. Consequently, in order 
to better analyse the activity in the EP and make sense of the interactions at play 
within the decision-making process, this study will focus on committee activity and 
negotiations. 
 
So far, section 2 has introduced the literature on the EP and the actors inside this 
institution: the MEPs. It has revealed that there are interactions that take place 
between MEPs, EP groups and national parties during debates in the Parliament, and 
that such interactions are mostly present at committee level, where diverging views 
are expressed and integrated towards a common line. In order to better understand this 
process, section three of this chapter will present the committee system in the EU and 
its evolution. 
 
2. 3 The committee system in EU legislation 
 
Section 3 presents the beginnings and the evolution of EP committees, identifying 
some of the European integration advances that have lead to the creation of the 
committee system active today. 
Committees in the EP have been set up from its first stages when it was the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. They were set up to ensure the 
efficient functioning of a chamber that was formed of representatives chosen by the 
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national parliaments of Member States, who would meet just several times a year. In 
time, they have gained more power and their numbers have increased, especially after 
the first EP elections of 1979. From an historical perspective, it can be said that 
committees have gained more importance in the complete makeup of the institution 
over the years due to the increase in legislative powers. Once the EP was assigned 
legislative and budgetary powers and it had to debate on EU legislation, there was 
also scope for a more specialised information and work on issues presented to the 
Parliament. Over the time of several legislatures these committees have attracted 
interest from MEPs who now see them as an essential part of their activity and the 
main focus of their work (according to the 2010 MEP Survey Data from the European 
Parliament Research Group - EPRG, the choice of committees by MEPs was 
motivated mainly by their personal interests - 28% - and by those of their constituents 
- 18% - and 46% of those who answered the question on the role of MEPs, considered 
that their role was working on legislation). If in other national legislatures, from 
France or the UK, committees have limited, if no powers, and have not gained more 
prominence over the years, in the EP system of separation of powers and 
multinationalism, committees have become the centre of decision-making. 
 
The Single European Act, signed in 1986, entered into force on the 1st of July 1987 
and brought about the need for extensive legislation, rendering the activity in 
committees more intensive and specialised, given that the policy areas covered by the 
legislation were more numerous. At the same time, political groups became interested 
in obtaining a balanced representation in these committees and ensure that their 
presence at this stage in the decision-making process structures, a priori, the results of 
vote in the plenary sessions. Therefore, assignments in committees grew in 
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importance, as well as the high-profile functions attached to these, such as Chair or 
Vice-chairman, or even the rapporteurship (the quality of an MEP rapporteur, 
involving  the  preparation  and  negotiation  of  the  report  and  the  EP’s  position  on  a  
legislation) on key acts. 
Changes in the treaties, such as the introduction of the co-decision procedure with the 
Maastricht Treaty and its later simplification brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty, 
have led to what Maurer (2003: 236) refers  to  as  a  ‘structural  concentration of 
workload in only three of the 17-20 permanent committees: the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection; the Committee on Transport 
policy  and  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs.’ Thus, a differentiation has been
operated between what are known as legislative and non-legislative committees and 
that is the result of the fact that legislative committees are, as stressed before, 
confronted with more legislative acts that can affect the evolution of European 
integration. As a result of that, they are more lobbied and more present in the view of 
the public opinion. The above-mentioned differentiation is particularly important to 
MEPs, because an assignment to one of these committees can also offer them the 
opportunity to gain recognition by obtaining a number of rapporteurships on high-
profile cases. In such instances, the national party can see that its representative is 
active. Moreover, this information could also attract the interest of European and 
domestic media and guarantee a degree of notoriety for the MEP in question in his 
country and to his electorate. 
 The period that the author is referring to is the 1994 – 1999 parliament and the 1999 – 2004 one, that 
of EP4 and EP5. 
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Indeed, committees have become central to the activity of any MEP and, as this 
section has shown, they have evolved in parallel with the EP as a reaction to the EU 
policy developments and subsequent legislative demands. Unlike committees in other 
national legislatures, they became more powerful also as a consequence of the EU 
system of separation of powers and multinationalism. 
2. 4  ‘Sub-Government’  type  committees
The current section investigates the different theories that explain how EP committees 
function and are structured. It first introduces the existing literature on committees, 
namely the literature on the US committee system, and then continues with the 
analysis of the studies that have been carried out in regards to aspects pertaining to the 
EP. 
A legislature commonly finds its standing point in committees, which are at its core 
and, as a consequence, there is an important literature written on the subject that 
analyses how a committee system structures itself (Whitaker, 2011), how the 
members are selected and the reasons that form the basis of their assignment to a 
particular committee, how committees become more specialised and how 
representative they are in practice of the whole chamber (Mamadouh and Raunio, 
2003; McElroy, 2006). 
American literature analysing the committee system and its underpinnings is centred 
upon  the  idea  of  specialised  committees  that  form  a  distinct  case  of  ‘sub-government’  
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as they can be mostly composed of preference outliers (Weingast and Marshall, 
1988). This implies that they are formed of members who have chosen a particular 
committee because of the special interest their constituency might hold in that area, 
becoming in time increasingly specialised and non-representative of the views of the 
House as a whole. In addition to this, since studies on voting behaviour in the EP have 
revealed a pattern of floor voting where the view put forward by committee is very 
likely to be accepted by other members of the party (mostly due to the fact that they 
acknowledge the degree of specialisation and seniority of the members of that 
committee) this has led some to say that the power has been transferred to a system of 
committees that does not represent the views of the House as a whole and forms a so-
called  ‘sub-government’. These are interpretations that have been projected on the 
activity of committees in the EP and have been tested (Whitaker, 2005; McElroy, 
2006; Yordanova, 2010). Others also sharing these views are the internal actors – the 
MEPs. In such cases most of them see certain committees as being mostly sought 
after by members from particular countries (French in the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Committee, Spanish and Portuguese in the Regional Development 
Committee, British in the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee).  
 
Referring to the US literature on committees, Cox and McCubbins (2007) conclude 
that most studies present an image where parties are seen as having a minor role in the 
House. In an attempt to summarise the conclusions of existing studies on the 
Congress they put forward three commonly held views: that parties have little 
‘systematic  influence  on  pre-floor  behaviour’  (Cox  and  McCubbins  2007:  4)  - they 
are not able to exert control over the decisions and the outcomes of the votes that take 
place  in  committees;;  that  ‘parties  are  primarily  procedural  coalitions  that  have  
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relatively  little  influence  over  the  substance  of  legislation’  - they are the ones 
organising the processes but take little responsibility for the outcomes of the 
processes  themselves;;  that  ‘party  leaders’  actions  in  Congress  are  conditional  on  the  
support of the party membership on a case by case basis, rather than taken as a part of 
a  more  general  and  unconditional  delegation  of  power’(Cox  and  McCubbins,  2007:  
5).  Nonetheless,  both  authors  see  a  ‘translation  of  procedural  into  substantive  
advantages  as  occurring  on  both  an  ‘active’  and  a  ‘latent’  track’  and  note  that: 
 
‘Much  less  attention has been paid to the substantive advantage that the majority party 
can attain simply by structuring the committee system – setting up jurisdictions, 
allocating resources, assigning members, and so forth - and then letting things 
proceed  on  ‘automatic pilot’  (n.a)’(Cox  and  McCubbins,  2007:  5).   
 
Their view is that parties, in spite of their apparent lack of control in the committee 
stage of legislation, are still able to structure these committees in a manner that would 
give them the opportunity to use these procedural means in order to influence the 
substantive aspects that are part of committee activity. Subsequently, the Cox and 
McCubbins (2007) model supports the theory that parties are more likely to try and 
ensure representation in committees where the policy decisions reached may affect a 
large part of the electoral districts and therefore the majority of the electorate. This 
causes in turn a lower level of interest in representation in committees, which have 
what  they  call  ‘targeted  externalities’  or  ‘mixed  externalities’,  meaning  that  the  
decisions reached in such committees have the potential to affect a specific type of 
electorate or different types of electorate but not the electorate as a whole. According 
to the same rationale, this would mean that members who tend to focus their attention 
on committees that are most likely to affect their electorate and try to follow the 
interests of their constituency would more likely be present in committees with 
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‘targeted  externalities’.  Such  behaviour  could  have  two  results:  a  concentration  of  
policy outliers in certain committees and the predominance of these in committees 
with  ‘targeted  externalities’,  where  EP  groups would have a lower interest in ensuring 
representation. It would also result that there might be a greater level of variation 
between policy decisions taken by committees and the opinions of the party in regards 
to that policy, just as much as it would imply that decisions reached by committee 
might not correspond with the interest of the electorate as a whole. Indeed, as 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) point out, a strong set of committees can have 
considerable influence over the legislative process, while a system with strong parties 
also could, but would in turn have to feature a committee system more susceptible to 
control exercised by parties (Weingast and Marshall, 1988: 159). 
 
Unlike the distributive and the partisan selection models, Krehbiel (1990) has a 
different approach in that he sees the main function of committees as a provider of 
information for the legislature in regards to the possible results of different policy 
options. They can develop specialised knowledge, which can benefit the legislature as 
a whole and they will be selected by the party on the basis of their level of knowledge 
and the close alignment of their preferences with the ones of the party. This makes for 
a more effective and majority based legislature where the policy outcomes of 
committees are more likely to be in the interest of the electorate as a whole and not a 
small minority represented by policy outliers concentrated in the committees.  
 
Consequently, transferring these inferences to the EP scene would imply that if one 
works based on the assumption that there is no party structuring and leadership in the 
EP when it comes to committee activity and votes are cast according to committee 
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members' preferences then, the possibility of the party setting out a specific allocation 
pattern in committees to suit an agenda would be overlooked. As a result actors would 
Such an approach would be detrimental; only follow their own preferences. 
particularly when, in practice, European parties allocate their seats in committees 
based on a system of proportionality and are not entirely reliant on the requests of 
their members or of the national delegations that compose them. This is an example of 
the particularities that the legislative system in the EP presents in comparison to the 
US one and it stresses again the need to apply an adapted theoretical model when 
analysing its activity. Nonetheless, these inferences help structure the analysis of EP 
committees, in that they offer a basis for the investigation of political group influence 
on parliamentary committees. Therefore, in the framework of this study, the Cox and 
McCubbins partisan selection model will be verified against observations in the EP, 
mainly those presented in the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 to establish if, by 
controlling committee assignment, EP groups can impact on the decision-making 
process in the Parliament, enduring voting cohesion and coherence of committee-
plenary decision. The findings in chapter 6 indicate that this does not happen because 
committee members end up delineating a line and establishing agreements in 
committee, which then get internalised by the group, explaining the transferral of 
committee decision in plenary. 
 
After presenting the US literature on committees, referred to up until now in order to 
account for the activity and the powers of EP committees, this section has revealed 
that the US model of analysis has to be adapted when applied to the Parliament. 
Therefore, section 5 will investigate the existing studies on the EP committee system 
and the fitting models they have found for their analysis. 
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2. 5 Committees in the EP 
 
Section five discusses the literature on EP committees and isolates the main argument 
in the debate regarding their influence in the decision-making process. 
 
Research on committee activity in the EP has looked at different aspects: it has 
focused on report allocation in committees taking as a variable the presence or 
otherwise in the Council of the political group to which the rapporteur belongs 
(Benedetto, 2005; Høyland, 2006; Yoshinaka et al., 2010), on the composition of the 
committees and the extent to which they reflect the EP composition as a whole 
(McElroy, 2006; Kreppel 2002b; Whitaker, 2005), on the committee system 
(Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003), on the role committees play in reaching early 
agreements under the ordinary legislative procedure (Reh et al, 2011; Reh, 2014; 
Yordanova, 2013) and on the level of consensus in committees (Settembri and 
Neuhold, 2009). They have revealed that committees are generally representative of 
the EP (McElroy, 2006), mirroring the composition of the full chamber, and that they 
follow a consensus policy, even more so since enlargement, trying to achieve this 
consensus at an early stage in the legislative process (Settembri and Neuhold, 2009). 
Studies, such as the one from Whitaker (2005) which looks at the extent to which 
national parties are ready to ensure their representation in committees, are extremely 
relevant in showing the interest that national parties take in the activities of their 
MEPs as opposed to the views that still judge them as being simple followers of the 
national party rule. If  some  years  back  MEPs  were  seen  as  ‘marginalised’  members  of  
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their domestic parties and had little scrutiny over their work (Raunio, 2003), in EP6 
(2004-2009) and EP7 (2009-2014) the situation has changed. Mostly as a 
consequence of the increase in EP powers and the impact of legislation drafted at EU 
level, the work of MEPs has also become more valuable to national parties (Ladrech, 
2002), which can turn to their members for information on EU legislation and advice, 
contributing, in certain cases, to a process of Europeanization of their own domestic 
parties. Others, such as Yoshinaka, McElroy and Bowler (2010) have attempted to 
identify the main actors in EP decision-making, in particular those who influence the 
dynamics of this institution, and have found that committee rapporteurs play a 
significant role in the process.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the studies can be complemented with a broader image of what the 
functioning inside the committees really incurs, namely that apart from the 
background exchange of influence amongst national delegations and EP political 
groups, there are also daily debates and arguments that are held during the sessions 
where MEPs may express their opinions and personal beliefs on a matter. There are 
indeed interactions amongst the members and their political group coordinator that 
take place during the voting time, refusals to vote according to the voting lists or 
failure to do so because of lack of interest, interactions that cannot be accounted for 
by analysing the allocation of reports, the results of the votes or the number of 
members that a party has in a particular committee. They are important aspects of an 
analysis of the activity in committees but they are not the only ones. Therefore, I 
believe that a quantitative analysis cannot illustrate the full spectrum of activities 
taking place in the committees, but needs to be complimented with qualitative 
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methods capable of filling the gaps. The raw data, once interpreted, makes the case 
for a very clear and unequivocal presentation of an event that has unfolded within the 
EP, but it cannot account entirely for all other interactions and aspects that are 
involved in the decision-making process. Therefore, this research wishes to make the 
case for an integrated approach where descriptive and qualitative data will be 
gathered and used in mapping the existing processes active in the EP committees. 
 
 In line with what was previously mentioned and considering the findings of Høyland 
(2006: 42)  who  argues  that  ‘being  in  government  increases  the  predicted  production  
of co-decision  reports’,  it  is  clear  that  this  result  is  also  influenced  by  the  interest  of  
national parties to have an important leverage in both institutions, as well as by the 
ease with which rapporteurs (MEPs in charge of preparing a report and passing it 
through the chamber) can gather essential information on a particular report and the 
existing debates in the Council. There is an informal network of information that is set 
in motion in such instances in order to ensure the representation of the same decisions 
in both the Council and the EP. This same network can support MEPs from national 
parties represented in the Council in their attempt to obtain political notoriety and in 
highlighting the importance of their activity in the EP to the leadership of their parties 
back home and the national delegations. I believe that this sort of exchanges must also 
be analysed in order to grasp the real level at which decisions are made within 
parliamentary committees.  
 
Høyland stresses a number of important facts which are also in line with another body 
of research on the parliamentary committees, that of Mamadouh and Raunio (2003), 
such as the leverage that the size of the EP group and the national party have in 
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contributing to the nomination of an MEP as a rapporteur. Also, political groups that 
incur higher costs in reaching a level of coordination have a lower volume of reports. 
This is in accordance with the facts presented by Mamadouh and Raunio (2003: 342) 
on the way that rapporteurships are distributed in the committees:  
 
‘  …  party  groups  have  developed  a  system  based  primarily  on  the  rule  of  
proportionality, with procedures that may differ between committees. Each group 
receives a quota of points out of the total point tally based on its share of seats in the 
committee. Party group co-ordinators and committee chairs decide the value of each 
report to be produced by the committee, and co-ordinators identify their groups’  
priority reports and make bids on behalf of their groups in specific co-ordinators’  
meetings.’  
 
Therefore, it becomes clear why, in practice, due to the existing system that is in 
place, the larger their political group, and then their national delegation inside the 
group, the more rapporteurships are some MEPs in a committee likely to obtain than 
others. Still, there are a number of other factors that might lead to this outcome and 
that is linked to how an MEP is perceived by his or her group co-ordinator in the 
committee and this will affect his or her chances of actually obtaining a particular 
report on which interest has already been expressed. This perception is also linked to 
the level of involvement that an MEP might have expressed in time in the existing 
activities of the committee in question, as it is also linked to the level of knowledge 
and specialisation that a member might have on the topic concerned by the report 
(Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 343). Such aspects are extremely relevant to the 
validity of the main argument of this study and will be analysed in detail in chapter 4 
on the role of rapporteurs and the part that they play in the activity of committees and 
in the transferral of a committee decision to plenary. 
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In line with the research looking to establish the existing correlations between 
national parties, represented by their national delegations in the EP, and MEPs, 
Whitaker (2005) analyses the activity of parliamentary committees for a one-year 
period. His research focuses on the roll-call vote data in the EP in an attempt to 
establish the extent to which members active in committees keep in line with the 
views of their national party delegations. By comparing the votes cast in plenary by 
committee members with the votes of the rest of their group he observes a high level 
of similarity between the preferences of both the specific members and the rest of the 
group, as expressed on particular reports that were under debate.  
 
Nonetheless, research analysing EP votes has its caveats and this is mostly due to the 
fact that votes cast in committees are not recorded in the same way as roll-call votes 
are in plenary. This makes it difficult to compare committee voting with roll-call 
plenary voting, given that one can only see the final results of the votes in committee, 
without having the exact voting record for each member. Still, there are other means 
available for analysing this aspect, mainly using proportions and correlations between 
the overall final result of a vote in committee and the result in plenary. The fieldwork 
of the current research done in the parliamentary committees and the compiled data 
from the final votes expressed at this level, point to a high degree of unanimity, with 
many reports seeing an undisputable vote in favour. As such for most cases, if there is 
a unanimous vote or a very significant majority (with only one or two votes against 
and a small number of abstentions) the variation between the vote in committee and 
the one in the plenary can be verified, as seen in chapter 4 and 5. 
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Additionally, an interesting aspect of Whitaker’s  research  underlines  that  the  level  of  
representation of national delegations in parliamentary committees, as well as the 
congruence amongst the votes of the members and the rest of the group, are linked to 
the level of legislative activity of the parliamentary committee. In short, the more say 
a committee has in influencing policy outcomes, the more interest there is from 
national parties in being represented in these committees and ensuring that their views 
and interests are portrayed accordingly: 
 
‘…national  delegations  maintain  higher  levels  of  representativeness  on  committees  
that  hold  legislative  powers,  compared  with  others.’  (Whitaker,  2005:  7) 
 
At the same time, members of the political group will be more likely to follow their 
colleagues’  views  on  matters  that  were  debated  in  committees  and  judge  the  latter  as  
holding a high degree of expertise on a certain subject. 
 
Moreover, Whitaker approaches the analysis of the representativeness of the national 
party preferences throughout a committee using the mean absolute difference score 
between the votes cast by committee members in plenary and the ones of the rest of 
the party. In this respect he issues a number of hypotheses, using the Cox and 
McCubbins (2007) partisan selection model, stating that the more widespread an 
interest is for a particular committee, due to its capacity of issuing decisions that may 
affect constituencies to a similar level - that  is  to  display  an  ‘uniformity of 
externalities’  (Cox  and  McCubbins,  2007)    - the more interest will a political group 
have in ensuring its preferences are well represented throughout committees. He then 
makes a comparison between the EP and the US Congress committee system, arguing 
that the latter makes a clearer point of active involvement in committees of members 
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that are interested in reaching policy outcomes that benefit their constituents, 
concluding that the low level of variance between the pattern of votes of EP members 
from committee and the rest of the group is an indication of growing interest from 
national parties, and therefore national delegations, in the activity of MEPs and the 
level to which they are representative of the rest of the EP group. However, the 
comparison to the US Congress committee system is incomplete, as Krehbiel (1990) 
points out the variance in the preferences of members of committees and those of the 
rest of the House is not significant enough in order to account for a specific difference 
in the orientations of the committees on certain policy aspects. More precisely, there 
is no clear argument to support a theory where MEPs from a particular region or a 
particular country that has additional interest in a European policy, would focus upon 
committees involved in that policy.  
 
Bearing in mind all of the abovementioned studies, the research of Gail McElroy 
(2006) on parliamentary committees addresses a number of issues that might first 
seem self-explanatory but have not been fully tested yet: the level to which the 
committees are representative of the EP in general, and the degree of specialisation of 
MEPs on a certain committee. An MEP's assignment to a committee might, indeed, 
lead the member to establish his own agenda in terms of policy outcomes, which 
could  be  different  from  the  national  party’s  or  the  EP political group. Still, it seems 
natural that depending on the legislative powers of a certain committee, the interest 
for the main EP groups to have representatives on it would be greater and therefore, 
naturally, political parties in committees would reflect the composition of the EP. 
This would also be supported by what Mamadouh and Raunio (2003: 338) refer to as 
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a division of committee membership and chairmanship according to the principle of 
proportionality.  
 
In addition to that, given the high level of specialisation of the legislation discussed in 
these committees, it is understandable why an MEP would chose to serve on a more 
technical committee if he/she would fit the technical profile. The high degree of 
specialisation and the specificity of the profiles of MEPs do not automatically call for 
a development of a voting behaviour that no longer follows the European group or 
national line. This is mainly due to the existing rules inside the group in a committee, 
which account for voting lists and preparatory meetings that ensure cohesiveness of 
the  group’s  position  in  the  given  parliamentary  committee.   
 
Furthermore, McElroy uses the informational approach to explain the organisation of 
the committee system in the EP and concludes that committees in their make up 
reflect the composition of the parliament as a whole (McElroy, 2006: 25). In line with 
the informational perspective put forward by theorists such as Gilligan and Krehbiel 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel, 1991), the argument here is that the institution 
in itself is interested in organising committees that can provide it with additional 
information and that, in order to render it more efficient, benefit from an important 
level of specialisation of their members on designated policy fields (McElroy, 2006: 
10). By focusing the argument on the informational perspective, McElroy views the 
‘lack  of  ‘pork’  (selective  goods  to  offer  as  rewards  to  constituents)’  that  the  MEPs  
have within the European institution as another reason to refute a distributional 
approach (McElroy, 2006: 10), where the membership of a committee is sought by the 
members to purposely influence the developments of a policy in view of obtaining 
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accrued gains for their constituents and ensure their own chances of re-election. 
However, the distributional dimension cannot be side-lined since MEPs, unlike the 
members in the US Congress who appear to be following the policy preferences of 
their constituencies, try to follow the preferences that are expressed by the main 
electorate in their countries, simply put - their country preferences. Even if this does 
not cause them to disregard the group line, the possibility of their clustering in 
committees  according  to  their  country’s interests can be envisaged and could lead to a 
diminished representativeness of the Parliament. 
 
In reference to the degree of representativeness committees might have of the plenary 
as whole, as well as regarding transparency of the legislative process, another 
significant body of research has focused on the wide-spread use of early agreements 
in first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure, how it has impacted the 
decision-making in the EU and implicitly in the EP (Reh et al., 2011; Héritier and 
Reh, 2012; de Ruiter and Neuhold, 2012; Yordanova, 2013; Reh, 2014). The study on 
the codecison files for EP5 and EP6 done by Reh et al. (2011: 1113), points to an ' 
"informalization" of the political process', where negotiations are carried and 
agreements are reached amongst a closed number of actors. Like Yordanova (2010), 
Reh et al. (2011: 1113) stress that once a compromise is agreed at this stage between 
Parliament, Council and Commission, it becomes difficult for the EP committee or 
plenary to modify it. Thus, committee's ability to influence the decision-making 
process in Parliament is questioned, especially when 'such "early conclusion" 
accounted for 72% in the 2004 - 2009 parliamentary term' (Reh et al., 2011: 1113). 
Moreover, Yordanova (2013) concludes that committees have limited legislative 
influence under early agreements, arguing that when an agreement is already reached 
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before the vote in committee and later confirmed in both committee and plenary, it 
renders  ‘both  committee  and  plenary  discussion  virtually  obsolete’  (Yordanova,  2013:  
89).  However,  it  is  the  committee’s  prerogative  to  cast  the  vote  allowing  the  
agreement to reach plenary, thus the committee retains the power to sanction it.  In 
addition, the EP Rules of Procedure provide clear guidelines in both instances: where 
negotiations in view of an agreement are entered into after the adoption of the 
committee report Rule 70 applies, and when negotiations start before the adoption of
the report Rule 70a is foreseen. The negotiations Parliament, Council and 
Commission enter in view of reaching an early agreement, known as trilogues, are 
made up, on the EP side, of Chair, Vice-chairman or committee members of the 
responsible committee. This ensures a significant representation for the committee 
and, as it will be detailed in chapter 3, cannot be seen as substituting committee 
influence with that of the trilogue negotiation team. Moreover, Toshkov and 
Rasmussen (2012) indicate that the instituted practice of early agreements may have 
led to an extension in the duration of first reading after 2004, especially when 'salient 
legislation is on the bargaining table and there is a level of political disagreement 
between the co-legislators' (Toshkov and Rasmussen, 2012: 17). Thus, sufficient 
discussion and information at committee level may still be carried out. It is, however, 
impossible to overlook that early agreements used at this scale point to a closed doors, 
efficiency based approach towards the legislative process, characterised by little 
transparency, and committees are a part of this process. But, as it will be shown in the 
other chapters, early agreements do not prevent committees from having any impact 
on the final decision and the institutional compromise. 
 The numbers for the EP Rules of Procedure are those which operated in EP7 and are accessible at the 
following address: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+RULES-EP+20140310+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. In the meantime, 
EP8 Rules of Procedure have been renumbered. 
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From the studies mentioned so far it results that an important number of questions are 
still left pending in respect of committees. Do parties deliberately operate committee 
assignments in order to ensure this representation? Do they discipline their members 
in the committees as much as they plan to do in the plenary? Are there essential 
differences between the votes cast in the committees on a particular report and the 
votes that are cast in the plenary on that same file? And more importantly, are the EP 
groups operating most of these actions in consultation and accordance with the 
national party delegations or are there instances of conflict as well? This study 
clarifies some of these questions in chapter 4, 5 and 6, relying on the main argument 
of centrality of committees to the EP legislative process. It puts forward a more 
comprehensive model of analysis of the committee system. 
Therefore, section five of this chapter has introduced the existing literature on EP 
committees. It has analysed the reliance of these studies on US Congress literature, its 
advantages and shortcomings, and has demonstrated that a more integrated approach, 
mapping all interactions in committees is required in order to gain a better 
understanding of the activity of parliamentary committees and its implications for the 
decision-making process in the Parliament. Consequently, the next section of the 
chapter seeks to establish how and why this integrated approach should be pursued. 
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2. 6 The committee system in the EP through input data and interactions
Based on the arguments presented in the previous section, relating to the models used 
up until now for the analysis of parliamentary committees in the EP, the last section 
of the chapter offers an explanation for the use of a more comprehensive account of 
committee activity through qualitative and quantitative methods. It highlights the 
issues linked to committee analysis limited to quantitative tools and based on the US 
literature theoretical models. Subsequently, it brings evidence in support of the 
analytical approach used in this study. 
The existing literature on parliamentary committees is complex and based on 
observations and conclusions reached in the study of US Congress committees. The 
results of the studies differ widely and have led to several interpretations as to what 
would be the function of committees in a legislature and the impact that their activity 
might have on legislative outputs. 
If, however, these models of analysis are applied to the committee system in the EP, 
one finds that there are significant differences in terms of rules and procedures, as 
well as legislature organisation, between the US Congress and the EP, not to mention 
the differences in characteristics between US parties and EP political groups. As 
mentioned, Whitaker looks to find, based on the Cox and McCubbins partisan 
selection  model,  levels  of  variation  between  the  committee  members’  votes  in  the  EP  
on their own committee report and the national party delegation votes. His findings 
are to a certain degree in accordance with the predictions of the model but there is too 
little variation for them to be strongly supported. He then concludes that the level of 
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representation of party preference in committees is indicative of the growing interest 
that national parties have demonstrated recently, mainly as a result of the increase in 
the EP powers. 
 
Still, there are a number of issues  that  put  Whitaker’s  (2005)  analysis  into  question,  
one of them being that roll-call votes in the EP do not represent the totality of the 
votes cast, nor do they express the exact views on a particular report (Carrubba and 
Gabel, 1999). There is also the issue of defining in the EP the committees that have 
indeed  ‘targeted  externalities’  and  for  which  countries  that  might  be  more  relevant.  
Such aspects might be essential in judging results as a consequence of applying the 
Cox and McCubbins model. However, one of the points that seem to cause the 
greatest level of doubt is the fact that, even when applying this model to the US 
committees, the level of variance in policy decisions between committees and the 
House is still rather limited. And this in a context where parties have less cohesion 
and the impact of policy decisions reached by the US Congress is more visible for the 
electorate, in comparison to the way in which the European electorate can perceive 
the level of impact of EP decisions on their daily activities. It seems more likely and 
self-explanatory for EP committees to portray an important level of representation of 
the national party opinions, given the circumstances, than it would in the case of the 
US committees. That is why EP committee research should not stop at the 
interpretation of roll-call votes but look into the qualitative side of the argument. 
 
Therefore, a better way to approach the analysis of the parliamentary committees 
would be to keep in mind the important effect that discussions in committees and 
preparatory meetings held by each political group have in shaping the votes of their 
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members, as well as the influence of the group coordinator and the policy advisor on 
the output of the policy decisions of a group. Moreover, there are significant 
interactions that take place between members in the committees, the national party 
delegations and the EP group coordinators during the vote on a specific report and 
they all make up an intricate part of the decision-making process inside the 
committee. They are the ones that give MEPs the opportunity to organise and rank 
their preferences and the ones of their national parties and political groups in order to 
form a view on the matter at hand. A close look at all these factors, cross-referenced 
with results offered by the quantitative data, mainly roll-call votes, would be able to 
portray an image of greater variation in term of policy preference in committees in 
comparison to the actual end result of the votes. It would present a clearer image of 
the consensus mechanism in the EP and explain why it still prevails even in times 
when  the  EP’s  competencies  have  extended  so  far. 
 
The justification for such an approach, which combines quantitative analysis with 
qualitative data, stems from the special characteristics and the intrinsic nature of the 
EP and its committees in comparison to other legislatures. The organisation of the US 
Congress committees might see similarities with that of the EP but the nature of the 
parties standing in the two legislatures is completely different: the EP groups are 
parliamentary organisations that incorporate a great number of national parties with 
different political traditions and policy backgrounds compared to the US. On the other 
hand, they still show a greater level of internal cohesion compared to the US parties 
and that is not necessarily explained by the rules of procedures but more by an 
informal set of rules and interactions in the EP. It is not the fact that a national 
delegation in the EP votes against the EP group position that might cause it to be 
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expelled from its EP political group, but it might lead to a loss of credibility of that 
party inside the group and a reluctance to assign high profile reports to members of 
those delegation. This is just an example to illustrate the tools that an EP group has at 
its disposal in order to react to group disruptive forces and maintain intra-party 
discipline.  
 
 The benefits of such a view on parliamentary committees in the EP would come from 
a realisation that matters cannot be simply defined by asserting the control of national 
parties or EP groups upon their members on aspects that have a direct impact at 
national level and, at the same time, their complete disinterest in the other aspects of 
their MEPs activity. But rather by taking into consideration the sometimes-intricate 
bargaining process that takes place in the EP in between votes. This study will do just 
that in the course of the following four chapters, analysing the data from fieldwork 
observations, vote results and amendment numbers. With an understanding of the 
different models used for the analysis of EP committees, as presented throughout this 
chapter, this thesis will go on to present in chapter 3 the theoretical basis for the 
study, while chapter 4, 5 and 6 will reveal how committees exert their influence with 
the  help  of  three  ‘relais’  channels:  rapporteurs,  amendments  and  political  group  
interactions. 
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Chapter 3 
The European Parliament Committees - A Source of Influence over 
the Plenary? 
 
 
This chapter presents the main argument underpinning the thesis, emphasising that the 
EP, in an effort to gain legitimacy through increased legislative output, has developed 
a set of internal processes of decision-making which are sometimes highly technical 
and depoliticised. As a result, it has created a strong system of committees where 
negotiations are carried out and agreements are forged before the final plenary vote. 
The hypotheses presented throughout the chapter and analysed in the study test the 
influence these committees exert over the internal decision-making process. When 
verified, in the following chapters, they reveal an image of the EP where committees, 
define  the  institution’s  opinion. 
 
Existing studies (McElroy, 2006; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009; Ringe, 2010; 
Whitaker, 2011) have acknowledged committees in the EP as prominent actors of the 
institutional process, starting with Maastricht and continuing with the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions which extended the ordinary legislative procedure to most EU policy areas. 
However, in spite of the increased profile given to committees, they place political 
groups at the centre of decision-making in the EP and regard the plenary as the final 
forum  where  the  Parliament’s  opinion  is  defined.   
 
Within this framework, the current theory supports the idea that EP has, over time, 
internally developed a more depoliticised decision-making process, with a strong 
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system of committees becoming responsible for resolving dissent and bringing 
ideological and political differences towards a common centre of consensus. 
However, when decisions on certain files in the EP become depoliticised, it is for 
efficiency purposes and is thus underpinned by a conscious political choice of EP 
groups to speed up the legislative process on salient issues. Consequently, the main 
argument of this study stresses that around a centre of consensus and in the 
parliamentary  committees,  the  institution’s  opinion  is  structured.  This  thesis  argues  
that committees, as institutional actors, lead the legislative process, while political 
groups may choose to intervene only if they judge it necessary, in most cases relying 
on the opinion expressed by their members from the respective committees.  
 
Therefore, throughout this chapter, the theory will be analysed with the help of the 
main hypothesis. This emphasises that parliamentary committees may, at times, form 
the opinion of the institution on legislative matters to a greater extent than political 
groups. The chapter goes on to present the hypothesis and three supporting sub-
hypotheses in order to identify the processes and the extent to which committees 
impact  on  the  institution’s  decisions.  Relying  on  process  tracing  of  the  activity  of  
parliamentary  committees  and  of  MEPs’  work,  the  research  isolates  three  different  
channels through which the influence of committees within the internal process is 
exerted: rapporteurs and their work, amendments tabled to reports and political group 
meetings. The hypothesis and sub-hypotheses used to test the impact of each of these 
channels aim to show that the high level of political cohesion in the final stages of 
decision-making cannot be explained by party discipline or control alone, but rather 
by a strong set of committee agreements forged and lobbied for by committee 
members within their political groups and in the plenary. Moreover, the strong 
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correlation discovered between the result of votes on reports in committee and in the 
plenary, which will be analysed in more detail in chapter 4, is explained, on the one 
hand, by the influence of committees and, on the other hand, by the perceived 
coherence of preferences (Ringe, 2010) that MEPs from a political group may have in 
relation to their colleagues, members of the committee responsible. 
 
Finally, once the hypotheses have been presented, the chapter will show that the 
institutional constraints imposed on the EP and the constant need to legitimise it as an 
efficient supranational entity have all been decisive factors in the development of a 
powerful committee system that delineates the EP opinion. All this with the added 
consideration that such developments have not necessarily been applied to the 
detriment of political groups but rather with their knowledge and approval in view of 
rendering the legislative process more efficient. This implies that there is no distinct 
win or lose relationship between political groups and committees, but rather an 
institutional compromise, where a concern for efficiency causes political groups to let 
committees take centre stage. 
 
The first section of this chapter looks at EP developments accounting for the increase 
in committee activity and their influence. The second section presents the main 
argument and the hypotheses of this study, while the third details the data and the 
methodology. 
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3. 1 The Road to Power of the Parliamentary Committees  
 
Within the framework of European integration, the EP has been an institution with the 
most interesting evolution, due to the constant changes it has undergone over the 
course of the years. It has been, by definition, an institution in transition, even more 
so after the first direct elections of 1979, and it continues to be so. For these reasons it 
constitutes a focal point for research on the EU and it has favoured the analysis of its 
internal mechanisms in an attempt to become more prominent among the other 
institutions but, also, to define itself as a main actor in the decision-making process at 
European level. 
 
The pattern of changes to the structure of the EP has been driven by an accumulation 
of powers gained over time and by  developments  within  the  EU.  The  ‘talking  shop’  
(Rittberger, 2005: 73) comparison that used to define EP in the early stages of its 
institutional development has gradually been replaced with that of co-legislator. The 
Parliament now has the ability to amend and decide on legislation that affects more 
than 500 million citizens all over Europe and it has, in practice, more power than 
other national legislatures. This partly explains why its organisation system is so 
complex, a factor that renders more difficult the mapping of its internal decision-
making.  
 
At its core, the Parliament has become a legislature defined by its changing nature 
brought on by successive Treaty modifications. That is why studies documenting its 
activity and decision-making process have become more important than in the case of 
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other  legislatures.  They  respond  to  a  need  to  investigate  the  EP’s  influence  and  
explain its positioning within the institutional triangle structure.  
 
It has to be said that, given the supranational character of the EU and the constant 
representativity gaps and legitimacy issues for which it has often been criticised, the 
EP has used to the fullest its representational features and legitimacy when confronted 
with the citizens of Member States. The only elected institution in the EU has, since 
the first elections in 1979, succeeded in exploiting the legislative advances it has 
gained over the course of the years and in minimising its institutional marginalisation 
by expanding the scope of its influence and policy competences. To date, it has 
achieved an equal footing with the Council and has influence over most, if not all, 
legislative acts that are drawn up at European level. However, in doing so, it has also 
had to maintain and improve the image of an efficient institution. It is particularly this 
aspect that I believe has caused Parliament to sometimes sacrifice political 
competition for the purpose of achieving a speedy accomplishment of legislative tasks 
through consensus. Resolving dissent in the early legislative stages through a 
consensus-based policy and with the help of internal mechanisms set up to support it 
has allowed the EP to improve its image as a well-oiled and functioning supranational 
institution. But, in the process, the EP has become, in part,  a  ‘closed  doors’  
institution, which is less transparent, due to the high level of technicality of legislation 
that it has to deal with and, to a certain extent, sometimes depoliticised. This is most 
clearly expressed in the emergence of a strong system of committees that cover all EU 
legislation matters. However, this is not to say that EP has become devoid of politics, 
since political deals are struck amongst the groups as in any other legislature, but 
rather that it is characterised by a contained type of politics as far as this does not 
 73 
ultimately impact on the final agreement on a piece of legislation. Nor does this imply 
a voluntary choice of the EP itself to ground its politics in consensus, but a result of 
the institutional make-up and overall structure of the EU political system. In order to 
be able to bring significant input to legislative proposals and set the mark for 
negotiations with the other institutions (the Council and the Commission), EP 
committees have had to set up internal mechanisms that allow for conflict and 
ideological differences to be resolved before the final vote of the full chamber. The 
fieldwork carried out for this study shows that these mechanisms involve: setting up 
meetings between the rapporteur (MEP responsible for drafting  the  EP’s  position  on  a  
legislative or non-legislative matter) and the shadows designated by the other political 
groups; encouraging common as well as compromise amendments to legislation, 
which can be negotiated in more detail before the committee vote and hold more 
weight in plenary; facilitating debate amongst committee members on controversial 
issues, by setting up additional committee meetings, if necessary, for the expression 
of views of MEPs, in order to allow for conflict to be resolved and agreements to be 
forged before the vote. All of these factors lead to quicker legislative results and, in 
spite of the heated and conflicting political debates that take place here, the 
committee’s  final  decision,  as  is  shown  throughout  chapters  4,  5  and  6,  remains 
largely consensual. Most importantly, as the data in chapter 4 will show, the decision 
taken at committee level is replicated in the vote of the full chamber, a fact that 
stresses the importance and the influence of committees. 
 
Therefore, in order to try to highlight developments in the organisational structure of 
the EP, but also to analyse its internal functioning in an effort to identify the stage at 
which agreements are forged, this research looks at the committees that make up the 
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EP and the part they play within its decision-making process. It is in the committees 
that the EP deploys its strength and in this area it is clear that the institution is no 
longer just a talking shop. The study will compare existing models used to analyse 
parliamentary committees in the EP and test them against fieldwork observations 
carried out in the institution over the course of one year – from May 2010 until June 
2011 – supported by structured interviews with MEPs, their staff, political group's 
staff, officials from the Secretariat of the EP and interest group representatives. It will 
assess  committees’  role  within  the  whole  legislative  process  of  the  institution.  All  this  
will be done using a comprehensive approach that looks at the way in which political 
preferences develop and choices are made inside committees amongst their members, 
as well as amongst members of the same EP political group. In other words, the focus 
is on the findings from the actual committee sessions and their outcome, as well as on 
the interactions and debates that lead up to them in order to determine whether, 
through the transferral and adoption of a committee decision in the plenary session, 
parliamentary committees can have more say in establishing the final position of the 
EP than political groups.  
 
After looking at EP developments that explain why committees might have gained 
more power, the next section of the chapter will analyse some of the EP committee 
system features. It will then present the hypotheses that can help test and establish if 
decisions and votes in committees constitute the essential output of this legislature, an 
output subsequently sanctioned in the plenary of the Parliament and if the main 
hypothesis stating that can be verified. This main argument will be developed by an 
analysis of the factors that explain and indicate the reasons for such interdependence 
between the two legislative stages, these being the rapporteurs, the amendments 
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tabled on reports and the group debates on the reports. Each of these will be tested 
with the help of sub-hypotheses that will be presented in more detail. The aim is to 
investigate whether or not the activity of a rapporteur on a report, or the number and 
type of amendments or the debates and position of the political group on a specific 
matter can be used to explain if and why the House chooses to simply formally 
recognise a decision already formulated by its parliamentary committees. 
 
 
3. 2 A theoretical framework for analysing the EP committee structure 
 
Existing work on EP parliamentary  committees’  activity  has  tried  to  clarify  the  
purpose they serve and analyse the main characteristics of their work. The previous 
section presented the changes in the EP and the consolidation of committee activity 
inside it. The following paragraphs will discuss the implications of the literature on 
this subject. 
 
As presented in chapter 2, research so far has focused on the different perspectives of 
committee activity, but also on committee composition, representativity and 
consensus level. As far as the EP is concerned, the three theoretical models derived 
from the US Congress, and on which most of the literature on the subject is based, 
seem to explain different facets of the organisation of parliamentary committees and 
their activity. The models, however, must be used with the understanding that they 
can help as a tool for structuring the research and the findings without restricting their 
results to a predefined framework. Furthermore, their use must complement the other 
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research methods employed to study an institution which is so specific from a 
procedural point of view. 
 
So far, the fieldwork observations in the EP have supported the validity of the concept 
of  ‘perceived  preference  coherence’  (Ringe,  2010),  while  at  the  same  time  stressing 
the influence that committee decisions can have over plenary ones. Accordingly, it 
must be mentioned that an assessment of the activity and the discussions that took 
place in the EP political groups was also part of the study and contributed to the 
testing of this principle. Knowing that the monthly group meetings are distributed and 
divided in three separate Working Groups in accordance with the different 
committees, in the framework of these groups, MEPs have the capacity to discuss and 
debate reports that are being managed by their colleagues or for which one of their 
colleagues is a shadow. These reports are the ones that can be found on the agenda in 
the committees. In this manner, an MEP, expert on the issue under discussion, 
provides an overview of the topic and the matters at hand, including the implications 
for the group position on the subject and the national party interests in different 
Member States. From then onwards, the debate is open as to how things should 
proceed and be voted on, all this in accordance with the line set by the shadow or the 
rapporteur. This constitutes evidence that the group itself can ensure, to a certain 
extent, that a decision is already taken before the plenary. However, due to 
outstanding national interests, MEPs may choose to put forward oral amendments in 
plenary, thus raising specific points, making interventions and detouring from the 
rapporteur or the shadow rapporteur line, changing the voting list altogether. But, as 
illustrated in the case studies from chapter 4, 5 and 6, the decision taken at group level 
on the basis of prior deliberations and consensus achieved at committee level, can 
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limit the plenary vote to a mere exercise, to a framework upon which opinions, views 
and policy preferences can be stated and reinforced, this time with a greater audience. 
Contrary to this, if parliamentary committees were outliers and unrepresentative of 
the House as a whole, as one would expect under the distributive perspective, or 
would only provide technical information to the chamber and offer it additional 
knowledge on policy and its outcomes, then the data from committee votes and 
plenary should display significant variation between the two levels and different 
results of votes as a general rule.  
 
Also, from a legislative process-oriented perspective, if the EP were to have a 
different view to that of the committee, then more modifications to the text of the 
report should be tabled through plenary amendments or, according to the Rules of 
Procedure, there should be alternative motions for resolution tabled by the political 
groups to a specific report. On account of the data available so far from committee 
and plenary votes, from the amendments and from group meetings, such practices are 
very rare. The explanation is linked to the great workload the EP needs to go through 
during a voting session in plenary. The number of reports is so high that the EP tries, 
when possible to limit the number of amendments, especially when this concerns a 
legislative decision that has to be taken by roll-call vote. There are, however, 
instances where the plenary chooses to refer a report back to the committee and such a 
practice is also codified in the EP rules (Rule 162 and Rule 57). Rule 162 states that 
in  the  case  where  more  than  ‘fifty  amendments and requests for a split or separate 
vote have been tabled to a report for consideration in Parliament, the President may, 
after consulting its chair, request the committee responsible to meet to consider those 
amendments  or  requests.’  On  the  other  hand, Rule 57 foresees that in an instance 
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where  the  Commission  has  not  expressed  its  position  on  Parliament’s  amendments  or,  
as  mentioned  in  paragraph  2  of  this  Rule,  ‘if  the  Commission  announces  that  it  does  
not  intend  to  adopt  all  Parliament’s  amendments, the rapporteur of the committee 
responsible, or else the Chair of that committee, shall make a formal proposal to 
Parliament as to whether the vote on  the  draft  legislative  resolution  should  proceed.’  
In this case, if the vote is postponed, the committee can reconsider the legislation and 
then the committee alone can table amendments in view of reaching an agreement.  
 
The procedure under Rule 57 has gained a significant momentum in the EP over the 
last years because it facilitates the continuation of negotiations between the EP, 
Council and Commission under first reading, in view of reaching an early agreement. 
It involves Parliament voting on an initial set of amendments to a proposal for 
legislation and postponing the final vote in order to move on and negotiate with the 
other institutions a common agreement that is very likely to be adopted. Once the 
agreement has been reached it is presented to the House in the form of an amendment 
replacing those voted in a previous session. It is particularly this practice that has been 
referred to as a closed, informal type of negotiation (Reh et al., 2011: 1136) between 
a set of actors who operate outside committee reach and overturn committee 
decisions. I argue that, in spite of the small number of actors involved in negotiations 
for completing early agreements at this stage, the representation of committee is still 
ensured.  These  ‘relais  actors’  (Judge  and  Earnshaw, 2011) are in fact committee 
members and the negotiating team includes the Chair or Vice-Chair of a committee, 
who keep in contact with the other members at each stage to inform them of the 
outcome of negotiations. Moreover, the consolidated amendment tabled for plenary 
and  containing  the  early  agreement  has  to  be  ‘submitted to the committee responsible 
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for consideration. If approved by a vote in committee, the agreed text shall be tabled 
for consideration by Parliament in the appropriate form, including compromise 
amendments’  (Rule 70). Annex XX in the Rules of Procedure on the conduct of 
negotiations under codecision gives clear indications as to how these should be 
carried  and  stipulates  that  the  ‘lead  parliamentary  committee  shall  be  the  main  
responsible  body  during  negotiations  both  at  first  and  second  reading’.  Therefore,  
committees still have an important say in the decision-making at this stage, even if the 
result of voting down committee amendments in favour of a consolidated amendment 
containing the agreement might offer a different image.  
 
Committee work is prevalent in all aspects of EP decision-making, including in early 
agreements and it is therefore difficult to establish precisely at what point committee 
preferences are overruled by those of the negotiating team members. It is however 
clear that for efficiency purposes the EP has adopted a practice which limits open 
committee deliberations and contestation is also more contained as a consequence of 
the small number of actors involved. The Directive on consumer rights, which had 
been sent back to the responsible committee in view of completing an early 
agreement, provides a good example. (Initially, there were 1600 amendments in 
committee limited to 600 compromise amendments by the rapporteur and finally 210 
plenary amendments). This was a particular case of legislation that had set out to 
regroup all of the already existing Directives in this field into one text and which had 
a very difficult process in committee. It will be investigated in more detail in part 4 of 
this chapter, as well as in chapter 4 that looks at rapporteurs and their role in passing 
legislation swiftly and consensually through the EP. 
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As a consequence, this research starts from the understanding that, considering that 
the extension in the ordinary legislative procedure after the Lisbon Treaty has 
increased the power of the EP, the volume of work in its parliamentary committees 
and, subsequently, their strength, one would expect to find the decision-making 
process bogged down by legislative burden. Having to pass more acts involves more 
debates, consultations, negotiations and, inevitably, more significant chances to be 
confronted with disagreement, even conflict. Still, the EP has continued to vote on 
legislative and non-legislative procedures in plenary at a constant pace, all having 
been debated and voted previously in committee. Can such developments be 
accounted for by a strong party discipline or by an internal policy of consensus that 
prevails in the institution? Does committee activity play a significant role in the swift 
passage of legislation through the House? Can this role also be expressed through 
proportionality between the voting results at this stage and those in the plenary? Are 
there certain political actors or particular internal, formal or informal, procedural 
arrangements that allow for the voting in the EP committees and plenary to be done 
with such large majorities? Answers to these questions will offer a clearer view and 
provide a better understanding of the links that exist in the EP between committee 
activity and plenary voting results. They will identify process-related patterns and 
particularities for the EP.  
 
 
3. 2.1 Hypothesis and sub-hypotheses 
 
Most studies on EP place political groups at the centre of decision-making in the 
institution and analyse committee activity with a partisan view in mind. Undoubtedly, 
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political groups play one of the most important roles within the Parliament and the 
organisation of the highest decision-making body is evidence to that: the Conference 
of Presidents, which decides on all matters related to parliamentary activity, including 
committees and plenary and is composed of leaders from every political group. 
However, they do not always make full use of the tools and available resources to 
ensure policy cohesion and exercise full control over the activity and the voting 
decisions of their members, in both committee and plenary. To a certain extent, they 
are relying on ex-ante control of their members through committee assignments and 
afterwards it falls to the committee group coordinator to steer members and ensure the 
group line is followed. Political groups, as stated before, have procedural tools 
available to impact on committees but they act on the basis of an understanding of 
preference coherence and representativity of their members in committee. Moreover, 
what fieldwork from this research will show is that, during committee meetings and 
informal group meetings preparing the committee agenda, members develop, over 
time,  an  ‘esprit  de  corps’  as  Corbett,  Jacobs  and  Shackleton  (2011:  145)  refer  to  it.  
This causes them to share and expand on their expert knowledge, impacting 
considerably, if not shaping entirely, the group line. Such exchanges of information 
and policy based interactions are evidence of committee activity impact on political 
groups and, eventually, on the entire House through the vote in plenary. A decision-
making process based on such interactions does not diminish the importance of 
political groups. It does, however, illustrate how the groups and the House as a whole 
follow committee decisions and agreements, in the later stages of the legislative 
process. More precisely, it uncovers a systematic influence from the side of 
parliamentary committees on the EP’s  opinion.  For  reasons  related  to  efficiency,  
streamlining of decisions and embedded institutional consensus policy, political 
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groups integrate committee views and assimilate them with help from the input of 
their committee members. Therefore, these aspects will be tested using the main 
argument of the research, which can be expressed by the following question: 
 
Are parliamentary committees more influential than political groups in forming the 
opinion of the EP and do they play a pivotal role in the decision-making of the EP 
because the decision is defined at this stage, transferred to the plenary where it is 
then adopted? 
 
This question underpins the research of this study and is underlying for all the other 
sub-hypotheses drawn from it, which are tested in each chapter. It encompasses the 
specific viewpoint adopted in this thesis for the analysis of the EP decision-making 
process: that is to look at committees, their technical input and influence, having as 
prior expectation that they are a more important factor than political groups. If the 
majority of studies so far considered political groups as the most important variable in 
the analysis of the EP institutional processes, this research, without denying the 
former’s  importance,  shifts  the  focus  towards  parliamentary committees and discovers 
they have developed into strong political actors with considerable impact on the daily 
parliamentary activity. Therefore, in order for the main hypothesis to be verified, 
there should be significant evidence of committee agreements being sanctioned by the 
House. Most importantly, there should be strong similarity of results between 
committee votes and final votes of the full chamber to be able to account for an 
influence of committee over plenary. At the same time, the null hypothesis in this 
case would be that committees do not play a significant role in the decision-making 
process of the institution and have no effect on the proceedings and the final opinion 
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expressed by Parliament. If there is evidence of engendered disagreement in the 
plenary sessions resulting in different voting patterns in these sessions as opposed to 
committee meetings, then the null hypothesis will be supported. Strong divergent 
views expressed by political groups in the final stages of the legislative process, 
resulting  in  different  voting  tendencies  at  the  two  stages,  rendering  committees’  views  
unrepresentative of the House, would all constitute signs of an EP where political 
groups alone dictate the rules and can turn the balance in favour of a strong plenary 
opposing a system of committees that serve purely an informational role. In such 
cases, the plenary sessions would be expected to hold significant relevance in the 
intra-institutional process. By looking at debates in the plenary sessions and in 
committee on a sample of reports, using process tracing and interviews with actors 
involved, one would expect to find great interest from MEPs into plenary debates and 
the expression of dissent issued from opposing views in the speeches. The result 
foreseen in this case would be the acknowledgement of a strong plenary in a first 
instance and that of a weak committee system working in the background. Also, the 
analysis of vote results for the first half of EP7 in both committee and plenary should 
provide sufficient evidence to establish whether the full chamber vote mirrors the 
committee one. 
 
Moreover, in order to test the hypothesis, three instruments, which allow for 
committee influence on the decision-making process, will be investigated. These are: 
the rapporteurs, the number of amendments and the political group meetings. Each of 
these will be analysed in detail in the empirical chapters and tested with the help of 
the sub-hypotheses below.   
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H1: Starting with the decision reached in the parliamentary committee, the 
rapporteur influences the final text of a report throughout the entire process up to its 
adoption by the plenary. 
 
This first sub-hypothesis is tested in chapter 4 in order to investigate how rapporteurs 
contribute to a committee decision being adopted by the full chamber. As mentioned 
in the previous section of this chapter, studies like that of Yoshinaka et al. (2010) 
have identified rapporteurs as the main figures acting in committee and plenary to 
structure EP opinion on a proposal for legislation or a non-legislative act. 
Consequently, chapter 4 analyses in detail their activity and verifies with the help of 
H1 if the rapporteur is one of the instruments that acts as a linking mechanism, 
helping transfer the result of committee decisions to the plenary. Based on the theory 
and the main hypothesis, the rapporteur would be expected to act as a pivot between 
the committee and the full chamber debate, ensuring agreement through debates and 
informal meetings with the shadows from the other political groups and moving the 
committee decision to plenary. The chapter focuses on the sequence of events, the 
institutional mechanisms in place and the discussions that form the process of drafting 
and voting the sample of reports from the case studies in committee and plenary, as 
well as on the result of votes that are part of the process. If there were evidence of 
considerable involvement from political groups in the drafting of a report, in the 
meetings with the shadows representing the other groups, in the results from 
committee meetings and in the forging of agreements, this would cause H1 to be 
false. Moreover, if such evidence is found, rapporteurs will appear to merely serve the 
functional role of conducting procedures linked to the passing of legislation in the EP, 
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being under the control and strict guidance of their political groups. They would not 
be in a position to ensure a committee opinion is accepted in plenary. 
 
In addition to rapporteurs, there is another factor that can point towards the level of 
committee influence: the number of amendments a report receives in committee and 
in plenary. Chapter 5 will investigate it using two sub-hypotheses: 
 
H2a: A large number of amendments tabled in committee leads to a report receiving 
fewer amendments in plenary. 
 
H2b: The number of committee amendments tabled to a report signals plenary voting 
behaviour and the extent to which it will follow a committee decision. 
  
Both H2a and H2b test whether there is any significance that can be attached to 
amendments submitted at the two stages. First of all, the assumption is that a large 
number of amendments initially submitted in committee would indicate disagreement 
on a report and different views held by committee members. If committees play a 
pivotal role in the decision-making process of the EP, looking to secure consensus, 
then amendments tabled here, even if they are numerous would serve to draw the lines 
along which agreement can be struck. Once these are then integrated in the form of 
the report that goes to plenary, assuming the consensus has been reached at this level 
and bearing in mind the way committees can influence the outcome of the decision in 
the full chamber, one would then expect fewer amendments to be introduced in 
plenary. Following the same logic, fewer amendments tabled in committee should 
signal less disagreement on a report at this stage and a complete transferal of the 
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committee vote result to the full chamber. Therefore, looking at the number of 
amendments tabled on reports in committee for the period selected and comparing 
this with the number that has been tabled on the same reports in plenary, should 
indicate if there is a connection between amendments that an act receives and its 
voting results. If committees exert influence over plenary, then amendments at the last 
stage in the legislative process should be fewer and, subsequently, a report, which 
already received a limited number of modifications in committee, should be voted in 
the full chamber with a large majority. Similarly, if H2a and H2b are not verified, 
then findings should reveal that there are more amendments submitted in plenary than 
in committee, thus indicating that disagreement has not been resolved prior to the 
final vote. Also, should a report with many amendments tabled in committee and a 
large majority vote then be voted down in plenary, H2b would fall. Therefore, a 
validation of both H2a and H2b would establish a clear connection between 
amendment numbers at committee and plenary stage and the success of a report, 
while also recognizing amendments as an instrument to verify the impact committee 
activity has on the Parliament.   
  
Finally, chapter 6 looks at the political group meetings that take place before the 
plenary sessions of the EP and the role that committee members play during these. In 
order to test this, it relies on the following sub-hypothesis: 
 
H3: Through their activity, appointed group members ensure committee majority 
decisions are supported and followed by their political group in the plenary session.  
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Through an analysis of the ALDE political group meetings, which debated the reports 
that are amongst the case studies used in chapters 4 and 5, chapter 6 looks for 
evidence of committee members involvement in debates, using the method of process 
tracing. If H3 were valid, then committee members assigned by political groups 
would be expected to contribute to these meetings, bringing expertise and information 
back from committee and establishing a group line through negotiations and debates. 
On the other hand, if analysis of these group meetings were to illustrate committee 
members as being outliers, sharing different policy preferences to those of their 
colleagues and in disagreement with them, then H3 would fall. Following the same 
logic, the voting results from committee and plenary should then be different, since 
members in committee act as outliers. Nonetheless, a non-validation of H3 would not 
exclude the possibility of having a replication of committee voting result in the final 
vote of the full chamber, provided political groups ensure control over both decision-
making stages in the institution. As discussed up until now and based on the findings 
of previous studies, it is clear that, apart from an ex-ante control, political groups have 
few tools and resources available to discipline their members and exert strong 
influence. Consequently, if findings offer proof of a replication of committee voting 
results in plenary, then this can only be explained by the existence of a significant 
rapporteur input at both stages, verified by fewer amendments to reports in plenary, as 
well as by the impact of committee members expertise on their colleagues preferences 
and on the group line. 
This section of the chapter has summarised the main hypothesLs of the thesis and 
presented the sub-hypothesHs that will be tested in the three empirical chapters. The 
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next section will look at the data used in this study and the findings that it might lead 
to. 
3. 3 Committees vs Plenary - Data, methods and research
The previous section of the chapter has put forward the hypothesis and sub-
hypotheses belonging to each chapter. They will be tested against data I collected 
over a period of one year, during EP7, from committee meetings, ALDE political 
group meetings and plenary sessions of the EP, together with interviews of political 
actors involved and the result of votes and number of amendments from committee 
and plenary. Therefore, this section will present the data collected, the methodology 
used and the research. 
To begin with, I have gathered data on votes available on the EP website of the 
Legislative Observatory, from all the standing committees in the EP, including the 
two special committees that were active until July 2011. It contains the number of 
votes in favour, against and abstentions for each of the reports voted in committee 
during the period of September 2009 until July 2011. These results have been cross-
referenced with those from the plenary votes, more precisely with the votes in favour, 
against and abstentions. In addition to this I have gathered the data on the number of 
amendments tabled in committee and in plenary to reports voted during that period. 
Also, specific proposals for legislation and debates on reports were analysed in a 
sample of five legislative committees (that deal with acts where the EU has extended 
competencies and the EP decides under the ordinary legislative procedure) and non-
legislative committees. The monitoring of these reports was carried out during the 
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one-year fieldwork observation, starting with their initial stages and concluding with 
the final vote in the full chamber.  
 
For this detailed analysis I have used the method of process tracing (Box-
Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier, 2008: 703; Checkel, 2005), which fits in with the 
initial question of the study and tries to establish how committees influence the EP. 
Since  an  observation  of  the  institution’s activity requires tracing the causes that are 
behind the ability of committees to impact on EP decisions, process tracing is in this 
case, the method most suited to investigate the internal interactions in action. As 
Checkel stresses in a paper discussing this  method,  ‘methodologically  speaking,  
process tracing provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism-
based  accounts  of  social  change’  (2005:  5)  and  this  is  what  the  thesis  wishes  to  
achieve in regards to understanding how decisions from committees can influence the 
opinion of the full chamber. Starting with a prior expectation that parliamentary 
committees can impact on the decision-making process in the institution, with the 
help of process tracing, this study looks to interactions and mechanisms that delineate 
the process, so as to finally establish that these are important actors influencing the 
EP, in certain cases more than political groups. In practice, this methodology has 
involved following a EP report from the inception phase in a parliamentary 
committee, to the vote in the committee up to the plenary debates and the final vote 
cast in the plenary session by all MEPs. Moreover, comparisons between the vote 
results, as well as between amendment numbers, in committee and plenary have also 
served as an alternative approach to testing the hypotheses and have supported the 
evidence which resulted from process tracing. The findings have all been analysed in 
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relation to the pre-floor (committee) and floor (plenary session) voting results and 
supported by structured interviews.  
 
The political group meetings that were investigated to see how committee output 
influences a group line, were those of the ALDE group in the EP. The choice for the 
group was made based on findings from previous research (Hix, 2005) that this is one 
of the groups with the highest potential of becoming a coalition partner for the other 
two large groups: the EPP and the S&D. It plays a pivotal role in consolidating the 
opinion of the EP because, in order for the other two groups to be able to influence 
the final plenary vote, they have to accommodate the views of ALDE. Moreover, 
during the fieldwork I conducted, this was the group that has provided me with the 
opportunity to have a full insight in their internal procedures and an access to its 
meetings. 
 
The choice of committees has been operated so as to ensure that a multitude of 
decisions and reports causing debates in the EP are covered. Since the more 
controversial and significant reports in terms of impact on EU legislation are 
discussed in legislative committees, the sample selected has focused on the activity of 
the following committees: the Committee on Budgets (BUDG), Committee on 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), Committee on Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection (IMCO), Committee on Regional Development (REGI). 
Apart from this, the activity of the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT), a 
non-legislative committee, has been monitored in order to allow for an account of the 
any existing differences between it and the others in the sample. 
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The time frame of the analysis has been limited to a period ranging from September 
2009 until July 2011 for the roll-call data, with the fieldwork taking place from May 
2010 until June 2011, in order to establish a pattern of representation and clearly mark 
the trends of variation in committee work, especially after the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions were introduced. Another reason for imposing this time limit is related to 
the high level of qualitative information that had to be collected as part of process 
tracing and to compliment the roll-call data. Moreover, the content of reports has had 
to be analysed, as well as that of the opinions, of the interventions and debates in 
these committees, together with the number of amendments put forward. The 
interviews with MEPs, staff and secretariat, which were part of the process tracing, 
inevitably demanded that the study be performed on events of immediate nature, so as 
to ensure the accuracy of the account recalled. The imperative of interviewing MEPs 
in a timeframe immediately following, or soon after, the debate in committee offers 
another explanation for the limited period covered by the study. Furthermore, the act 
of studying these interactions and decisions within a short-term remit from the events 
that they were part of, has allowed for an in-depth analysis into the interactions at 
play amongst the MEPs, their national delegations and their EP political groups. In 
addition to that, the study has also identified high-profile reports and has compared 
the debates and interactions around them with the rest of the subjects on the 
committee agenda at that time.  
 
The analysis has been focused around testing whether committees mirror the 
decisions of the whole EP, whether there is a degree of specialisation in these 
committees and test if they only serve an informational role for the institution. In a 
first instance, the initial aim has been to establish if there are differences between the 
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vote in the committees and the vote in plenary, in order to test the level of 
representation that the former holds over the latter, as well as the committee level of 
specialisation. Bearing in mind that the voting in committee was not a roll call vote 
and therefore not registered or reported separately according to the party membership, 
unlike the plenary, this has consequently been analysed using proportions. The results 
will be presented at length in the next chapter, which analyses committee activity, its 
key actors and how they affect the transferral of a committee decision to plenary in 
view of its adoption.  
 
Chapter 5 of the thesis will analyse the amendments tabled in committees as opposed 
to those submitted in plenary. This is due to the fact that the EP, once presented with a 
legislative proposal and after having established the committee that will analyse, draft 
a report and vote it, can still add amendments to a report in its plenary phase. These 
can be introduced by an MEP who is not a member of the relevant committee. The 
account of any instances where amendments are added at plenary stage reveals the 
representativeness of the assigned committee and the level of support that the plenary 
has  for  the  committee’s  views. 
 
An important test in this study is also constituted by the account of the voting patterns 
associated with the expression of views made by MEPs. This has been presented in 
detail in chapter 6 and has allowed for an investigation of the political group level of 
control over their MEPs. It has also unveiled the level of cohesiveness and typology 
of the issues that MEPs are most likely to be cohesive on.  
All this in order to provide a clearer image of the organisation of parliamentary 
committees in the EP and establish whether the pattern of disagreement is more 
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present in the committees and whether the decision is taken at pre-legislative level 
and carried onwards to the floor.  
 
 
3. 3.1 Evaluating the data  
 
In order to test a part of the theory on the similarity of votes between committee and 
plenary, I have taken a sample of reports discussed in five of the EP committees: 
Committee on Budgets (BUDG), Committee on Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety (ENVI), Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
(IMCO), Committee on Regional Development (REGI) and the Committee on Culture 
and Education (CULT). These are only reports voted under the two main procedures 
of the EP: ordinary legislative procedure and the own-initiative procedure, where 
Parliament can prepare a non-legislative report to signal its view on a matter where it 
does not have competence. I have looked at the votes that were cast in the committee 
on the own-initiative and ordinary legislative procedure reports and, subsequently, at 
those cast in the plenary, in the current legislature. The reason for the choice of period 
is linked to the beginning of EP7, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force with 
enhanced powers for the Parliament. A second reason for this is related to the 
extended access that I have been granted in the course of the fieldwork, in order to 
document aspects related to the internal political group and committee works from the 
beginning of 2009.  
 
Consequently, a mapping of the votes on the reports present on the agenda for the 
IMCO, REGI, ENVI, BUDG and CULT committees between September 2009 and 
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July 2011 has provided a body of evidence that points to a high level of similarity 
between the vote tally of a report in the pre-floor and floor stage. 
 
In the case of IMCO, most reports seem to have followed in plenary the voting line 
established in committee (Table 3.1). Some reports stand out, like the report on 
Textile names and related labelling of textile products, which presents the highest 
number of abstentions and that might very well be explained by the high degree of 
technicality of the matter under discussion and the inability of smaller groups to put 
forward a position on this subject. For example, members of the European 
Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) had all decided to abstain. The perceived 
preference coherence model in this case seems to explain the similarity between the 
votes in the prefloor and floor stages. European party group members appear to 
follow the position of their colleagues in the committee responsible when voting in 
the plenary session, since the 3 ECR members in IMCO and the 3 members of the 
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) abstained in the final vote 
on the report in Committee, as did their groups in plenary. 
The Consumer rights directive also illustrates a specific case. As mentioned before, 
this was a legislative proposal negotiated over a lengthy period of time and was 
subject to an early agreement.   
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Table 3.1: Results of votes in the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (September 2009 – July 2011) 
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Internal Market Scoreboard 22 59% 15 41% 0 530 86% 85 14% 3 
Consumer protection 34 92% 0 0% 3         
SOLVIT 34 92% 2 5% 1         
Delivering a single market to consumers and citizens 32 91% 0 0% 3 578 93% 28 5% 16 
New developments in public procurement 28 78% 0 0% 8        
EEA-Switzerland: internal market 32 94% 2 6% 0        
Completing the internal market for e-commerce 32 100% 0 0% 0        
Future of European standardisation 36 97% 0 0% 1        
Impact of advertising on consumer behaviour 30 91% 1 3% 2        
Implementation of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC 32 84% 1 3% 5        
Revision of the General Product Safety Directive and market surveillance 36 95% 0 0% 2 628 97% 11 2% 7 
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A Single Market for Enterprises and Growth 24 65% 0 0% 13 570 89% 44 7% 28 
A Single Market for Europeans 21 57% 3 8% 13 600 89% 48 7% 27 
Governance and Partnership in the Single Market 24 65% 1 3% 12 595 89% 61 9% 10 
A more efficient and fairer retail market 32 91% 3 9% 0 
Universal service and the 112 emergency number 33 97% 0 0% 1 
Repealing of Council Directives regarding metrology 30 91% 3 9% 0 656 100% 0 0% 2 
Textile names and related labelling of textile products 30 81% 1 3% 6 528 81% 18 3% 108 
Late payment in commercial transactions (recast) 30 83% 0 0% 6 612 95% 12 2% 21 
Second reading: Regulation laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction 
products  36 97% 1 3% 0 390 98% 4 1% 6 
Consumer rights 32 65% 16 33% 1 615 94% 16 2% 21 
Textile fibre names and related labelling and marking of fibre composition 30 83% 2 6% 4 528 81% 18 3% 108 
Enforcement of consumer protection laws 33 100% 0 0% 0 
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The Regional Development Committee also orients the votes that are cast in the 
plenary (Table 3.2). Indeed, the only way we can say that with certainty is by 
attending the committee at the time of the votes. For example, in the case of the report 
on the Eligibility of housing interventions in favour of marginalised communities, the 
Europe of freedom and democracy Group (EFD) voted against the report in 
Committee and most of their colleagues in the plenary voted against it as well, or 
chose to abstain. Without mentioning the big parties who formed a majority on this 
vote, such as the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP), 
the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP (S&D), 
the Greens/EFA and who all voted according to the line set in the committee, we have 
to say that the smaller groups, like the ECR or the EFD were less cohesive. That 
could be explained by the fact that the members of the REGI committee who come 
from these parties are less organized and cohesive as a group in committee as well, 
influencing the manner in which their input and preferences are perceived by their 
colleagues in the rest of the party. Based  on  Ringe’s  (2010)  perceived preference 
coherence model, in order for the European party group to vote cohesively on a 
report, the members of that same party in the specific committee must also be 
cohesive as a group. That is why, lack of coordination of party group members in a 
committee can account for a higher variation between the final results of votes on a 
report in committee and the final results of votes in the plenary. This also shows that, 
apart  from  Ringe’s  principle  of  perceived  shared  preferences,  the  pattern  of  vote  in  
committee for the group members, which was in this case inconclusive and pointed 
towards the existence of diverging views amongst members, plays a role in 
anticipating the pattern of the final vote in the full chamber.
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Table 3.2: Results of votes in the Regional Development Committee (September 2009 – July 2011) 
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Contribution of Cohesion policy to the achievement of Lisbon and the EU2020 objectives 40 95% 1 2% 1 
Implementation of the synergies of research and innovation earmarked Funds 39 95% 1 2% 1 559 91% 18 3% 36 
Transparency in regional policy and its funding 34 92% 1 3% 2 629 95% 6 1% 26 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the role of macro-regions in cohesion policy 43 98% 1 2% 0 
Contribution of EU regional policy towards fighting the financial and economic crisis - Objective 2 42 95% 0 0% 2 609 91% 46 7% 14 
Good governance with regards to the EU regional policy 35 100% 0 0% 0 
Achieving real territorial, social and economic cohesion within the EU 38 86% 5 11% 1 491 79% 117 19% 13 
Objective 3: a challenge for territorial cooperation 45 98% 1 2% 0 
Report 2010 on the implementation of the cohesion policy programmes for 2007-2013 40 98% 1 2% 0 
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Increased effectiveness between the ERDF and other structural funds 43 98% 1 2% 0 
European Urban Agenda and its Future in Cohesion Policy 36 95% 0 0% 2 
Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy 31 70% 4 9% 9 506 77% 48 7% 101 
Regulation on the ERDF as regards the eligibility of housing interventions 34 89% 3 8% 1 588 89% 57 9% 16 
Regulation concerning general provisions on the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund 36 88% 4 10% 1 519 82% 33 5% 83 
Regulation on EU financial contributions to the International Fund for Ireland (2007-2010) 42 98% 0 0% 1 630 95% 9 1% 25 
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In the case of the ENVI Committee the situation varies across the vote, especially 
given the importance of some of the legislation under consideration (Table 3.3). Many 
of the reports listed in the table were voted in plenary with a simple show of hands 
procedure, a fact which indicates large consensus in the House, since no request for a 
roll-call vote was made and therefore no record of opposition was judged necessary. 
This points to a consensual decision and coheres with the high level of agreement in 
committee. The reports that were in second reading, like the Recommendation for a 
second reading on the Council position at first reading for adopting a directive of the 
EP and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and 
control), by rapporteur Holger Krahmer, saw a lot more division in plenary and 
variation between the committee votes and the ones in the plenary, as well as a lot 
more plenary amendments tabled. This proves that a large number of amendments in 
plenary is indeed indicative of differences in voting in the two stages. Moreover, it 
indicates that there is a difference in voting patterns in first and second reading. 
However, reports such as the one on the Proposal for a regulation of the EP and of 
the Council on the provision of food information to consumers, by rapporteur Renate 
Sommer, have followed in the final vote the pattern set out by committee, even if they 
have had a large number of plenary amendments (351).
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Table 3.3: Results of votes in the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee (September 2009 – July 2011) 
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Commission White Paper: 'Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for 
action' 49 91% 3 6% 2 
Action plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation (2009-2015) 58 98% 0 0% 1 
Action Against Cancer: European Partnership 56 100% 0 0% 0 
Management of bio-waste in the European Union 55 95% 3 5% 0 
A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters 42 84% 6 12% 2 
Implementation of EU legislation for the conservation of biodiversity 55 100% 0 0% 0 
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European  initiative  on  Alzheimer’s  disease  and  other  dementias 48 98% 0 0% 1 646 98% 6 1% 6 
Reducing health inequalities in the EU 52 87% 1 2% 7 379 58% 228 35% 49 
Evaluation of the management of H1N1 influenza in 2009-2010 in the EU 58 95% 2 3% 1      
Forest protection and information in the EU: preparing forests for climate change 53 90% 6 10% 0      
GDP and beyond – Measuring progress in a changing world 59 97% 1 2% 1      
EU legislation on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) and related feed and food 
controls 56 98% 0 0% 1      
Options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions 44 75% 14 24% 1      
Animal health requirements applicable to the non-commercial movement of pet animals 35 97% 0 0% 1 618 97% 17 3% 5 
Importation of certain live animals and their fresh meat 36 100% 0 0% 0 533 96% 9 2% 16 
Standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation 53 98% 0 0% 1 643 96% 16 2% 8 
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Provision of food information to consumers 33 83% 6 15% 1 559 87% 54 8% 32 
Second reading: industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) 40 70% 13 23% 4 402 62% 189 29% 54 
Prevention of the entry into the legal supply chain of medicinal products which are falsified in 
relation to their identity, history or source 46 96% 0 0% 2 500 98% 12 2% 
Second reading: obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market 49 86% 6 11% 2 465 69% 22 3% 187 
Second reading: novel foods 49 91% 2 4% 3 667 96% 16 2% 9 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency 52 
100
% 0 0% 0 559 97% 7 1% 12 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 49 91% 0 0% 5 569 96% 8 1% 15 
Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment 
(recast) 53 98% 0 0% 1 640 98% 3 0% 12 
Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (recast) 51 93% 1 2% 3 580 91% 37 6% 22 
Placing on the market and use of biocidal products 24 67% 3 8% 9 553 84% 20 3% 83 
104 
Setting emission performance standards for new light commercial vehicles 35 57% 25 41% 1 520 79% 122 19% 13 
Information to the general public on medicinal products for human use subject to medical 
prescription 51 91% 2 4% 3 564 87% 41 6% 45 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 46 92% 1 2% 3 558 85% 42 6% 53 
Second reading: application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare 47 94% 2 4% 1 297 52% 120 21% 152 
European environmental economic accounts 40 83% 4 8% 4 616 92% 26 4% 24 
Provisions for engines placed on the market under the flexibility scheme 51 88% 5 9% 2 
Provisions for tractors placed on the market under the flexibility scheme 45 80% 5 9% 6 402 64% 218 35% 11 
Possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory 34 57% 10 17% 16 
Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, 57 92% 4 6% 1 606 89% 46 7% 26 
Fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption 41 76% 9 17% 4 
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For the BUDG and the CULT committee there is an important similarity of the results 
of votes between the two stages, especially in the case of the latter, where the 
presence of so many votes cast by the normal procedure - ‘show  of  hands’  - indicates 
a consensual approach and an agreement to the decision reached in the pre-legislative 
stage (Appendix 5.4 and Table 3.4). Nonetheless, it has to be pointed out that there is 
a possibility that the interest from MEPs is more limited in acts such as the Maria 
Badia I Cutchet Report on key competences for a changing world: implementation of 
the Education and Training 2010 work programme, particularly when it comes to 
policies where the EU has few or no direct competences. 
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Table 3.4: Results of votes in the Culture and Education Committee (September 2009 – July 2011) 
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Europeana - the next steps 30 100% 0 0% 0 
University-business dialogue 29 97% 1 3% 0 
An EU Strategy for Youth - Investing and Empowering 31 100% 0 0% 0 
Key competences for a changing world: implementation of the Education and 
Training 2010 work programme 26 90% 1 3% 2 
Journalism and new media - creating a public sphere in Europe 24 86% 3 11% 1 
Public service broadcasting in the digital era: the future of the dual system 19 76% 5 20% 1 522 86% 22 4% 62 
Early Years Learning in the European Union 27 100% 0 0% 0 506 86% 27 5% 55 
Cultural  dimensions  of  the  EU’s  external  actions 26 100% 0 0% 0 519 88% 46 8% 25 
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Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries 26 93% 0 0% 2         
Youth on the Move: - a framework for improving Europe's education and training 
systems 27 93% 0 0% 2         
European Union action for the European Heritage Label 28 100% 0 0% 0 497 89% 18 3% 41 
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So far, from the test on the committee sample presented above, it becomes clear that 
there are strong similarities between committee and plenary votes, mirroring each 
other, while there are differences in the voting pattern depending on first and second 
reading. Moreover, the vote of the full chamber analysed from the perspective of 
committee voting results, indicates that MEPs take input from their expert colleagues 
when establishing their voting choice, but they also rely on the committee 
proceedings, the results of votes and the level of disagreement between group 
members at that stage. The last section of the chapter will analyse some of these 
findings and see how they inform our current image of EP committees. 
 
 
3. 4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has put forward the main argument of the research that EP has 
undergone a process where contestation is contained and limited to committees, with 
the increase in its powers, and a strong committee system has emerged as result of 
this. Based on what is already known about EP committees, this research shows that 
these have come to influence the legislative process in the Parliament to a great 
extent, an aspect which will be illustrated in detail with the help of process tracing 
throughout the study.  
 
The first section in the chapter has shown how committees have come to play a 
significant  role  in  the  EP,  in  parallel  with  the  institution’s  increase  in  policy  
competences and out of a need to ensure legislative acts are debated and voted in 
time. The second section has looked at models used to analyse committees and has 
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presented the hypotheses that will be used to investigate committees and explain how 
they can exert influence on plenary decisions. Finally the third section of the chapter 
has presented the data and methods used by the research and looked at a sample of 
committees to check for similarities between the committee and plenary votes.  
 
All of the above has indicated that the current activity of committees is a consequence 
of the increased EP powers and these appear to have become more sophisticated and 
more decisive in the role they play within the legislative process.  
 
In conclusion, after analysing committee developments within a more powerful EP, as 
well as the committee studies, theoretical models used to analyse and their success in 
explaining the activity inside EP committees, this chapter posits that committee 
decisions impact on the political group activity and on the plenary results. While 
previous studies place political groups at the centre of the legislative process, this 
research shows that committees have also come to hold this place. This argument is 
supported by evidence issued from committee meetings and interactions between 
MEPs, political groups and committee members throughout passage of a report from 
draft phase to final decision in the full chamber. In order to stress the validity of this 
statement, the main hypothesis will be tested throughout the next chapters to show 
that the pattern of negotiation and agreement is usually reached in the pre-floor 
stages, either in committee, political group meeting or in rapporteur - shadow 
rapporteur meetings. This ultimately implies disagreement voiced mainly at 
committee level. Such findings break with those issued from an important body of 
research on the EP that has been focused too much on plenary session results, due to 
quantitative data gathered from roll-call votes, and has put less emphasis on how 
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committees impact the EP, partly excluding the pre-legislative stage debates, 
interactions and negotiations from the analysis of the decision-making process.                                               
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Chapter 4 
The Activity of the Parliamentary Committees and Principal Actors 
Involved 
This chapter provides empirical evidence that committees are key internal actors in 
the EP, in certain instances to a greater extent than political groups or national party 
delegations. It analyses the work in committees, in particular that of rapporteurs, 
comparing its results to those of the work in the plenary when the Parliament as a 
whole votes on the final reports. 
Committees in the EP have come into research focus over the past years partly as a 
consequence of the institutional changes, but also of the importance MEPs attach to 
the work they carry out there. From a general perspective, they appear to serve only 
an informational purpose, providing specialised knowledge to the legislature. Studies, 
such as those done by Whitaker (2011), Høyland (2006), McElroy (2006), Judge and 
Earnshaw (2010), Ringe (2010) and Benedetto (2005) on the internal activity and the 
decision making of the institution have tried to establish, by looking at different 
actors, how the output of committee work influences the legislative process in the 
Parliament. This has  led  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  EP’s  functioning  and  has  
emphasised the part played by some of these actors, such as the rapporteurs. 
However, it has also raised additional questions regarding the functioning of the 
institution and the place that committees hold within it, stressing the need for a more 
in-depth account of the parliamentary committee activity. 
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The previous chapter has looked at theoretical aspects describing and explaining 
committees’  place  within  the  legislative  process  inside  the  EP. In light of the 
conclusions drawn there, the main argument underpinning this study can be summed 
up as follows: parliamentary committees play an essential part in the decision-making 
of this institution, irrespective of any other variables that could be involved at this 
stage, such as party or policy. Consequently, they are in a position to influence 
Parliament, which in turn leads to the final vote cast on a report in plenary being 
directly linked, and ultimately following, the result of votes in committee on that 
same report. In this respect, this study aims to contribute to a body of work trying to 
isolate, identify and present the mechanisms through which committee influence can 
be exerted in plenary. It is based on a core set of three chapters analysing the 
interactions, the pattern of decision-making and the result of votes in the 
parliamentary committees and in the plenary session. Each of these three test 
hypotheses on the interplay between committee and plenary in the EP in order to 
illustrate how decisions reached at one level – the parliamentary committee – are 
carried over to the next – the plenary session. The purpose of this analysis is to find 
an explanation for the significant overlap that exists between committee and plenary 
decisions on reports in the EP. Within this framework, the chapter focuses on 
committee workload and the role that different actors, like rapporteurs or group 
coordinators, play. Respectively chapters 5 and 6 look at the significance of 
amendments made to reports presented in the committee as opposed to those 
submitted in plenary during the legislative process and the manner in which group 
meetings manage to coordinate the work of MEPs and committees with the plenary 
sessions held every month (chapter 6). 
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EP committee activity has many different facets and those involve working on 
drafting  reports  on  Commission  proposals,  structuring  the  EP’s  position  on  the  EU  
policy perspectives, as well as holding the other two institutions that are part of the 
decision-making triangle (the European Commission and the Council) accountable for 
their policy programmes and initiatives. In all these instances various actors, in 
particular rapporteurs and group coordinators, play a major role in the daily work 
carried out in this institution. The activity such actors carry out in committees is an 
essential indication of the importance that the former have within the whole decision 
making process of the institution. Analysing their work can reveal not only the pattern 
of organising consensus and solving dissent in committees, but also the way in which 
the adoption of a decision at this stage can directly impact and ultimately shape the 
entire legislative process that a report follows inside this legislature. More precisely, 
this chapter argues that the influence that rapporteurs and group coordinators have 
upon a report debated in the parliamentary committees is also replicated in the plenary 
and that this extended influence constitutes the linkage mechanism that explains why 
results in EP committees pre-empt the final decision of the plenary.   
 
Therefore, this chapter analyses, first of all, the role that rapporteurs play within the 
debates and negotiations on a report in committee and further on in the plenary and 
looks at how group coordinators bring their contribution at this stage. The main 
purpose is to identify the extent to which reports have similar results in committee 
and plenary and what part rapporteurs might play in achieving this outcome. 
Moreover, it has to be established if there is sufficient evidence of any other factors 
that might account for the overlap between committee and plenary decisions instead 
of the activity of rapporteurs, the institutional makeup or the group coordinators. 
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Analysis for this chapter shall rely on fieldwork observations of debates in several 
committees carried out through process tracing (Checkel, 2005) and accompanied by 
a series of structured interviews with actors directly involved in these cases. This will 
then be complimented by a descriptive analysis of data I collected from the EP 
website and which consists of results of votes on reports in both committee and 
plenary. 
To begin with, the chapter will look at the existing body of work involving 
parliamentary committees and how the main argument fits in with the findings. It will 
then go on to present the way in which discussions and negotiations are carried out in 
committee, aiming to identify how the interactions are then pursued in the plenary 
sessions. 
4. 1 Parliamentary committee activity and rapporteurs
The existing studies on parliamentary committees in the EP are either focused on the 
level of representation that these have of the legislature (Mamadouh and Raunio, 
2003), on the place they occupy and the purpose they serve inside the institution 
(Whitaker, 2011), or on the amount of influence that party groups might hold over 
them (Whitaker, 2005). Furthermore, studies researching the role of rapporteurs in 
committees focus on their importance in representing the EP in the interinstitutional 
negotiations (Costello and Thomson, 2010), their ability to impact on these 
negotiations in the trilogue meetings (Yordanova, 2010), their nationality and thus 
their representativity of the Parliament as a whole (Kaeding, 2004) or on the 
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correspondence between their political affiliation and that of national parties in 
government represented in the Council (Høyland, 2006). The literature recognises that 
both parliamentary committees and rapporteurs are important factors within the make-
up of the EP. However,  it  does  so  mostly  by  comparing  the  legislature’s  influence  on  
legislative proposals with that of the other institutions – the European Commission 
and the Council. Indeed, such analysis can offer an image of the place Parliament has 
in the decision-making triangle but it leaves a gap in terms of understanding the 
activity inside the legislature and the processes that lead to the formulation and 
coordination  of  EP’s  position.  That  is  why,  this  chapter analyses the procedures 
involved in drafting a report in the committees of the EP, in order to illustrate the role 
of rapporteurs and group coordinators within this process, as well as the impact they 
might have on the output from committee and on passing the achieved result through 
to the full session of the House.  
 
So far, research on rapporteurs and their work in EP committees has centred around 
questions related to the representativity of the institution, the extent to which the 
parliamentary committees are illustrative of the Parliament as a whole. McElroy’s  
(2006) findings point towards a high degree of representativity, as is the case with 
Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) but these results can also be explained by the 
distribution of committee assignments in the EP based on the size of the political 
groups, which is proportional to the number of MEPs belonging to each group. 
Consequently, from a political group perspective, each parliamentary committee 
mirrors the composition of the full EP. This factor can also account for correlations 
between the size of the party group and the number of rapporteurs these manage to 
secure, as found by Benedetto (2005). However, the same correlations cannot be 
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established in regards to the nationality of MEPs that obtain rapporteurships, as Hurka 
and Kaeding (2012) point out in an analysis of the rapporteurship assignments from 
1994 to 2009. Their findings show a significant degree of under-representation of 
MEPs from the new Member States (Hurka and Kaeding, 2012). The reasons for this 
might be centred around the size and concentration of national delegations inside the 
largest party groups in the EP (such as the EPP, S&D and ALDE), knowing that a 
strong and cohesive national delegation affiliated to one of the main parties can play 
an important role in securing rapporteurships for their Members; but also around the 
idea of expertise of the MEPs selected.  
 
While such findings provide more insight into the nature, characteristics and 
likelihood of an MEP obtaining a rapporteurship, they offer less information in 
regards to the influence they might have on the legislative process, more precisely, on 
the intra-institutional process. 
 
As initially stated, the main argument underpinning this study places committees at 
the centre of the EP, being in a position to influence the entire legislature. Through 
aggregating opinions and solving dissent at this level, committees reach decisions that 
are then put forward and taken over by the plenary session in the final votes. Amongst 
factors influential within this process can also be counted the activity of the 
rapporteurs. This chapter, in fact, argues that they are instrumental, together with the 
group coordinators, in ensuring a clear transfer of the committee decision to the 
plenary stage. Therefore, studies such as those carried out by Costello and Thomson 
(2010)  on  the  influence  of  rapporteurs  on  the  EP’s  opinions  can  explain  in  more  detail  
the processes at play.  
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Costello and Thomson (2010) look at the way in which rapporteurs in the EP can 
‘influence  policy  outcomes’ (2010: 221), using the informational approach to analyse 
parliamentary committees. This approach looks at committees as an institutional tool 
meant to provide the plenary with specialised knowledge (Costello and Thomson, 
2010:  220).  On  such  basis,  they  conclude  that  ‘the  delegation of committee tasks to 
rapporteurs gives these individuals the potential, albeit a constrained potential, to 
influence  decision  outcomes  in  their  favour.’  (Costello  and  Thomson,  2010:  221)  
They consider amendments submitted in committee and in plenary a source of 
constraint to the input that a rapporteur might have on the final position of the 
Parliament (Costello and Thomson, 2010: 235). Indeed, changes to the report may be 
introduced at either committee or plenary stage by other MEPs, political groups or 
parliamentary committees providing their opinion on the proposed text. However, at 
any point along this process, the MEP charged with drafting the report has different 
opportunities to seek consensus and aggregate views and even influence the outcome 
of the amendments submitted initially. He has the option to do so because the 
institution already has a series of informal processes in place which allow him to call 
for meetings (so-called shadow-rapporteur meetings) to prepare the report with his 
counterparts from the other political groups (shadow rapporteurs), but also to discuss 
possible amendments, to try and establish compromise amendments that fit with the 
line set up by him in the report and to convince others of the necessity to include or 
exclude certain changes to its final version. In practice, the rapporteur does not have 
to be constrained by modifications submitted to the draft of the report he prepares, as 
long as he aligns the views of his colleagues in committee and builds up consensus 
from an early stage. Such discussions start in committee with members assigned to 
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these  and  the  basis  for  the  EP’s  ‘opinion’  on  a  specific  matter  as  expressed  in  the  
report is constructed and defined at this stage. Once a vote is passed in committee, the 
resulting report goes to plenary. Therefore, the rapporteur can be instrumental in 
ensuring that the agreement obtained at an early stage in committee is respected and 
followed by the entire plenary of the EP. From this, the hypothesis underlining this 
chapter can be derived: 
 
H 1: Starting with the decision reached in the parliamentary committee, the 
rapporteur influences the final text of a report throughout the entire process up to its 
adoption by the plenary. 
 
Existing research has recognised the influence of rapporteurs (Kaeding, 2004; 
Høyland, 2006; Benedetto, 2005; Costello and Thomson, 2010) and the place they 
hold within the decision-making process of the EP. Moreover, studies have 
highlighted their importance in the process of completing early agreements on 
legislative files under first reading, where EP rapporteurs are key negotiators in the 
legislative process with the other institutions  (Reh et al., 2011; Héritier and Reh, 
2012) and where it has also been  claimed  that  they  have  ‘undermined the legislative 
role  of  the  parliamentary  committees’  (Yordanova,  2013:  85). They are indeed part of 
the negotiating teams in trilogues and, together with the shadow rapporteurs and the 
Chair, have the considerable influence and the ability to impact on the final adoption 
of a proposal. In this framework, Yordanova argues that rapporteurs benefit from an 
asymmetry  of  information  with  the  other  committee  members  and  ‘leading  the  
informal inter-institutional negotiations gives the rapporteur strong agenda-setting 
powers’  (2013:  89).  Such  an  approach,  however,  does  not  account  for  the  existing  
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interactions taking place between the rapporteur and other committee members who 
do not take part in the trilogues but are consulted so that their preferences may be 
considered in view of the successful adoption of the agreement. Consequently, the 
current study goes further and analyses in detail the level of involvement of 
rapporteurs and the implications derived from this for the final result in the plenary. 
More precisely, while looking at the entire process a report follows from committee to 
plenary, it verifies whether the rapporteurs are the main agents that ensure the transfer 
of the parliamentary committee decision to the full session of the EP.  
Since rapporteurs are key actors in the process that a text has to follow in order to 
become  the  common  ‘opinion’  of  the  EP,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  they  are  also  in  
charge  of  securing  plenary’s  agreement  on  a  committee  decision.  This  would  be  a  
necessity for any MEP responsible for a report and wishing to see it pass at both 
legislative stages, without too many amendments, in a uniform and cohesive manner. 
However, if the rapporteur were to have a less significant role in pushing through a 
report in the EP, then we would expect for the coordination to originate from a 
different set of actors alongside different premises, actors such as the party groups. 
These would then have to be more involved in the drafting stages of the report, to 
frequently discuss reports from their initial phases onwards in order to find the party 
group position and align the views of all MEPs prior to the parliamentary committee 
and plenary vote. At the same time, they would have to impose measures of control to 
ensure that the line they set out is followed. Indeed, finding evidence of greater party 
involvement would be a pre-requisite to establishing that rapporteurs play a more 
limited role in aligning the committee and plenary final vote. Moreover, given the 
nature of the EP and that of its political groups, considerations related to their 
capacity, resources and overall interests have to be carried out in order to determine 
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the likelihood of such a control being exercised by them. This is due to the fact that 
the EP is recognised as being an institution with a high volume of legislative work 
and weak political groups, formed of MEPs with different constituency interests and 
agenda priorities depending on every Member State. Apart from that, they group a 
series of very heterogeneous views from different national parties, an aspect that 
makes it difficult at times to form a common position on a given policy. This in turn 
provides additional incentive for key actors, such as rapporteurs, to seek to fill-in the 
preference coherence gap for their group members and, at the same time, provides 
committees with an opportunity to impact on the final decision of the House. Under 
these circumstances, political groups have to dedicate time and resources in order to 
coordinate and streamline the activity in all parliamentary committees. Therefore, 
after setting the theory background provided by the existing studies and establishing 
the hypothesis, the following section of this chapter will focus on the background 
aspects related to committee work in the EP, on the manner in which rapporteurs can 
influence it, but also on how political groups organise to follow this activity. This last 
aspect, however, will be analysed in more detail in chapter 6, which looks at political 
groups and their impact in EP committees. 
 
 
4. 2 The daily work of parliamentary committees of the EP 
 
The previous section has set the theoretical basis for the current chapter so as to 
identify actors who are instrumental in passing the decision reached in the 
parliamentary committee through to the plenary final vote. The next part of the 
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chapter will focus on describing the work these carry out and the activity that takes 
place in EP committees. 
Several aspects distinguish committees in the EP from other legislatures, and amongst 
those is the highly technical nature of most issues they have to assess and provide an 
opinion on. Ever since the single market, the largest project of the EU, launched in 
1992, the EP and its committees have pushed through a great number of proposals for 
legislation coming from the Commission. In the last two terms, 2004 to 2009 and 
2009 onwards, the Parliament has done so mostly after the first reading of the 
proposals, in an effort to gain legitimacy from the increased legislative output it 
created. Over time, activity in parliamentary committees has increased and the 
plenary has had less opportunity and fewer resources to engage in full debates on 
reports coming from committees. In its stride to increase efficiency, the EP has had to 
pass more reports through the final legislative stages, the plenary session. In order to 
do this, EP has resorted more often to early agreements with the other institutions, to 
be able to make sure that a legislative proposal is completed in first reading. 
Parliament figures on EP7 (2009-2014) show that 84% of all legislation during this 
term has been completed under first reading, with an average duration of 18 months 
per procedure. In practice, this implies reaching a decision at an earlier stage before
that of the final plenary session, so that the report containing the opinion of the EP on 
a proposal for legislation can be voted in a timely manner instead of being submitted 
to extensive discussions later on in the full House. As a senior official from 
the Secretariat of the EP pointed out, the political groups chose to have a 
plenarydedicated to grand policy debates, which are more likely to raise the interest of the 
5 Source: Conciliations and Codecision website 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/statistics_en.htm 
 Interview with an official from the Plenary directorate of the EP, 7 December 2011. 
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press and that of voters, rather than technical discussions on environment or single 
market legislation for example. Consequently,  members’  activity  in  committees  has  
become increasingly significant to the decision-making inside the institution and has 
had to be better organised. Such organisation came from the group coordinators, 
members of political groups assigned to a parliamentary committee who coordinate 
the activity of all the other members from their party group active in that same 
committee. Together with the rapporteurs (members responsible for drafting the 
report containing the view of the EP on a legislative proposal) they are essential 
figures in driving the committee workload further through their activity. 
That is why, it is necessary to analyse in more detail the path taken by an EP 
“opinion”  from  committee  stage  to  the  final  vote  in  the  House  and  look  at  the  
influence exercised upon it by the main actors that can contribute to the alignment of 
the committee and plenary outcome of votes. Aside from investigating group 
coordinators and their meetings, this will help establish whether political groups are 
instrumental in controlling the output of committee or if this is not in fact the role of 
rapporteurs, seen as agents managing the work in committee and ensuring that the 
decision taken here is replicated in the plenary. Such an approach differs from the 
view taken so far in the existing studies on committees, such as Whitaker (2011), in 
that it does not only see rapporteurs as representatives and enforcers of the choices 
made by the political group they belong to, but also as agents of change themselves, 
shaping political group policy and the general EP position on a legislative or non-
legislative matter. From this perspective, these studies do not generate a sufficiently 
in-depth image of the dynamics inside these committees and this is due to a various 
set of reasons: either they see EP committees as having an informational role to play 
within the EP decision-making process (McElroy, 2006), as actors central to the 
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legislature, but focusing less on their ability to influence the result of the final votes, 
or they are considered a preliminary stage in a process that an act follows before 
reaching the plenary sessions of the Parliament (Costello and Thomson, 2010). 
Nonetheless, if such analyses are based on an understanding of the decision-making 
processes in the institution as following, in many instances, a consensus-based 
approach, the need for an agent, such as the rapporteur, aggregating consensus in the 
EP and forming a common opinion based on the median position of the main political 
groups (the EPP, S&D and ALDE) can be easily justified. Starting from a body of 
fieldwork carried out in this institution over the course of one year, May 2010 to June 
2011, in this section I will analyse some of these statements and shed more light on 
the processes and interactions that are present in these committees. 
 
EP committees amend proposed legislation that is forwarded by the Commission and 
they provide a source of specialised knowledge on EU policies. MEPs see them as the 
most important part of their work and so do the Council and Commission. Based on 
data from the 2010 MEP Survey, 46% of the respondents considered the principal role 
of the EP to be that of legislating, a role where committees have a stronghold in the 
institution. Activity in committees allows MEPs to build up a profile and gain more 
visibility towards their electorate and the other institutions. The latter usually have 
delegates attending all committee sessions and reporting on the proceedings. These 
committees pass all legislation relating to the single market, thus creating the 
regulatory system for the EU economy, one of the largest in the world, and that 
implicitly affects the entire world economy. Their importance cannot be overlooked.  
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There is a total of 20 parliamentary committees that are active in the Parliament at 
present, as well as two sub committees (Human Rights Committee and Security and 
Defence Committee) and one special committee (CRIM - Organised crime, corruption 
and money laundering Committee). Most of these are standing committees, with the 
exception of the special committee set up in order to deal with recent policy issues, 
which has been preceded by two former special committees (CRIS - Financial, 
Economic and Social Crisis Committee and SURE – Policy Challenges Committee) 
set up as a consequence of the economic crisis and whose work has been completed at 
the end of July 2011 and June 2011 respectively. EP committees can count up to 76 
MEPs, while the smallest ones group only 24 MEPs. They also count substitute 
members that have the possibility to attend committee meetings and in some cases 
even become shadow rapporteur, when the rapporteur is chosen from the ranks of 
another political group (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 117). According to 
Rule  186  ‘the  composition  of  the  committees shall, as far as possible, reflect the 
composition  of  Parliament’  (Rules  of  Procedure,  2012)  and  ‘the  proportionality  of  the  
distribution of committee seats among political groups must not depart from the 
nearest appropriate whole number. If a group decides not to take seats on a 
committee, the seats in question will remain vacant and the committee will be reduced 
in size by the corresponding number. Exchange of seats between political groups is 
not  allowed’  (Rule  186).  Therefore,  the  allocation  of  committee assignments is 
proportionate to the size of the EP group, but it is also influenced by the size of the 
national delegation in the party group. National delegations in an EP political group 
are composed of all the MEPs from a political party in a Member State and the leader 
of the delegation is the one who has the power to distribute assignments of committee 
membership to its members and coordinate their activity at the European party group 
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level. They can speak for the delegation and constrain members to follow a specific 
national party line, if necessary. As it can be seen in Table 4.1, there are certain 
national delegations that have a strong presence throughout the main political groups 
in the EP. This is the case for the EPP German national delegation that has 42 MEPs, 
or the S&D German delegation, with 23 MEPs, or the ALDE British national 
delegation, counting 12 MEPs and sharing the role of largest national delegation in 
the ALDE group with the German national delegation. This concentration of MEPs 
from particular Member States across the main party groups in the Parliament can 
also be a factor in explaining the high numbers of rapporteurs from one or two 
countries, like Germany, France or Spain (Hurka and Kaeding, 2012). However, this 
matter will be analysed in more detail in the next section of the chapter when looking 
at the influence of the rapporteurs through a number of case studies. 
 
Regarding  the  EP’s  political  groups,  it  is  also important to point out that the larger the 
party, the higher the number of available committee seats will be for MEPs interested 
in securing benefits for their constituents through their committee work. Nonetheless, 
judging from the high number of members and substitute members present for 
example in the Foreign Affairs Committee (79), which does not deal with the 
legislative issues where EP enjoys considerable power, it could be concluded that it is 
not only practical constituency preferences that influence committee choices of 
MEPs, but also the apparently prestigious nature of securing membership in a 
parliamentary committee dealing with world policy matters. All in all, it is difficult to 
establish if MEPs seek to secure assignments in committees based on preferences of 
their constituents. The explanation for this is the large number of cross-sector issues 
that committees deal with and the fact that they touch, at different levels, on all 
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interests that could be present in a constituency. If we are to take the example of a 
small maritime region in Spain, the interests of constituents in this area might be 
covered by the Fisheries committees, but also by the Regional Development 
Committee, in terms of structural funds, by the Agriculture and Rural Development 
committee, by the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee, or by the 
Transport and Tourism Committee, in an equal manner. Therefore, an MEP would be 
faced with a situation where he would have to make a decision on the committee 
membership most likely to serve the interests of his constituency, but also of his 
country, in order to ensure his re-election and his presence on the party lists. This 
would also be coupled with the constraints imposed by the existing assignments 
within the national delegation, as represented in the party group, as well as with the 
place that committees hold within the EP as a whole, whether or not they are
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Table 4.1: Political Groups Composition in the EP according to Member State (May 2012)
 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE GB 
EPP 5 7 2 1 42 1 4 7 25 30 35 2 4 4 3 13 2 5 6 29 10 14 4 6 4 5  
S&D 5 4 7 4 23 1 3 8 23 11 22 2 1 3 1 4 4 3 5 7 7 11 2 5 2 6 13 
ALDE 5 5  3 12 3 4 1 2 6 6  1 2 1   6    5 2 1 4 4 12 
Greens 
/EFA 
4   2 14 1  1 2 14   1  1   3 2  1   2 2 4 5 
ECR 1  9 1         1 1  1  1  11       26 
EFD 1   1      1 10   2    1  4     1  10 
GUE 
/NGL 
  4 1 8  1 2 1 5  2 1     2   4   1  1  
NI 1 2      3 1 3      3  5 6   3     6 
Total 22 18 22 13 99 6 12 22 54 70 73 6 9 12 6 21 6 26 19 51 22 33 8 15 13 20 72 
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committees mostly responsible for proposals of legislation – legislative committees – 
or non-legislative committees. 
 
As far as political groups inside parliamentary committees are concerned, their 
influence may vary and this is due to several reasons, amongst which the lack of 
strong instruments for discipline once an MEP has received his assignment. Parties 
and groups have an ex-ante control through assignments but from there onwards their 
ability to control members' activity in committee is limited. However, there is an MEP 
designated to act as a whip on behalf of the political group and assume responsibilities 
as its main representative in committee, and that is the committee group coordinator. 
In some cases he can impose a level of discipline and ensure that group members in 
committee have a cohesive line of vote at this level. However, there are no direct 
consequences, such as penalties or sanctions, for an MEP who defects from the line 
set out by the party, such as expulsion from the committee, for example. Nonetheless, 
the committee group coordinator plays a key part in the entire activity of the 
committee, from the first stages a legislative act or an opinion requests that the 
parliamentary committee draft a report. As they are chosen to ensure the discipline 
and cohesion of MEPs from a political group in a specialised committee, they can 
align the group's position with the help of preparatory meetings organised before each 
committee session and can ensure that its members follow the same voting indications 
during the committee votes. They are also the ones that can decide which substitute 
member can receive shadow rapporteurship or can vote in the place of another 
member, holding a full assignment in committee. All in all, this is a key position and 
judged by MEPs as being very valuable, together with that of Chair or Vice-chair of 
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the committee or rapporteur. The implications and consequences of the influence of
these  coordinators,  or  group  ‘spokespersons’  (Corbett,  Jacobs  and  Shackleton,  2011:  
151) as they have been referred to, will also be analysed in chapter 6 from the 
perspective of their role and interactions inside the political group structure as a 
whole. 
As part of the daily work, a coordinator attends the monthly  coordinators’  meetings  
held behind closed doors, together with the committee secretariat and the Chair and 
Vice-Chairs of the committee. He has the ability to decide on the future calendar and 
committee agenda, the decisions that will be passed, the legislative, non-legislative or 
own-initiative reports that will be drafted in the coming months. Most importantly, 
the coordinator is the one who can obtain assignments on reports for the group 
members, the so-called rapporteurships. These are used to describe the quality of a 
rapporteur, who is in fact the MEP appointed by the responsible committee to 
elaborate, coordinate and present the report of the Parliament on a particular proposal 
from the Commission, an initiative of the EP or any other resolution. It is worth 
noting that, in the course of EP7, committees have notably increased the number of 
own-initiative reports they deal with. These do not have a legislative value but can 
signal the position of the EP to the other institutions on a particular subject (Hurka 
and Kaeding, 2012: 516). They first need the authorisation of the Conference of 
Presidents, the highest decision body in the EP, before the parliamentary committees 
can initiate them. The former is composed of the President of the EP and the chairmen 
of the political groups and it decides on long term policy, institutional strategy, but 
 Interview with the ALDE group coordinator from the Regional Development Committee, 23 June 
2010. 
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also organisational matters, such as  the  ‘responsibilities  and  membership  of  
committees  and  delegations’.
Regarding the distribution of reports, this appears to differ depending on committee, 
but it is generally done using a points-based system, whereby each coordinator 
attending the meeting can bid for a report according to the point value initially 
awarded to it by the committee secretariat (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 
158). Appendices 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the way in which points are distributed inside 
a committee amongst different political groups and give an example of the agenda 
setting that is done by group coordinators. The distribution is done proportionally 
according to the number of MEPs each political group has. The tables present the 
value that is awarded to each legislative act, own-initiative report or opinion dealt 
with by the committee. This evaluation is usually being performed in relation to the 
importance of a legislative proposal that is submitted to the committee. The group 
coordinators decide together the value of a report (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2011: 
158). For example, rapporteurships on legislative opinions, which hold less 
significance in terms of the impact they have on the position of the EP as a whole 
compared  to  that  of  a  full  report,  “cost”  one point, while the non-legislative opinions 
“cost”  0.5  points  (See  Appendices 4.1 and 4.2). To what concerns high-profile 
legislative packages, the points awarded to these can vary according to the number of 
“bidders”  that  wish  to  fight  for  them,  going  up  to a maximum of five points (Corbett, 
Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 158), but there are also instances where co-
rapporteurships might be established between the largest political groups in the 
committee, as it was the case with the Report on the proposal for a regulation laying 
 Rule 24, Rules of Procedure of the EP, 2012. Source: www.europarl.europa.eu. 
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down common provisions on the General Regulation.Observations carried out in the
course of fieldwork in the Regional Development Committee, during a coordinators
meeting that had to decide which group will be awarded rapporteurship of the 
abovementioned report, revealed that the group coordinators from the main political 
groups, the EPP and the S&D reached an agreement to receive the co-rapporteurship 
on this legislative act. In this way, they were counting on ensuring cross-party support 
for  the  report,  but  also  on  raising  the  “cost”  of  this  rapporteurship  for  other  smaller  
groups  and  diminishing  their  own  “points’  expenses”  by  having  to  use  fewer  points  
than for a full rapporteurship. In the course of the meeting, the Chair of the 
committee, EPP Polish MEP and former Commissioner in the 2004-2009 term, 
Danuta Hubner, informed the group coordinators that co-rapporteurships were treated 
as exceptions and as such they had to be officially validated by the Conference of 
Presidents in order for them to be applied. In the end, the co-rapporteurship was 
accepted and the group coordinators of the largest political groups in committee, 
Dutch MEP Lambert van Nistelrooij -  EPP coordinator - and German MEP 
Constanze Angela Krehl - S&D coordinator - were named co-rapporteurs on this 
particular report. This case illustrates how consensual rapporteurship decisions can be 
seemingly easily reached in committees and these do not have to follow the normal 
cross-party ideological divide. There is, however, political calculation involved here 
since both rapporteurs would be actively pursuing a common line across the House 
 The General Regulation referred to here was covered by the EP in the Report on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common 
Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
The draft report dating from the 14 May 2012 is available on the EP website, at the following address: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/regi/draft-reports.html. 
 Fieldwork  observation  made  in  the  Regional  Development  Committee’s  group  coordinators’  
meeting of 9 May 2011. 
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and would be able to rally the support of their group colleagues at the time of the final 
vote in plenary. 
Furthermore, coming back to the  “costs”  associated  with  different  acts  and  procedures  
dealt  with  by  committees,  according  to  the  observations  from  the  group  coordinators’  
meetings, within the frame of the bargaining procedure, obtaining a rapporteurship on 
an  opinion  will  “cost”  the group less than a legislative proposal. In such 
circumstances, the coordinator is called upon to make the most of the points received 
for the first two and a half years of the EP term and to try and give the group more 
prominence in committee by obtaining as many significant reports as possible. The 
number of points allocated to each group being proportionate to its size would, in 
certain cases, allow for the main group in the Parliament, such as the EPP for 
example, to obtain all important dossiers within that committee for a given period of 
time (see the number of points allocated to each political group as listed in 
Appendices 4.1 and 4.2). However, fieldwork observations of the coordinators 
meetings together with the abovementioned case of the General Regulation Report, 
reveal that in most cases a policy of consensus and negotiation is applied, where the 
group coordinator from a larger political group works in agreement with the others 
and tries to distribute dossiers in a balanced manner.  Such a practice allows smaller 
groups, who otherwise would be left out, to also bid successfully for more relevant 
reports. Moreover, in some cases there are reports or opinions that may sometimes be 
worth  zero  points,  such  as  the  ‘The  European  Schools'  system  in  2009’ that is listed in 
Appendix 4.1 with zero points. This allows group coordinators from smaller groups, 
such as the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) or the Confederal 
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Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) for example, to 
obtain rapporteurships as well as some added visibility for their members.  
Nonetheless, as mentioned before, fieldwork observations show that there are 
different practices for allocating rapporteurships in EP committees and not all of them 
are based on this system of bidding points. Some of the appointments are simply done 
consensually, without any bidding taking place, since an MEP in the committee might 
be judged as a specialist on the technical matter approached in the report (Corbett, 
Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011:158); while some of them look at assigning, especially 
on essential pieces of legislation, MEPs with a high political profile and expertise on 
the issue.  
 
In addition to the post of rapporteur, each of the group members that are part of the 
committee can receive from the coordinator the assignment of being shadow 
rapporteur of a dossier when the group did not manage to secure a rapporteur on the 
given file (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2011: 159). This position offers them the 
opportunity to coordinate the common line of group members in committee on a 
specific topic and represent their technical and political views during meetings with 
the main rapporteur and other group shadows. These are organised in the period of 
time leading up to the drafting and presentation of the final report. Such assignments 
can hold a lot of value for MEPs who are part of smaller political groups and have 
fewer points, as a result of that, and fewer opportunities allowing them to obtain 
rapporteurships. Even for a group like ALDE, a key actor in the coalition formation 
partnership inside the EP, but relatively small in size compared to the other two main 
parties, as can be seen in Table 4.1, and thus with fewer points to make use of, the 
practice of using shadow rapporteurships is instrumental in ensuring that MEPs from 
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this group influence the outcome of a report in committee, in spite of not being able to 
secure rapporteurship. Observations from the ALDE group obtained during fieldwork 
in the EP, revealed that members in a committee consider these appointments as a 
means to gain a higher level of specialisation on a particular topic and be recognised 
as experts by their party colleagues serving on that same committee. Moreover, as it 
will be explained in more detail in chapter 6, the shadow rapporteurs also intervene in 
group meetings before the plenary debate to summarise the report, the main issues 
covered by it and the possible divergent lines that might appear, and to ultimately give 
voting instructions if necessary. This is how they are able to gain more visibility 
inside their political group and even have their expertise recognised with time.  
 
Therefore, the prerogative of a group coordinator to distribute rapporteurships and 
shadow rapporteurships to his members signals the decisive role they play. It also 
highlights the fact that political groups have limited influence over the decisions these 
coordinators take in committee. So far, fieldwork observations from committee 
meetings, meetings with committee members from the ALDE political group, as well 
as group meetings, have not indicated any control or follow-up on committee 
decisions being exercised by the group in respect to its coordinators. On the contrary, 
debates during group meetings before the plenary revealed that the group 
coordinators, rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs were the ones guiding the group 
position based on the committee agreement.  
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In addition to this, an example taken from fieldwork observation illustrates in more 
detail the role of group coordinators. For a high profile report1 in the Environment,
Public Health and Food Safety Committee, the group coordinator who secured the 
rapporteurship  in  the  coordinators’  meeting  decided  to  go  through  a  rapporteur  
nomination procedure for his committee group colleagues. This involved several high 
profile and technically specialised members sending letters of intent and participating 
in a screening similar to a job interview in view of obtaining the rapporteurship.1 In
spite of some MEPs challenging the results of this rapporteur selection procedure, 
they had no alternative but to accept to decision of the group coordinator. This is an 
edifying example of how group coordinators align views of committee members from 
the group. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones influencing decisions at this stage. 
The  rapporteurs,  who  are  in  charge  of  drafting  the  report  detailing  the  Parliament’s  
view on a proposal for legislation or on a policy development, also play an important 
part. While both are in some way meant to represent, through their work, the group 
they belong to, as it can be seen from the cases presented so far, they often have a 
high level of specialised knowledge and access to information. Consequently, this 
allows them to form and delineate the position of their party group on a particular 
subject. One explanation for that could be the level of technicality of legislative acts 
that EP has to deal with, especially in areas such as the development and 
harmonisation of the single market or environment, food safety and consumer 
protection. Moreover, while the group coordinator has a pivotal role during different 
stages of activity in the parliamentary committees, the rapporteurs remain those who 
 This was the report on the proposal for a regulation of the EP and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 648/2004 as regards the use of phosphates and other phosphorus compounds in 
household laundry detergents. It was voted on 24 June 2011, in first reading, in the EP plenary. Source: 
www.europarl.europa.eu  
 Interview with an MEP, member in the ENVI Committee, 26 October 2010. 
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guarantee the smooth transition of an act through the House, from committee to 
plenary, as will be illustrated in one of the sections of this chapter. 
So far, it can be concluded that the process through which a proposal is analysed in 
committee is complex and may be influenced by a variety of different actors at each 
stage. First of all, the Conference of Presidents of the EP which decides on the 
committee  that  will  have  to  analyse  the  proposal,  what  is  also  referred  to  as  the  “lead  
committee”  (Corbett,  Jacobs  and  Shackleton,  2011:  153);;  secondly,  the  committee  
secretariat who plays a part in the drafting of the report analysing the legislation, the 
initial considerations and the legal basis justifying it. Thirdly, group coordinators who 
bid for the proposal and advance the members with qualifications most appropriate for 
dealing with such a report, or those who are recognised as experts in the field. 
Fourthly, the rapporteur who, depending on the degree of specialisation he has 
acquired and the reputation he enjoys amongst his colleagues in committee, must be 
able to build consensus and integrate the views of most parties in the final text of the 
report. The shadow rapporteurs, MEPs and lobby groups also play a part in the entire 
process (Marshall, 2010). The latter use a significant amount of resources even before 
a proposal reaches Parliament and they try to obtain here the last concessions that 
would allow  them  to  steer  the  report’s  conclusion  and  the  provisions  of  the  
final  legislative act towards their point of interest.1
All of these aspects and the cases presented so far, illustrate the manner in which the 
legislative process is conducted and point towards the existence of an alignment of 
views and a structured debate taking place in the pre-legislative stage, before any of 
 Interview with an interest group advisor following the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
Committee and the Industry Research and Energy Committee, 22 June 2010. 
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these reports reach the plenary. More precisely, they show that the existence of an all 
deciding plenary cannot be supported, given that most of the preliminary stages of any 
report in the EP appear to be constructed in a continuous set of interactions, 
negotiations and alignment of positions of groups, making it difficult to state that the 
decision-making process is expressed in the final vote of the House. This is the basis 
for the main argument of this entire study, which stresses the key role played by EP 
committees in forecasting and ultimately deciding the results of the votes in the 
plenary. Apart from being central to this legislature, committees also steer the 
decision through plenary. Three main factors are crucial to the parliamentary activity 
of these committees and to underpinning this argument. They are: the rapporteurs, the 
amendments submitted to reports in the parliamentary committee and in the plenary, 
and the political group negotiations on reports. These are all intertwined and play their 
part in each of the steps in the committee activity. The significance of amendments 
and that of political group negotiations will be analysed in greater detail in the next 
two chapters and that of rapporteurs in the following paragraphs. 
MEPs designated as rapporteurs are very involved in committee negotiations and the 
scholarly literature has identified their important role from the beginning (Mamadouh 
and Raunio, 2003; Kaeding, 2004; Kreppel, 2004; Høyland, 2006; Benedetto, 2005; 
Costello and Thomson, 2010; Jensen and Winzen, 2011; Kaeding, 2012). They gather 
consensus and help establish the position of the House on a legislative act or a policy 
opinion. They carry out negotiations that are decisive for the swift passage of 
legislation through the EP. In addition to that, when a rapporteur is able to control the 
decision-making process very early in the pre-legislative stage, as we will see in the 
case studies from the next section of the chapter, the report benefits greatly and is 
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more likely to see a great majority vote in committee and a vote with few or no 
amendments in the plenary session. Equally important, they are directly involved in 
decision-making with the other institutions as part of the negotiating team on early 
agreements for legislative proposals in first reading and can steer negotiations. 
Moving on in tracing the procedure of the report through committee, once a 
rapporteur has been nominated, the committee secretariat together with the MEP 
assigned begins drafting the text of the report. Depending on the circumstances, 
fieldwork observations have shown that, especially on own-initiative reports (where 
the EP decides to signal its position to the other institutions on a non-legislative 
matter), MEPs are often interested in drafting the content of the report and therefore 
work in close contact with the secretariat and the policy advisor of the group.1
However, it can also be that MEPs choose, especially on more legislative and highly 
technical acts1, to let the secretariat draft the report and contribute only to the
explanatory statement accompanying it. Under such circumstances it can be more 
difficult for MEPs to have a direct influence on the first text that is submitted for 
debate in the parliamentary committee, during what is referred to as a first expression 
of views.1 Another aspect that differs is the amount of negotiation done on the basis
of a report and that also depends on the will and the interest of the rapporteur in 
creating consensus and ensuring that the draft report will receive a limited amount of 
 This  was  the  case,  for  example,  with  the  Regional  Development  Committee’s  own-initiative report 
on  ‘good governance with regards to the EU regional policy: procedures of assistance and control by 
the  European  Commission’,  as  well  as  with  the  Culture  and  Education  Committee’s own-initiative 
report  on  ‘unlocking  the  potential  of  cultural  and  creative  industries’.   
 This was the case with the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee and the report on 
‘Consumer  Rights  Directive’. 
 When first putting a report for debate in the parliamentary committee, the secretariat of the 
committee  refers  to  it  in  the  agenda  meeting  documents  as  a  “first  expression  of  views”. 
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amendments, keeping the text to as short a form as possible. This will be illustrated in 
more detail in the case studies of the next section. 
Furthermore, the rapporteur exerts his influence through several means: calling 
shadow-rapporteur meetings even before the discussions reach the amendment phase 
in committee (this can lead to a small number of amendments being tabled if all of the 
shadow  rapporteurs’  views  can  be  accommodated  in  the  draft  version  of  the  report);;  
leading an articulated and well structured debate in the working group and political 
group meetings; maintaining a link with the shadow rapporteurs all throughout the 
process with the help of or having as intermediaries the policy advisors in charge 
(Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011: 153). 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to establish with accuracy if the strength of a rapporteur 
and his activity in committee has been the only factor that led to a clear result carried 
through to plenary. It could be the result of the will of political groups in the EP to 
speed up the decision-making process of a legislative proposal, or that the report was 
so accommodating of all existing views amongst different members that it received 
the same vote in the two legislative stages. Even when involved in negotiations for 
early agreements, rapporteurs are part of a team also formed of Chair or Vice-Chair 
and shadows. Consequently, the next section of the chapter will analyse a number of 
cases where sensitive reports have been passed through committee and the plenary 
session. In order to test if there are significant differences between the decision-
making process followed in legislative and non-legislative committees, one of the 
cases from a legislative committee has been selected, such as the Consumer Rights 
Directive from the Internal Market, as well as one from a non-legislative committee, 
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such as the report on unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries from 
the Culture and Education Committee, and one from a committee which often groups 
both legislative and non-legislative characteristics, like the report on the Commission 
Fifth Cohesion Report from the Regional Development Committee. This will also 
allow for a closer look at the role of rapporteurs and group coordinators through 
different stages of the legislative procedure in the EP. 
4. 3 Getting reports successfully through plenary – three case studies
The previous section of the chapter has presented in detail the process followed by a 
report in the EP parliamentary committees and the main actors who can influence this 
process. Amongst these are the rapporteurs, whose activity shall be analysed with the 
help of three case studies. Different perspectives of two of these cases - that of the 
Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy 
and the Cultural and creative industries report - will also be presented in the next two 
chapters that focus on amendments and political group meetings related to 
parliamentary committee work. The case studies have been selected from committees 
where I have followed closely, over the course of one year, the parliamentary work 
and these particular reports have been analysed using the method of process tracing 
from the first time they were assigned to the responsible committee to the moment 
they were voted in plenary. Most of the data relating to meetings, debates and 
negotiations on these reports comes from fieldwork observations in the EP, as well as 
from interviews with the MEPs involved, their staff, and the political group and 
committee staff. All three of these cases have to be significant due to the specific 
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nature of the intra-committee and intra-party group debate that they have caused 
among the ALDE group members from the committees concerned. 
4. 3.1 Consumer rights directive
While preparing the text of a report the rapporteur is responsible for taking a series of 
steps to facilitate negotiation and allow for consensus to be built inside the EP, as was 
the  case  with  the  EP’s  position  on  the  Commission  proposal  for  a  directive  on  
consumer rights1 discussed in the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee. The designated lead rapporteur was Andreas Schwab, German MEP from 
the  European  People’s  Party  (EPP)  group.  The  Legal  Affairs  committee  also  served  as  
associated committee for this report, having Diana Wallis, British MEP from the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), as rapporteur for the opinion. 
Since this proposal fell under the jurisdiction of several committees, the Conference 
of Presidents, acting on a recommendation from the Conference of Committee Chairs, 
decided which committees would be involved in the procedure (Rule 50 of the EP 
Rules of Procedure, 2012). As a result, one was designated lead committee - the 
Internal Market committee - while the associated committee had to provide an opinion 
(Rule 188). The consumer rights directive was also subject to an early agreement 
between institutions, which led to its conclusion under first reading after more than 
two years of debate. This brings additional relevance to the study of this case for the 
purpose  of  analysing  a  rapporteur’s  influence  and  that  of  the  committee  on  the  
 Directive 2011/83/EU of the EP and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 25 October 2011. 
142 
adoption of an act as an early agreement. Early agreements have become increasingly 
common in recent years (Reh et al., 2011, Héritier and Reh, 2012; de Ruiter and 
Neuhold, 2012; Reh, 2014). 
From the beginning this report was considered by MEPs to be a high profile one, as 
one interest group representative pointed out. In his view, MEPs who were not
members of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, the lead 
committee, did not understand the purpose of the proposed Directive: to regroup four 
separate existing Directives, touching on different aspects related to consumer rights, 
under one single legislative text. Consequently, the proposed act received a significant 
amount of amendments from all MEPs wanting to modify the initial text, either due to 
interest  group  lobbying,  or  because  of  important  constituents’  interests,  or  simply  to  
put their contribution forward on what they deemed to be an important piece of 
legislation. As a result, 1600 amendments were initially tabled in committee and the 
rapporteur had to find compromise with different amendment authors so as to limit 
the number of modifications brought to the text; but also to form a median line that 
could be voted in the parliamentary committee with the compromise amendments. In 
such cases amendments on the same paragraphs are redrafted into a compromise 
amendment with a view to sum up most changes requested by authors based on the 
rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs' preferences and those of committee members, as 
expressed during meetings. The entire text was amended, discussed and debated 
throughout 2010 and voted in plenary, first time in March and then in June 2011. The 
first vote concerned amendments put forward by committee and the second one, 
usually the final vote, sanctioned the legislative resolution. Such practice of 
 Interview with an interest group representative following the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection Committee, 16 March 2011. 
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postponing the final vote after deciding on amendments is meant to give EP 
negotiators a basis to start building compromise on with the other institutions. 
Because Parliament took a different approach, to limit the scope of the proposal 
foreseen by the Commission and yet not as conservative as that of the Council, the 
rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs and rapporteur for opinion together with Council, 
openly called for negotiations to continue on this file. During the debate in March
2011, the Presidency in office representing Council remarked that: 
"...  tomorrow’s  vote  on  the  proposed  draft  amendments  will  be  so  important.  If  
the European  Parliament  decides  in  tomorrow’s  plenary  sitting  to  refer  the  
dossier back to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection, the Hungarian Presidency will endeavour to ensure with great 
commitment that an agreement is reached at first reading. We are prepared to 
make every effort necessary to this end. Naturally, a very great deal will 
depend on what kind of amendments Parliament proposes."
Andreas Schwab could not limit any further the number of modifications brought to 
the proposal either and there were 265 amendments submitted to plenary. On some of 
these, the Commission expressed views of complete disagreement but also support.
It is important to note here that the referral was made specifically for the purpose of 
allowing more time to negotiate with the intention to conclude the file in first reading. 
So, following a request from the rapporteur, the report was referred back to committee 
under Rule 57, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Procedure, which stipulates that in the case 
where  the  Commission  ‘declares that it is not prepared to accept all the amendments 
adopted  by  the  committee,  then  the  committee  may  postpone  the  final  vote’. 
 Consumer rights directive debate, 23 March 2011. 
 Enikő  Győri,  President-in-Office of the Council, intervention in the EP debate on consumer rights 
directive, 23 March 2011. 
 Viviane Reding speaking on behalf of the Commission stated in her speech to plenary her 
disagreement with amendment 14, foreseeing the obligation of 'distance traders to supply goods and 
deliver services in any other Member States'. She expressed support for amendment 122, 'which 
ensures that consumers will not be charged for sending back goods after a withdrawal if they are worth 
more than EUR 40'. (EP Consumer rights debate, 23 March 2011) 
144 
In an interview, a policy advisor in charge of following the files related to this 
proposal highlighted the existence of an extensive series of informal contacts and 
exchange of ideas. Prior to discussions in committee, the rapporteur organised 
meetings with MEPs from other political groups assigned to follow the proposal, the 
shadow rapporteurs, where he sought to reach a common agreement to limit the 
number of amendments submitted at committee stage. At times, these would be
organised weekly in order to allow for consensus to be constructed. As the policy 
advisor explained, Andreas Schwab attempted to bring together several text 
modifications into single compromise amendments, in order to have more impact on 
the final version of the text agreed by the committee, but also for practical reasons. 
Such informal processes, which are part of the legislative procedure of adopting an EP 
position, explain how the rapporteurs have the means to not only steer the decision 
reached in committee on a Commission proposal, but also pass it through the full 
session of Parliament. During these discussions, the actors involved, mainly shadow 
rapporteurs and the rapporteur go through a process of building a common line in 
negotiations with a view to passing the report, first through committee and then to 
plenary. Records of the debate on the 23 March 2011 are evidence of that and of the 
prevailing consensus. In addition to this, in the case of the consumer rights directive, 
MEPs wanted to adopt the legislative act in first reading and were ready to go into an 
early agreement, which can be interpreted as an added incentive to drive compromise 
and produce the expected output to render Parliament more efficient in the eyes of its 
citizens and of the other European institutions involved - the Council and 
Commission.  The high number of acts voted in the Parliament under first reading in 
 Interview with an MEP political advisor in charge of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
Committee, 21 June 2011. 
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the past years points to a clear trend that has become more prevalent during EP7,
since 2009. It can be argued that going into negotiations under early agreement, with a 
restricted number of actors involved at this level, limits the impact a committee has on 
the  adoption  of  the  proposal,  while  increasing  ‘the  agenda-setting powers of the actors 
negotiating  on  behalf  of  the  EP’  (Yordanova,  2013:  85).  However, evidence from 
speeches in plenary during the abovementioned debate points to the existence of a 
committee line, a consensus which became part of the final compromise, a fact which 
does not exclude committee influence altogether. The key actors part of the 
negotiating team under early agreement (rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs, committee 
Chair) act on the basis of a decision reached in committee and which is contained in 
the amendments previously voted in plenary. Contrary to what is argued elsewhere, 
they  do  not  ‘undermine  the  legislative  role  of  committees’  (Yordanova,  2013:  85),  but  
rather further it, since they are intrinsically linked to the decision-making process in 
committee during all phases of a report, including during the process of concluding 
early agreements. Moreover, the compromise in this case, once struck, was discussed 
in committee prior to being brought before the House for a final vote. This bears proof 
of the important role played by the rapporteur in securing the adoption of a committee 
decision in plenary, but also to the position occupied by committees within these 
negotiations. So instead of seeing the adoption of a consolidated text resulting from an 
early agreement as a significant modification of a committee report, I argue that it is 
another stage in the process of a committee passing a proposal through plenary. It is 
however important to note that the negotiation process in an early agreement is less 
transparent and, in spite of efforts made to keep all committee members up to speed 
 According to data available on the EP website, only in 2010, out of a total of 106 legislative
procedures voted in plenary (excluding from this total the budgetary procedures, which fall under a 
different set of rules), 79 were passed in first reading in plenary. In regards to 2011, out of a total 103 
(again, excluding budgetary procedures and other procedures), 82 were voted in first reading. Source: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sed/statistics.do 
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with developments, this can be judged as a more technocratic results-driven exercise 
rather than a political one. 
Furthermore, looking at the group meetings during which the report was discussed 
before the vote in plenary, fieldwork observations carried out in the ALDE group 
revealed that committee members, together with the group coordinator and the 
shadow rapporteur were those who presented the political group with the conclusions 
reached on the proposal and the compromises agreed. Given the significant number of 
negotiations held prior to these stages, MEPs involved were keen to secure the 
backing of their colleagues for the line of consensus that had already been built. 
Therefore, this illustrates a case where there was less ex-ante control exercised by the 
group and more of a prevailing perception from MEPs in the group that colleagues 
involved in the negotiations represented their preferences and had sufficient technical 
expertise  to  that  purpose.  Such  findings  can  be  explained  by  the  process  of  ‘perceived  
preference  coherence’,  as  defined  by  Ringe  (2010)  to  account  for  the  increased  group 
cohesion in this situation and, more generally, in the EP as a whole. Nonetheless, the 
high  degree  of  technicality  of  the  report  can  also  account  for  MEPs’  decision  to  
follow the line established by their colleagues in committee and entrust them with 
delineating  the  group’s  position.  
Finally, the report first reached plenary with 210 amendments resulted from 
committee debates. Out of those 210, 203 were adopted by plenary, while political 
groups submitted only 14 separate amendments at this stage. As a result, the majority 
of committee amendments were adopted in plenary without roll-call vote, by simple 
show of hands, a fact which points to an uncontroversial consensual vote. On this 
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basis the early agreement could be reached and voted in plenary with a significant 
majority2. Similarly, the result of the final vote was cast with a large majority in
favour of the report – 615 in favour, 16 against and 21 abstentions – a more 
consensual vote than in committee (22 in favour, 16 against and 1 abstention), where 
the Socialists and the Greens voted against the report. The results indicate that, in this 
case, divisions were solved in committee. Despite the early agreement, the divisions 
did not resurface before the final vote. The outcome supports the main argument 
which places committees in the first line of EP decision-making process, defining 
them as a space where divisions can be settled before plenary. Moreover, the initial 
hypothesis stressing the important role played by rapporteurs in this process finds 
sufficient evidence in the interactions and negotiations that were carried out by the 
rapporteur in this case throughout the entire process of passing this report in plenary.  
4. 3.2 The Commission Fifth Cohesion Report
The EP report on the Commission’s  Fifth  Cohesion  Report2 is another instance
where significant divisions present in the committee for regional development were 
solved before the plenary stage. In the case of this report, fieldwork observations were 
also carried out from the initial stages of the procedure. 
Unlike the previous example of the consumer rights directive, this was an own-
initiative resolution, of a non-legislative nature. Therefore, since the procedure does 
 Result of votes of 23 June 2011, Item 19. Source: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/minutes.html 
 Report  on  the  Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy, 
2011/2035(INI), June 2011. 
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not result in a legislative act applicable to all Member States in the EU and thus 
requiring a broad consensus across political groups in the EP to legitimise its 
decision, the findings should indicate less coordination between the committee view 
and the results in plenary. The rapporteur, under these circumstances, would be 
expected to represent a more personal, committee-specific line, since this is an 
initiative that relies on a committee decision to draft a report that would be necessary 
from a policy perspective. 
First discussions on this report were focused around the issue of creating the 
intermediate regions category as part of the cohesion policy after 2013. These would 
be regions  with  a  GDP  between  75%  and  90%  of  the  EU’s  GDP  and  those  from  
countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Belgium, would be 
affected by such provisions. The rapporteur on this report was Markus Pieper, 
German MEP from the biggest political group in Parliament, the EPP. In the initial 
stages of the process, Markus Pieper organised meetings with the shadow-rapporteurs 
to discuss the line that he would like the report to follow and the priority matters he 
would deal with. After a first presentation in committee, the members submitted a 
total of 569 amendments to the first text. Subsequently, the rapporteur chose to work 
together with the other shadows to ensure the high amount of amendments would be 
limited to fewer compromise amendments that had a coherent line and formed a 
common position to be voted at this stage. Finally, the report passed the first vote with 
31 in favour, 4 against and 9 abstentions. From the evidence collected, it can be said 
here that the high number of modifications to the text corresponds to the initial 
expectations that the report would represent to a lesser extent the median of the 
preferences  of  members  in  committee  and  the  rapporteur’s  opinion  more  specifically.  
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However, it would also be correct in this case to expect that the text would be 
amended even further in plenary. Again, this did not happen since the text resulting 
from committee had only ten amendments submitted in plenary. There are several 
explanations for this. The first one stems from the characteristics of the own-initiative 
report. According to Rule 482 regarding own-initiative reports, ‘Amendments  to  such
motions for resolutions shall only be admissible for consideration in plenary if tabled 
by the rapporteur to take account of new information or by at least one-tenth of the 
Members  of  Parliament’.  In  practice,  this  entails  a  significant  effort  from  MEPs  who  
wish to introduce a modification to the text in plenary and require a mobilisation of 
the political group. This may explain the limited number of amendments submitted in 
plenary to own-initiative reports. Nonetheless, the rule also signals the significant role 
that is given to the rapporteur in such instances, since he is the only MEP who can 
table additional modifications to the text without any constraints being provided for 
this in the rules. The second explanation would be the work carried out by the 
rapporteur after the vote in committee, in order to include all the views of MEPs and 
ensure, through meetings and negotiations, the support of shadow-rapporteurs. For 
this particular report, Markus Pieper was indeed involved in extensive discussions 
before the plenary session. Fieldwork observations from the ALDE group meeting 
that looked at this report before the final vote revealed that the group shadow had 
regularly met with the rapporteur and other shadows and was interested in having the 
consensus accepted by all colleagues. A full account of this meeting will be presented 
in the sixth chapter, but it is important to note here that following the group debate, 
ALDE MEPs voted in plenary according to instructions from the shadow and group 
coordinator. The only exceptions were one Finnish MEP who voted against the report 
 The numbers of the Rules used in the thesis are those which were in effect in EP7. 
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and three others who chose to abstain. Finally, the report was passed in plenary with a 
large majority – 506 in favour, 48 votes against and 101 abstentions. 
Consequently, in spite of expectations to find more division in the plenary vote on the 
own-initiative report, the current case illustrates not only the linking mechanisms 
ensured by the rapporteur to pass the final report through plenary, but also the high 
level of correlation between committee vote and the plenary one. It also proves that 
the members in committee are responsible for advancing an already defined common 
line and agreed consensus coming out of committee. In this instance, as in the 
previous case, the political group position was not imposed on the shadow-rapporteur, 
the group coordinator and committee members, but was rather forged by them based 
on negotiations carried out in the pre-legislative stage. 
4. 3.3 The report on unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries
The third case in this chapter analyses another own-initiative report from the Culture 
and Education committee in the EP. The issues covered by this resolution were not 
considered politically sensitive, except for the provisions on intellectual property 
rights that referred to cultural and creative industries. The rapporteur, Marie Therese 
Sanchez-Schmid, French MEP from the EPP group, initiated discussions with the 
other shadow-rapporteurs as soon as the text was available in an attempt to verify if 
there was enough support in committee for her view on how the matter should be 
approached. This did not, however, prevent the report from receiving 182 
amendments at this stage, which she tried to bring together into common amendments 
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of compromise between the main political groups in committee, the EPP, the S&D 
and ALDE. As a result, the text passed with a large majority in committee, 26 votes in 
favour and only 2 abstentions. However, in this particular case, even if the 
compromise in committee appeared to have been forged, the members in committee, 
in particular the shadow-rapporteur had to ensure that the other group colleagues 
follow it. The ALDE group, where most of the fieldwork observations were done, had 
divergent views in regards to intellectual property rights. The only way they could be 
aligned was through the intervention of an ALDE MEP, member in the Legal Affairs 
committee, who had prepared the committee opinion for this particular report. Her 
colleagues, including the shadow-rapporteur, unanimously accepted her expertise on 
intellectual property rights and technical knowledge of the subject. The decision was 
taken to follow the voting instructions based on the committee voting-list for the 
report. At the same time, the rapporteur Sanchez-Schmid, secured the swift passage of 
the report in plenary by consulting shadow-rapporteurs on the position they would 
take on last minute amendments tabled to the text in plenary. In spite of the fact that 
as rapporteur of an own-initiative report she had an advantageous position provided 
by the rules to refuse or accept modifications to the final text, she chose instead to 
seek consensus through consultation with the shadow rapporteurs from the other 
political groups until the last stages.2 As a result, the report was voted through the
show of hands procedure, mainly used when a large majority has been achieved and a 
broad consensus has been reached before the plenary, preventing political groups 
from requesting a roll-call vote. 
 Interview with MEP from the Culture and Education Committee, shadow-rapporteur on the report, 
15 March 2011. 
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This case, together with the two previous ones, reveals the existing interactions that 
connect the decisions taken in committee on reports with those in plenary. They all 
provide evidence of a more intricate network of negotiations that are carried out on 
reports then previously thought, while they also highlight the significant role played 
by committee members in defining the position of a political group. More precisely, 
the findings indicate that, in these cases, the members in committee were those who 
informed the view of the political group, rather than the group imposing a policy line 
to their MEPs. Moreover, the evidence gathered from fieldwork observations 
highlights the role of the rapporteur as a key actor, instrumental not only in gathering 
consensus, but also in ensuring that committee decisions are followed in plenary. This 
is in accordance with the hypothesis of this chapter and it explains why there is an 
overlap between voting results in committee and in plenary. 
The current section of the chapter has presented three case studies detailing the 
activity of rapporteurs in committees, as well as the negotiations and debates they 
organise in an effort to reach consensus at both legislative stages. So far, when 
looking at the results, there appears to be a clear coordination between the votes in 
committee and plenary. Therefore, the next section will verify if this is supported by 
data from committees. 
4. 4 Analysis of data on committee and plenary votes
The previous section of the chapter has tested the hypothesis and provided evidence, 
not only in support of the important role rapporteurs play in the decision-making 
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process, but also of the relevance of the decision reached by committees for the result 
of the final vote in the plenary. However, in order to complete the analysis, this 
section will present results from data on committee and plenary votes in order to 
establish if indeed the plenary of the full EP follows the decision reached in 
committee. This will be done using correlations between the votes in favour, against 
and abstentions cast in the parliamentary committees and those cast in the plenary on 
the same reports. 
The dataset that has been used for this study relies on data gathered from the website 
of the EP. It records votes, over a period of time ranging from the beginning of EP7 – 
September 2009 – until July 2011 in all of the standing committees of the EP and in 
two of the special committees whose work was completed last year. The time frame 
for the data was chosen to account for the latest developments in Parliament, as well 
as for the increase in powers brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and the way in 
which these have affected committee activity. For every committee, the result of votes 
was recorded on each report based on data collected from the Legislative Observatory 
website of the EP and then correlated with results of votes in plenary on the same
report, also listed on this portal. For the purpose of this research, I have chosen to 
collect only data on reports drafted by committees, excepting opinions or 
recommendations, since the main part of the activity of EP committees is expressed 
through these reports. Moreover, unlike opinions drafted at the request of or to serve a 
report in a lead committee, they receive a final vote in plenary, which can then be 
correlated with the one cast in committee in order to see if there are any similarities 
between them. The choice operated on the sample of reports was also made in respect 
 Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil  
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to the procedures that they cover. These are the ordinary legislative procedure, the 
budgetary procedure and the own-initiative procedure. This selection will allow for a 
comparison between the voting behaviour of committees depending on the nature of 
the procedure (the first two abovementioned procedures are legislative, while the last 
one is non-legislative), be it legislative or non-legislative. It will also give the 
opportunity to analyse whether committees that consider mainly legislative, and thus 
sometimes  more  technical  texts,  display  an  outlier’s  voting pattern compared to that 
of the plenary and in opposition to the non-legislative committees that receive fewer 
proposals for legislation. This aspect plays a significant part in answering one of the 
initial questions identified by this study when the sample of committees to be 
analysed through fieldwork observations was chosen: whether or not there are 
differences between legislative and non-legislative committees in relation to the 
voting behaviour on their reports in plenary. More precisely, considering the 
perceived preference coherence principle of MEPs, the data should reveal if MEPs 
perceive some committees as being more representative of the EP median line as 
opposed to others and thus they are more likely to follow their position. Furthermore, 
this would allow testing whether the decision reached by some committees is more 
often accepted and followed in plenary for matters relating to their highly specialised 
nature or the perception that MEPs have of their expertise. 
The data are comprised of a total of 545 reports drafted in committee and voted on in 
plenary from September 2009 until July 2011. They were gathered from all standing 
committees, including the special committees who ended their activity in June 2011 
and July 2011, respectively. However, due to the fact that a significant number of 
texts were voted in plenary with a simple show of hands and no record of the voting 
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results, a choice had to be operated to only use those where plenary voting had been 
done by roll-call vote and electronic vote and is available. This has lead to a total of 
266 to be observed from a more limited array of committees that could be analysed, 
since there was not sufficient relevance of the data resulted from votes in some 
committees due to the limited number of reports voted under roll-call. Moreover, 
correlations for the Petitions Committee, Financial Economic and Social Crisis 
Committee and the Policy Challenges Committee were only based on results from 
between two and five reports in total, since the rest were voted with a show of hands 
procedure. For this reason they cannot be judged sufficiently relevant to be considered 
for analysis here and have been left out of the table. 
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Table 4.2: Correlations between the parliamentary committee votes and the 
plenary session final votes 
Parliamentary Committee Correlation of proportions 
plenary/committee yes 
Regional Development (REGI) 0.82 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) 0.51 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) 0.44 
Culture and Education (CULT) 0.52 
Foreign Affairs (AFET) 0.79 
Development (DEVE) 0.29 
International Trade (INTA) 0.27 
Budgetary Control (CONT) 0.43 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) 0.75 
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) 0.75 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) 0.83 
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) 0.79 
Fisheries (PECH) 0.71 
Legal Affairs (JURI) 0.79 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 0.10 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) 0.90 
Women’s  Rights  and  Gender  Equality  (FEMM) 0.60 
Budgets (BUDG) 0.98 
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Nonetheless, the reports from the 18 remaining committees provide sufficient data. 
Table 4.2 displays the results of the correlation between the proportion of votes in 
favour cast in committee on a report and the same proportion of votes cast in plenary. 
The first significant aspect that can be observed from the correlations in the 
committees listed in the table below is the strong correlations that have resulted 
between the votes cast in committee and those in plenary. Many of the parliamentary 
committees display a correlation factor above 0.7, giving an indication of a level of 
influence resulting from committee, as this thesis argues. Still, such findings could 
also be explained by a strong discipline of political groups at both legislative stages, 
causing voting behaviour of MEPs to be similar. But the information resulted from 
fieldwork observations and interviews shows that this was not necessarily the case 
since there was not sufficient proof of political group control in the daily work of 
committees. 
However, the result of the correlations is significant for the hypothesis of the chapter 
and of the study as a whole, because it reveals a clear overlap between the vote results 
at both stages and some variation between different committees, some legislative and 
some non-legislative. This is the case for the following committees: International 
Trade, Development, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and also for the 
Women’s  Rights and Gender Equality Committee. All of these, apart from the Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, have fewer legislative acts to 
consider. The lower correlation between their votes and the rest of the plenary cannot 
be explained by the technical nature of the texts, but rather by a possible 
specialisation of the committee, which renders it less representative of the EP median 
line. Also, another aspect that can be considered is the fact that these committees deal 
158 
more often with matters related to international policies, global affairs, under the 
consultation procedure, where MEPs are more likely to have an opinion and a set of 
preferences that are already established and do not require the same level of expertise 
and specialised knowledge as the others that are strictly related to EU policies do. 
Nonetheless, the Civil Liberties Committee has a set of characteristics that 
differentiate it from the other ones in that it deals mainly with proposals for legislation 
in the area of freedom, security and justice. It legislates on technical judicial aspects, 
requiring a considerable amount of expertise. Thus the lower correlation of 
proportions compared to the rest of committees cannot be explained by the same 
factors that account for the variation in the others previously mentioned. Still, the 
nature of the EU policy that it covers might provide more insight. This is a policy 
whose acts, after the provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, have been drafted 
under the ordinary legislative procedure. Before these changes, it belonged to an area 
of competencies held by the Council and therefore falling mainly under the control of 
Member States' governments. According to the EU Treaties, Parliament was only 
consulted on the matters decided by Council and in general there was less integration 
and harmonisation in the EU in this field. As a result of modifications brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty, this committee now covers some issues where integration has 
not yet been fully achieved. MEPs are likely to take a less pro-integrationist stance in 
regards to matters they still consider as having national specificities and over which 
they display national preferences. However, a close look at the topics and debates on 
the reports where the plenary result of votes is different than the one in the committee 
does not support this explanation. 
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Table 4.3: Sample of reports in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (September 2009 – July 2011) 
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Confidentiality of Europol information 40 95% 2 5% 0 31 5% 605 94% 7 
Europol's relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified 
information 39 95% 2 5% 0 13 2% 628 97% 9 
List of third States and organisations with which Europol shall conclude agreements 42 95% 2 5% 0 17 3% 633 96% 7 
Rules for Europol analysis work files 39 95% 2 5% 0 12 2% 640 97% 10 
Setting up a European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) and repealing Decision 
2001/427/JHA 41 95% 2 5% 0 10 2% 642 97% 9 
Council framework decision on accreditation of forensic laboratory activities 38 95% 2 5% 0 9 1% 651 98% 7 
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What it shows is that the committee voted on a report deciding to reject a draft 
Council decision under the consultation procedure, while the plenary voted according 
to committee indications and rejected the proposal for a decision. 
Between September 2009 and July 2011, six of the reports in this committee fall 
under this category and they are all drafted under the consultation procedure. 
Amongst them were: the Report on the draft Council decision determining the list of 
third States and organisations with which Europol shall conclude agreements, the 
Report on the draft Council decision adopting the rules on the confidentiality of 
Europol information, the Report on the initiative of the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Kingdom of Spain for adoption of a Council framework decision on accreditation of 
forensic laboratory activities and the Report on the draft Council decision adopting 
the implementing rules for Europol analysis work files. In all these reports the 
committee proposed the rejection of the draft Council decision and in all instances 
plenary followed its instructions and voted by a large majority against the draft 
Council decisions (see table 4.3). An important factor that contributed to these results 
was also the fact that the rapporteurs on most of the reports were MEPs whose 
expertise was recognised by their colleagues and who had a professional background 
related to justice and home affairs matters. This was the case with the Spanish MEP 
Diaz de Mera Garcia Consuegra from the EPP group, former Director-General of the 
Spanish Police. Furthermore, a rapporteur on two of the reports regarding Europol, 
Timothy Kirkhope, a British Conservative from the smaller, European Conservatives 
and Reformists Group (ECR) set up at the beginning of EP7, was able to secure a 
similar political result in regards to the draft Council decision as he did in committee. 
Such an instance where a rapporteur from a small political group on the right side of 
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the political spectrum in the EP, with an anti-integrationist stance, has managed to 
instrument the passing of a committee decision through plenary, illustrates that the 
influence of political groups in gathering consensus in these cases is not sufficient to 
account for the result and that rapporteurs are indeed key actors that are pivotal in the 
process that links up the committee decision to the plenary one. Had this not been the 
case, in order to account for such voting results based solely on the control and 
disciplining of the political groups, then it would be expected for rapporteurs to come 
from the largest political groups in the EP. Therefore, based on the analysis of the 
data, the information gathered from debates, fieldwork observations and interviews, it 
is evident that the decision in committee is adopted in most instances in plenary and 
that rapporteurs are instrumental in achieving this result. They control the final voting 
result on a report at an early stage in the legislative process and the influence of 
political groups is secondary here. The hypothesis of the chapter is verified and the 
findings provide more evidence in support of the main argument of this thesis, which 
places parliamentary committees in the EP in the front line of the decision-making 
process, guiding the position of the House. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This current chapter has presented the different aspects linked to the activity of the 
committees in the EP. It has explored the different stages linked to the adoption of a 
report in order to identify the key actors who could influence the results of votes both 
in committee and in plenary. Furthermore, it has presented several case studies from 
different committees in order to map the interactions, detail the negotiation process 
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and the debates that are part of the work on a report. It has analysed the data on votes 
on reports in all committees in order to test if there are significant correlations 
between the result of the plenary final vote and the committee one. By looking at 
legislative acts displaying a variation between the voting results at both stages, it 
investigated whether those are influenced by the procedure ruling the text, by the 
rapporteur’s  background  or  level  of  expertise,  or  by  the  political  group  of  the  
rapporteur. This analysis was performed in order to establish if the hypothesis of the 
chapter can be verified and if so, to what extent it can contribute to the thesis. 
From the evidence presented in the chapter through the case studies, it is clear that 
rapporteurs are central to the path that any act has to follow in the EP. This aspect is 
supported by findings that have already been detailed in the existing body of literature 
on this subject. However, this chapter builds on the previous knowledge and identifies 
rapporteurs as actors that can influence the opinion of the EP, as it is expressed in a 
report, at an early stage of the legislative process in the institution, including early 
agreement negotiations under first reading. They are instrumental in constructing 
consensus in the House, thus ensuring that committee-based decisions are followed by 
the full plenary session and they impact negotiations with the other institutions of the 
decision-making triangle. But in order to achieve this outcome, they rely on a 
complex, well organised and institutionalised process of interactions, negotiations and 
debates with actors from the other political groups - like the shadow rapporteurs – 
also from other institutions involved in the EU decision-making, as well as with other 
members in committee, other MEPs and representatives of interest groups and of the 
civil society. It is these interactions that provide evidence in support of the main 
argument of the thesis that committees influence the decisions reached by the EP and, 
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in the absence of strong political group incentives, they take centre stage. The 
informal negotiation processes and meetings set up in the EP lead towards this 
outcome and are put in place to settle divisions in a relatively smaller, more restricted 
and  specialised  setting  that  is  formed  by  committees,  in  order  to  ultimately  ‘give  more  
time to the plenary to concentrate on grand policy and political debates. The political 
groups  have  the  plenary  that  they  have  wanted  and  asked  for.’
The case study of the consumer rights directive has illustrated this aspect very clearly. 
The significant number of amendments coming from committee was almost entirely  
(203 out of 210) accepted by plenary. Also, even with a referral back to committee 
and the postponement of the final vote on the report to facilitate continuing 
negotiations under early agreement, the file was not rejected and the legislative 
proposal was voted under first reading, passing with a larger majority (615 votes in 
favour, 16 against and 21 abstentions) in plenary than in committee (22 votes in 
favour, 16 against and 1 abstention). The evidence in this case points towards a 
resolution of divisions before the plenary phase, inside the committee. 
The case study of the report on the Commission Fifth Cohesion Report, investigated 
whether the type of procedure ruling the report, in this situation the own-initiative 
procedure, affects the process of decision-making. Findings have indicated that the 
role played by the rapporteur is just as important as in the case of the other procedure, 
while the process remains defined by the same set of interactions and negotiations. 
Moreover, they have also revealed that MEPs involved in a report (as shadow 
 Interview with senior official from the EP plenary services, 20 March 2012. 
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rapporteurs  for  example)  play  a  pivotal  part  in  delineating  the  political  group’s  
position and this is done on the basis of the agreement reached in committee. 
Finally, the case study of the Report on unlocking the potential of cultural and 
creative industries illustrates another aspect of how members in committee can inform 
the  political  group’s  view,  whether  they  are  directly  involved  in  the  report  (being  
rapporteur or shadow-rapporteur) or they have only provided a specialised opinion in 
relation to it, as was the case here. 
All of the cases have provided evidence of the central place the activity of the 
rapporteur has in the entire process linked to reaching consensus in committee. It is 
this activity that allows him to delineate the EP position in advance of the final vote. 
Moreover, fieldwork observations and interviews did not bring any substantive 
evidence in these three cases that could support the idea of a control exercised by the 
political group in committee. The quantitative analysis of the voting results in 
committee supports the main argument, in that it reveals a strong correlation between 
the parliamentary committee votes and the plenary ones. It also shows that the type of 
procedure of the report does not influence the strength of the correlation in most 
cases; nor does the party affiliation of the rapporteur or the political group size. In 
addition to that, findings point to some differences in the strength of the correlation 
amongst legislative and non-legislative committees. However, the large majority of 
committees, including those that were initially part of our sample, display a 
significant level of correlation. 
To conclude, it can be said that the findings in the current chapter point towards a 
significant influence of committees and of rapporteurs. The latter are amongst the key 
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actors that make-up the link inside the decision-making process that allows for a 
committee decision to be replicated in the plenary. 
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Chapter 5 
Amendments - Indicators of Dynamics in EP Decision-Making 
Process  
This chapter contributes to the main argument RIWKHanalysis and investigates one of the 
instruments indicating committee influence over the EP legislative process. Based on 
the approach presented in chapter 3, emphasising committee strength and the impact 
these have on decision-making in the institution, this chapter analyses amendments 
introduced, discussed and voted at committee and plenary level in the EP. It makes an 
observation and an assessment of existing correlations between the initial number of 
amendments tabled in committee, that of amendments tabled in plenary and the result 
of votes in plenary on a report. This is done with a view to establishing whether a link 
between amendment number and report success in plenary exists. The chapter 
investigates what amendment numbers can reveal about the legislative process in 
Parliament and identifies at which stage the decision on a report is reached. Unlike 
previous research on amendments (Kreppel, 1999) which has focused on determining 
the EP’s  influence  on  the  Council  and the Commission by establishing amendment 
success rate and their acceptance by these institutions, the current chapter analyses 
amendments tabled in committee and those submitted in plenary to establish whether 
conflict reaches plenary or is resolved in committee. In this context, the principal 
understanding is that if amendments in plenary are numerous then they indicate strong 
disagreement with the committee position, thus confirming the existence of an EP 
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decision-making process, which relies on the result of the plenary debate and final 
vote. 
However, findings from data gathered on amendment numbers signal that there are 
consistently fewer amendments submitted in plenary than in committee, in spite of the 
fact that the approval and final vote on a legislative act take place in plenary. This fact 
underlines that different positions on a legislative act and existing disagreements are 
resolved in committee and later sanctioned in plenary. It adds to and confirms the 
main  argument  of  the  thesis  by  emphasising  committees’  important  role  in  EP  
decision making and supports the argument that the EP has developed a strong system 
of committees to serve its desire for increased legislative output and efficiency. 
In this framework, the first section of the chapter presents the contribution of 
amendment analysis to the entire thesis and section 2 introduces the existing studies 
on this subject. Section 3 presents the hypotheses of the chapter, which are then tested 
based on the evidence detailed in section 4. Section 5 examines the conclusions 
derived from the findings of the previous section. 
5. 1 Why amendments?
This section introduces the purpose and aim of the chapter in the context of the study 
and the data analysed in chapterV 4 and 6. It presents the findings from the other two 
chapters and illustrates how amendment number analysis can complement and add to 
the validity of the main argument. 
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Amendments are essential components of decision-making in any legislature and even 
more so in the EP. They are amongst the main tools an MEP has at his disposal to 
influence policy outcomes on legislative and non-legislative packages in Parliament. 
Amendments are an indicator of  an  MEP’s  activity,3 involvement and willingness to
contribute in a policy debate. As part of this study on committee influence over the 
EP legislative process, I have analysed, in the previous chapter, the activity of 
rapporteurs and how it secures the transferral of committee agreements and decisions 
to the final stage of the full chamber vote. Chapter 4 has illustrated the way in which a 
rapporteur with his expertise and negotiation impacts upon the process and leads to 
the transferral in plenary of a committee decision. It has analysed the role an MEP 
holding a rapporteurship (quality of being a rapporteur – an MEP in charge of an EP 
dossier) on a specific legislative or non-legislative proposal plays in carrying a report 
forward to plenary in the same format and with a similar vote ratio as set out in 
committee. Based on data from committee meetings, as well as results of votes in 
committee and plenary, findings in chapter 4 have revealed the essential input and 
participation of rapporteurs, which ensures a committee decision is carried forward 
and adopted by Parliament. In addition, chapter 6 investigates political group 
meetings as another instrument that contributes to the linking mechanism of 
committee decision with the final position adopted by Parliament on a report. 
Viewing group meetings as arenas where group policy positions are aggregated, 
allowing for group cohesion to be established, the findings in chapter 6 reveal that 
committee members are instrumental in transferring committee decisions to plenary, 
while also structuring and delineating the group line. It is committee members that 
 Interview with ALDE MEP assistant, 21 June 2011. 
169 
cause the group to internalise committee agreements and vote accordingly in the final 
vote of the full chamber. Therefore, on the basis of the theoretical aspects presented in 
chapter 3 and the findings from the empirical chapters, the main argument of this 
study maintains that committees influence the legislative process in the EP and 
agreements reached here are carried forward and approved by the full chamber in 
plenary sessions. Such influence points to the existence of a strong committee system, 
resulting from Parliament’s  continuous  preoccupation  with  ensuring  institutional  
legitimacy through increased legislative output. I argue that this strong committee 
system and developments in Parliament’s  powers  and  structure,  following  the  
Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty provisions, have rendered the EP somewhat 
depoliticised and technocratic. Focused on passing legislation and agenda-setting in 
relation to the other two institutions, the Council and the Commission, on concluding 
early agreements under first reading, Parliament has had to rely on committees and 
agreements obtained here to facilitate cohesive group voting in the plenary sessions. 
In this context, amendments tabled in committee, as well as those submitted in 
plenary, are an indicator of a committee’s  ability to solve conflict and reach 
agreements that are later approved in plenary. The underlying assumption in this 
chapter is that the number of amendments a report receives in committee points to the 
level of dissent that is present at this stage and the extent to which it has been resolved 
before the final vote in plenary. More precisely, the chapter  argues  that  a  report’s  path  
through Parliament is discernable from committee stage based on the number of 
amendments tabled to the initial text. This implies that a report with a significant 
number of amendments in committee receives fewer amendments in plenary because 
the conflict has been resolved before the final vote and the agreement has been 
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reached. As mentioned previously, amendments are viewed as indicators of diverging 
policy and ideological views at both committee and plenary level. At committee stage 
they signal disagreement, while at plenary stage they indicate, through their limited or 
increased number compared to committee numbers, if an agreement has been reached 
in  committee  and  the  chamber’s  ability  to  follow  it  and  take  over  the  decision  adopted 
here. Analysing modifications and discrepancies in committee amendment numbers 
as opposed to plenary ones contributes to a broader understanding of the EP decision-
making process and helps establish whether the decision on a report has been reached 
in committee (a significant number of amendments have been integrated in the text 
that is submitted in plenary, thus policy and ideological differences have found a 
common denominator in committee) and then approved by the full chamber (fewer 
amendments are tabled at plenary level due to an acceptance of prior committee 
agreement). 
However, amendments are not the only instruments that signal and explain the 
approval of a committee decision by plenary. Once an agreement has been 
consolidated in committee it is ensured adoption in plenary through the activity of the 
rapporteur, group coordinator and committee members and the alignment of political 
group views in group meetings that take place before a final vote in plenary. That is 
why this study investigates in the empirical chapters each of the three different 
channels that indicate and explain how committee decisions are carried forward by 
plenary:  the rapporteurs and their activity (chapter 4), the amendment numbers in 
committee and plenary (chapter 5) and political group meetings (chapter 6). In each of 
these cases the interactions present in committee and plenary between rapporteurs, 
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group coordinators, committee members and colleague MEPs portray a more accurate 
view of the EP legislative process. 
Consequently, in this chapter I investigate amendment numbers on reports in 
committee and plenary to establish what they can reveal about decision-making in the 
EP. To do so, I shall first present what is already known about EP amendments, as 
well as the procedural matters related to tabling amendments in committee and 
plenary. These aspects are then tested with the help of information gathered from 
amendment numbers to reports, as well as fieldwork observations from committee 
meetings, rapporteur and shadows meetings and semi-structured interviews with 
members  of  the  political  group  staff,  MEPs’  staff  and  EP  secretariat  staff.  The  data  on  
amendment numbers in this chapter are drawn from publicly available records that I 
have gathered from the EP website of the Legislative Observatory for reports that 
were discussed and voted during the period of September 2009 to July 2011. They 
consist of the number of amendments tabled to a report in committee and in plenary 
and are complemented by results of vote in committee and plenary. For a more 
accurate analysis of specific proposals for legislation and reports of a non-legislative 
nature where EP signals its position to the other institutions, such as the own-initiative 
reports, I have focused the analysis on a sample of committees, where I observed 
monthly committee meetings, as well as meetings linked to the daily activity of an 
MEP working inside them. These have been preparatory meetings of the committee 
group coordinator with other committee members, as well as political group meetings 
aligning group views before a plenary vote. The fieldwork observation has been 
carried over the course of one year – May 2010 to June 2011 – and it complements 
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the quantitative data in order to reveal interactions inside parliamentary committees 
that lead to adoption in plenary of a committee decision. 
In the observed committees - Regional Development (REGI), Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection (IMCO), Budgets (BUDG), Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety (ENVI) and Culture and Education (CULT) – roll-call data and 
committee votes have been analysed from September 2009 until July 2011. The 
sample has been selected to account for both legislative (Internal Market, Budgets and 
Environment committees) and mainly non-legislative committees, such as the Culture 
and Education Committee, although this also covers legislative files. The first 
category of committees normally works on proposals in policy areas where EU has 
extended competence and where EP decides under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
The second covers areas where competence resides solely with the Member States 
and, as such, the EP can at best make recommendations on policies and the way in 
which Member States should coordinate them. The Regional Development 
Committee is situated in-between these two categories, its work comprising both the 
analysis of full legislative proposals, as well as non-legislative decisions. 
Therefore, based on a total of 169 reports discussed in the sampled committees with 
more than 12,000 amendments introduced in the pre-legislative stage and over 2,700 
amendments tabled at plenary stage, this chapter investigates differences in 
amendment numbers in committee and plenary and within different parliamentary 
committees. Moreover, it focuses on reports debated under the ordinary legislative 
procedure (OLP – referred to as co-decision – COD – before the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions were introduced), the budgetary procedure and the own-initiative 
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procedure. The first two are legislative, although the budgetary procedure is 
significantly different from the ordinary legislative one and specific to budget 
proposals in the EP, and the last one is mostly of non-legislative nature. The focus on 
these different procedures allows for a comparison to be made in terms of amendment 
numbers and report development across the sampled committees, establishing if 
Parliament is more likely to seek consensus when dealing with legislative reports or 
when faced with non-legislative resolutions. 
For the analysis of the data the chapter relies on calculating correlations between 
amendments tabled in committee and amendments tabled in plenary. The results are 
complemented by fieldwork observations from committee meetings analysed using 
the method of process-tracing (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier, 2008: 703; 
Checkel, 2005).  Drawing on discrepancies in amendment numbers, this chapter 
identifies factors that structure the legislative and non-legislative workflow of a report 
between committee and plenary. These are all supported by fieldwork observations 
from committee meetings. 
Following this presentation of the aim and the contribution of chapter 5 to this study, 
the next section will introduce the existing literature on amendments and the principal 
arguments it puts forward. 
174 
This section analyses the studies on amendments, their relevance for this chapter and 
study in general and whether they explain the data issued from the correlations of 
committee tabled amendments and plenary ones. 
In recent years, a growing number of studies on the subject of EU institutions have 
focused on the EP as a result of provisions introduced by the latest Treaties in the 
organisation and the competencies of this body. Scholars have analysed the initial 
stages in the development of this institution (Rittberger, 2005), the activity of MEPs 
(Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, 2005), the activity of EP groups (Kreppel, 2002) and the 
balance of influence between groups and national parties in the EP (Hix, Noury and 
Roland, 2007). Furthermore, they focused on the mechanisms that are part of 
decision-making in this institution, such as the activity of parliamentary committees 
(Kreppel, 1999; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009; Whitaker, 2005, 2011; Yoshinaka, 
McElroy and Bowler, 2010; Yordanova, 2010; Yordanova, 2013) or that of the EP 
plenary sessions (Proksch and Slapin, 2009). 
However, the underlying argument in most of these studies relies on the centrality of 
political groups in the EP legislative process. Groups are the main factor that can 
explain the outcome of decision-making and decision taking in the Parliament. 
Indeed, political groups play an important role in the EP and impact on the position of 
the institution. Still, there are other indicators that have an impact, namely the make-
up and functioning of this institution, which influences the results and the interplay 
between actors inside it. Internal structures, rules, organised meetings and exchanges 
of views also play a very important role in the processes that constitute the activity in 
the EP, where parliamentary committees are central. How committees are structured 
5. 2 Amendments in committees and in plenary
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and carry out their activity impacts on the legislative output of Parliament. Moreover, 
since the main argument of the thesis implies that indications issued by committees 
constitute the basis for a final decision taken in the full chamber, it becomes necessary 
to investigate how committee decisions are shaped and thus if amendment numbers 
play a part in their development and structure. 
Amendments are just one of the tools in this legislative process but they are an 
important component of decision-making in the EP. The legislative process consists 
of a number of stages that lead to a proposal or a resolution being adopted in plenary, 
but not before it is modified and adjusted to fit MEPs’ policy preferences through 
amendments. 
The literature on this subject has focused on the results and final adoption of a text 
with its amendments in the EP (Kreppel, 1999; Kreppel, 2002b). It has analysed EP 
success in passing its amendments by the other institutions of the decision-making 
triangle, the Commission and the Council, since all three have a part to play in the 
adoption of legislation at EU level. Less emphasis has been placed on aspects related 
to the drafting of reports, amendment tabling and the dynamic part of the decision 
process. In procedural terms, amendments constitute the end result of discussions on a 
proposal passed through Parliament and present the opinion of the institution on a 
Commission proposal. However, less is known about how they account for results of 
voteV on reports in committee and plenary and what they can reveal about the internal 
activity of committees. 
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Amie Kreppel (1999) seeks to determine the extent to which Parliament, through its 
amendments, changes Commission proposals or simply clarifies their text. She also 
analyses the rate of approval of amendments by the other two institutional actors 
(Kreppel, 1999) and points out that, it is not sufficient to account for the number of 
EP adopted amendments by the other two institutions without investigating the type 
of proposed changes. Her overall analysis of approximately 500 amendments 
concludes that Parliament is a key legislative actor of the EU institutions, bringing 
substantial changes to legislative proposals not only of a technical but also of a 
political nature. However, Kreppel (1999) notes that such influence varies from case 
to case, an aspect that could be explained by the different policies covering the 
proposals or the degree of unity that Parliament portrays when voting these 
amendments (Kreppel, 1999: 534). 
Kreppel later confirmed these initial findings in another research, focusing on a larger 
sample of 1,000 amendments (Kreppel, 2002b). In this second case she investigated 
whether different parliamentary procedures – co-decision or cooperation – constituted 
the sole explanation for the approval rate of an EP amendment by the other 
institutions or if there were other variables that could account for it. Her analysis 
revealed  that  ‘regardless  of  procedure,  the  EP  is  a  significant  actor  in  the  legislative  
game  of  the  EU’  (Kreppel,  2002b:  810),  but  also  that  ‘the  absence  of  internal  unity  
within the EP was shown to have a significant impact on eventual EP amendment 
success. A unified EP might signal that an issue is not controversial, or it may be 
representative of an EP that realizes that internal compromises and a united front are 
more likely to increase its influence vis-à-vis  the  other  institutions’  (Kreppel,  
2002E:810). 
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Fieldwork observation of committee meetings in this study confirms these findings in 
the daily activity of Parliament, in the internal discussions and plenary debates. 
Moreover,  the  EP’s  understanding of the necessity to portray strong internal political 
consensus vis-à-vis the other institutional actors, as Kreppel (2002b) indicates, 
constitutes an explanation for the limited variance that exists between the results of 
vote in committee and plenary, as presented in chapter 4. Indeed, political groups may 
not always be interested in tabling new amendments at the plenary final vote once a 
version of the report has already been debated and voted in the specialised committee, 
if this means jeopardising the agreements reached here. Additionally, it is worth 
mentioning that with the EP voting on a significant number of new legislation, the 
strong proportionality of vote results, as seen in chapter 4, is not only explained by 
EP’s  concern to portray a united front, but also by the willingness of the full chamber 
to approve decisions taken by committees. 
Kreppel’s  findings  offer  an image of an active Parliament, aware of the part it plays in 
the legislative process and concerned with influencing the decisions of the other 
institutions in the early stages of the process. However, they do not offer many details 
regarding the activity that takes place internally before these amendments are adopted 
and  come  to  represent  EP’s  opinion  on  a Commission proposal. Moreover, if studies 
such as Burns and Carter (2009), Clift (2009) and Judge and Earnshaw (2010) analyse 
the track of a legislative proposal through Parliament, including the process of 
amending it, they also fail to present a full picture of how amendments impact on the 
EP internal decision-making, how they are generally regarded by MEPs, how they 
become negotiated and adopted in committee and how they come to be tabled or re-
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tabled in plenary. Similarly, Yordanova (2010) analyses amendments tabled in 
committee and the impact agreements reached by EP with the Council have on them 
(Yordanova,  2010:  29).  She  argues  that  ‘it  is  not  uncommon  to  see  all  the  committee  
amendments rejected or lapsed in plenary and instead an alternative set of 
amendments  adopted  in  its  entirety’  (Yordanova,  2010:  29). Moreover,  ‘where  an  
early agreement has already been reached before the committee vote, the report 
proposed by the rapporteur is composed solely of amendments drawn from that 
agreement’  (Yordanova, 2013: 89). This  leads  in  turn  to  a  situation  where  ‘the  
legislative influence of committees is significantly diminished when an informal 
legislative agreement is reached with the Council of Ministers after the committee 
stage’  (2013:  107). Indeed, with the developments in the EP, where 85% of legislation 
was decided in first reading during EP7 (2009-2014), 3 the instances where the
process reaches the trilogue phase and negotiation with the Council have become 
more common. However, when discussing amendments under early agreements it is 
important to note that the first set of amendments from committee voted in plenary 
constitutes a basis for negotiation, while the amendments containing the compromise 
with the Council, the alternative set Yordanova refers to, are in fact first accepted by 
committee before being tabled in plenary and replacing the initial committee 
amendments. This means that these are not competing amendments, but simply 
different outputs from committee debates and then from EP negotiations with Council 
in view of an early agreement. The EP Rules of Procedure, namely Rule 70 and Rule 
70a, provide for a clear framework for negotiations with the other institutions and 
require the negotiating team to report to committee in order to ensure all members are 
informed on the matter. At the same time, there are interactions between the 
 EP Statistics from Conciliations and Codecision website: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/statistics_en.htm. Source accessed May 2014. 
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negotiating team members and other MEPs to secure the adoption of the agreement, 
as they do not act in disregard of committee preferences and its opinion on a file. 
Therefore, it is clear that the committee is involved in its entirety and represented by 
the negotiating team throughout all stages in this process and it is difficult to argue, as 
a consequence, that its role is undermined. Furthermore,  Yordanova’s  analysis  
focuses less on the process of amending texts in committee and its results in plenary, 
and more on the Parliament – Council early agreements and how amendments fit into 
this process. Like other studies, it investigates committee and plenary amendments in 
individual  cases  or  in  relation  to  what  their  acceptance  can  reveal  about  the  EP’s  
negotiation with the other institution, instead of analysing the place these amendments 
hold within the overall legislative process. Therefore, a more in-depth understanding 
on this topic is essential for an analysis of committee activity, since a significant part 
of the work here involves debating, compromising or voting off amendments to 
reports. 
After a presentation of the existing studies that have analysed amendments in EP 
committees, as well as those tabled in plenary, the next section will illustrate the 
process of amending Commission proposals and resolutions in committees. 
5. 3 The Scope and reach of parliamentary amendments
In order to analyse their impact, it is important to first establish how amendments are 
tabled in practice, both in committee and plenary. Therefore, this section will begin 
by mapping the process of drafting and amending reports in committee, providing 
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examples of reports discussed in the sampled committees. It will then formulate the 
hypotheses underpinning this chapter, drawing on data from these reports.  
Initial fieldwork observations in committees3 have revealed that the number of
amendments on reports can also constitute an indicator of consensus in committee, the 
quality of negotiations and the level of group cohesion on a particular topic. 
Amendments in the EP, as in any other legislature, consist of modifications brought to 
the text of a proposal and vary in importance according to their political or technical 
nature or the stage at which they are being analysed. In the case of a legislative 
proposal, the Parliament Rules of procedure allow for a first series of amendments to 
be introduced at committee stage. Here, all MEPs have the possibility to put forward 
their own suggestions so as to modify the initial proposal, even if they are or not 
members of the committee responsible for the policy covered by the proposal. Once 
debates are concluded, a committee vote is cast on the amendments and the report 
prepared by the rapporteur. The file is then referred to the final vote in plenary. At 
this point, another stage in the procedure intervenes, whereby amendments that have 
not passed the first vote in committee or additional separate amendments may be 
introduced by a political group, 40 MEPs or by 76 MEPs in the case of own-initiative 
reports. Such amendments are part of the analysis in this chapter because they help 
establish if their overall increase or decrease in number at the final legislative stage is 
an indication of conflict resolution at committee level rather than plenary level. This 
is an important factor in the study of committee activity because it points to an early 
agreement and a decision reached in committee, which, if it does not receive 
 Regional Development Committee meeting, 02 June 2010, 21 June 2010 
   Culture and Education Committee meeting, 01 June 2010, 23 June 2010 
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significant or substantial amendments in plenary, is then carried forward by the full 
chamber and becomes the official EP position. 
Observations from the fieldwork carried out in the sampled committees indicate that 
there is a broad understanding inside the Parliament of how important it is to show a 
united front when amending and voting decisive packages in plenary, as Kreppel 
(1999) suggested. For example, in a debate in plenary on 23 June 2011 on the 
Commission’s  Fifth  Cohesion  Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy, 
with rapporteur MEP Markus Pieper, the leaders of the main political groups, 
intervened in plenary and requested that a vote be cast on this particular report in 
order to make an important point to Council and show that the EP, with a large 
majority, did not agree with some of the provisions put forward in the next cohesion 
policy strategy.3 Also motivated by this need to portray unity, MEPs, even at
committee level, try to vote reports and amendments with large majorities when an 
important piece of legislation or a resolution is debated and they wish to send a strong 
signal to Council. The case of the Commission Fifth Cohesion Report has also been 
analysed the previous chapter and in chapter 6 and its findings confirm the significant 
decrease in numbers between committee amendments and plenary amendments 
(Appendix 5.2). 
Moreover, in one of the interviews conducted, an advisor in charge of the Internal 
Market committee pointed out that, in many cases, when legislative packages are 
being discussed in both committee and plenary, the general consensus is to have the 
 Brussels plenary debate, 23 June 2011. 
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text and amendments adopted en bloc with significant majorities.3 According to him,
such a clear result may discourage  Council  from  attempting  to  shift  Parliament’s  view  
and cause the text to enter a second reading. This is confirmed by data in Appendix 
5.1 detailing the result of votes in committee and plenary on the reports analysed. 
Here, it is clear that in most cases, especially in committees which hold legislative 
powers, such as Internal Market committee, the resultV of votes at both committee and 
plenary stageV display significant majorities. 
A similar result is confirmed in the case of the Environment Committee, with a 
particular mention that, for the result of votes of most texts in second reading the 
Parliament appears to be split: there are very large abstentions, as is the case for the 
Recommendation for second reading on the application of patients' rights in cross-
border healthcare, having as rapporteur Françoise Grossetête, with 120 votes against, 
152 abstentions and 297 votes in favour. This is in line with Yordanova (2010: 29) 
and exemplifies the discrepancies, not only in vote results, but also in amendment 
numbers in plenary between reports in first and second reading. However, for the time 
frame analysed in this study, there are clear indications that the majority of texts in 
Parliament are now voted in first reading.3 This fact points out that voting under
second reading has become an exception, explaining why there are also significant 
differences between committee and plenary results of votes and amendments in this 
legislative phase. Furthermore, such evidence emphasises the need to investigate 
more closely the data coming from committees, since they are the first actors to 
influence the legislative process in the EP. 
 Interview with an MEP Advisor, 15 March 2011. 
 According to publicly available data on voting statistics from the EP website. Source: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sed/statistics.do 
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Indeed, the need to portray unity in the EP provides an explanation for the similarity 
of vote results in committee and plenary on reports from the sampled committees. 
Nonetheless, this is just one of the factors that can influence the decision-making 
process, to the same degree that the number of amendments in committee and plenary 
can be an indicator of the convergence of results at both levels. 
Fieldwork observations of EP internal processes based on the activity in the sampled 
committees reveal that, in cases where the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs 
have carried out conclusive work supported by formal and informal meetings to 
streamline the position of the committee, (as was the case with reports presented in 
Appendix 5.1) a small number of amendments end up being tabled in committee and 
even fewer in plenary. I refer here to committee and plenary amendments 
separately because there is an important distinction made in the EP Rules of 
procedure between committee and plenary amendments Qamely, Rule 45 refers to 
the procedure in committee for legislative reports, stating that: 
‘The committee's report shall comprise: 
(a) amendments, if any, to the proposal, accompanied, if appropriate, by short 
justifications which shall be the responsibility of the rapporteur and shall not be put to 
the  vote;;’(Rule  45,  Rules  of  procedure, 2012) 
Regarding the process of amending a text, before a rapporteur presents a draft report 
and his amendments to Parliament, all committee members have the possibility to 
table their own amendments to the draft report. These amendments are the first ones 
to be analysed in this study and their numbers are verified against those tabled in 
plenary. 
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Concerning plenary amendments, these are more difficult to put forward since, 
according to the EP Rules of procedure, they require a set number of MEPs or a 
political group to support them: 
‘Amendments  for  consideration  in  Parliament  may  be  tabled  by  the  committee  
responsible, a political group or at least 40 Members. Amendments shall be tabled in 
writing and signed by their authors.’  (Rule  156,  Rules  of  procedure, 2012).  
Consequently, when a political group does not agree with the amendments tabled by 
the responsible committee and has not been able to influence the report outcome in 
committee, it can choose to table amendments in plenary. The same is valid for a 
group of 40 MEPs or more, who want to change the text of a report. Procedurally, 
however, it is more difficult to amend at this stage, unless there is strong support from 
the  group  of  an  MEP’s  view  and  policy  position.  Nonetheless,  the  rules  foresee  that  in  
a situation where a group is in full disagreement with a report drafted in the 
specialised committee, it can table an alternative motion for resolution that is then 
voted in plenary alongside the initial report and the amendments tabled by committee. 
Relying on the information presented and what appears to be the established decision-
making pattern in committee, the first of the two hypotheses in this chapter can be 
drawn. 
H2a: A large number of amendments tabled in committee leads to a report receiving 
fewer amendments in plenary. 
According to committee procedure, a draft report can be amended by any of the MEPs 
who are members of the respective committee or substitute members (MEPs assigned 
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to  the  committee  but,  unlike  ‘full  members’,  they  are  only  allowed  to  vote  in  
committee  if  a  ‘full  member’  from  their  political  group  is  absent).  Nonetheless,  other  
MEPs from different committees, who take an interest in the subject, can also amend 
at this stage. As summarised by an ALDE policy advisor3 and confirmed by data in
Appendix 5.2 and report analysis, it can be concluded that draft reports receiving a 
large number of amendments at committee stage can be indicative of three things: a 
controversial issue; a conflict in terms of policy or ideology inside the committee; a 
report that has not been accurately drafted. Therefore, according to H2a an analysis of 
reports and the numbers of amendments should first indicate that there is a strong 
relation between amendment numbers on reports in committee and those in plenary. 
Secondly, it should help establish if amendment numbers are indicative of dissent in 
committee and, subsequently, if fewer amendments in plenary constitute a proof of its 
resolution. In other words, this hypothesis tests the relationship between committee 
amendment numbers and plenary amendment numbers. It verifies the likelihood of a 
report getting fewer amendments in plenary if it has already received a significant 
number in committee. It establishes whether or not amendments are indicators of 
committee agreement and plenary follow-up of committee decision. 
Consequently, if a decrease in amendment numbers from committee to plenary stage 
is found, then it can be concluded that MEPs from the political group also accept the 
amendments submitted in committee. This implies that other MEPs, who are not 
members of the respective committee (also referred to as the lead committee in the 
EP), follow the line set by their colleagues. It would also mean that the political group 
view is not different from the one established by their members in committee, because 
 Interview with ALDE Policy advisor, 9 February 2011 
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groups are less likely to table new amendments in plenary or alternative resolutions to 
the reports submitted by committees. If H2a is confirmed, then I expect to see 
potential conflicts and final decisions on proposals being established in committee 
and then adopted in the session of the full chamber. 
On the contrary, if H2a is not confirmed, then there should be less correlation 
between committee and plenary amendments, with more amendments tabled in 
plenary than in committee. If amendment numbers in plenary are significantly higher 
than those in committee then it can be concluded that decisions reached in committee 
are not viewed as representative of the full chamber position. Consequently, an 
increase in amendment numbers should be Dcharacteristic of plenary sessions, as well 
as the presence of alternative resolutions. 
In addition to this, since the procedure ruling the debate on a specific proposal may 
influence the type of amendments tabled, explanations for their limited or significant 
number can vary accordingly. Therefore, it is important to verify the distinctions in 
amendment results under different procedures: ordinary legislative procedure, 
budgetary procedure and own-initiative procedure. Own–initiative reports could have 
more amendments in committee because the EP is only signalling its position to the 
other institutions, has fewer procedural constrainWs than in the case of a legislative 
proposal and is, thus, less consensus-oriented. The reasoning underpinning this 
assumption is linked to the observation that the number of amendments on an own-
initiative report of the EP can indicate the level of acceptance of the actual position of 
the rapporteur inside the committee. According to one of the MEPs interviewed, this 
is the case with most of the own-initiative reports that are being drafted in the 
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Regional Development Committee, where, if the rapporteur is able to consolidate the 
views of all members, be it in the first text or through the proposed compromise 
amendments, he/she will only be confronted with a small number of modifications 
to the draft report.3
Amendment results on reports that fall under the ordinary legislative procedure or 
budgetary procedure, however, require legal justification when they are introduced 
and are more restrictive in content and scope. Findings resulted from the analysis of 
amendments belonging to reports issued from the sampled committee, indicate that in 
most legislative committees, like the Internal Market committee, the majority of 
amendments are of a technical nature and always require this legal justification. The 
latter is a short text that accompanies an amendment and presents the rationale and the 
utility that stand at the basis of the legislative modification. This specificity of 
amendments in the legislative committees is a factor that can impact on the final 
number of modifications that are brought forward by Parliament to one of the 
proposals of the Commission. 
Amendment analysis and fieldwork observation reveal that less technical, politically
motivated amendments are more difficult to table and pass at plenary level. These 
findings  confirm  Kreppel’s  (2002b) conclusions in regards to the rate of success of EP 
amendments vis-à-vis the other two institutional actors. Even when tabling 
amendments at committee level, MEPs are aware that technical changes are more 
readily accepted. The explanation for this could be that ultimately, the EP remains



 Interview with an MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 24 November 2010. 
 Internal Market committee meeting, 2 June 2010, 23 June 2010, 12 July 2010 
 Interview with ALDE MEP, 9 February 2011. 
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an institution eager to prove its efficiency and its output is aimed at solving the single 
market issues for EU citizens. 
The case of amendments on the IMCO reports, such as the Report on the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on textile names and 
related labelling of textile products, having as rapporteur Toine Manders, illustrates 
this clearly. Here, the main focus of MEPs with extended knowledge on the subject 
was to ensure that technical aspects comprised in the regulation do not damage 
the interests of the industry or those of European consumers.4 Parliament seized 
theopportunity to add to the regulation references to consumer protection and labelling of 
textile products. It tabled amendments which passed in plenary and later on in the 
process, under second reading, the references to these same issues were accepted 
by Council and deemed adopted.4
Moreover, in the framework of internal parliamentary debate, another aspect that can 
exercise a notable influence is the extent to which the Commission is prepared to 
accept proposed amendments. Namely, there has to be a statement issued by the 
Commission stating if it is in agreement with the modifications brought by MEPs. 
This concerns all ordinary legislative procedure reports and even if such statements 
are usually issued after the vote in the full chamber, during committee debates4
preparing the final EP vote, representatives of the responsible Commission 
Directorates General are already in a position to indicate whether or not their 
institution is likely to support the modifications introduced by the legislature. 
 Internal Market Committee meeting, 16 March 2010. 
 EP debate on 'Textile names and related labelling of textile products', 10 May 2011. 
Internal Market Committee meetings: 16 March 2010, 7 April 2010, 2 June 2010, 23 June 2010, 12 
July 2010. 
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Consequently, based on all aspects presented above, it can be concluded that a report 
with a significant number of amendments tabled in committee has already integrated 
and resolved possible conflicts or diverging positions of political groups before 
reaching the plenary. Variations depending on the type of procedure are expected. 
Following from here, if H2a is verified, then a more comprehensive H2b can be 
formulated to test the extent to which plenary can follow committee decisions, as 
illustrated by the amendment numbers. 
H2b: The number of committee amendments tabled to a report signals plenary voting 
behaviour and the extent to which it will follow a committee decision. 
This argument helps to identify the point where conflict is resolved and offers an 
explanation to the correlation of results of votes and amendments in the two 
legislative phases. This hypothesis tests the link between amendment numbers in 
committee and result of votes in plenary. That is to say, it verifies whether the number 
of committee amendments is linked to a vote result characterised by significant 
majorities and strong support. The hypothesis tests whether dissent, as expressed in 
amendment numbers in committee, is resolved in plenary and reflected in the results 
of votes. In other words, will a report with a lot of amendments in committee be 
passed with a large majority in plenary because a consensus was reached in 
committee? 
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Therefore, if consensus is built in committee then the full chamber should follow the 
indications and, as a consequence, reports with a large number of amendments, where 
diverging views might have already been exposed and solved in committee, should be 
characterised by a strong correlation between committee and plenary vote. The 
underlying argument in this case is that once the discussion has covered the principal 
lines of dissent and, with the help of amendments and through negotiations the 
rapporteur in charge has managed to accommodate all different views in his report 
before submitting it to the plenary, a strong consensus is consolidated and MEPs are 
more  likely  to  vote  according  to  their  committee  colleagues’  preferences. This implies 
that a large number of amendments indicating the many views held by the members in 
committee bring the debate to a quick resolution and lead to the adoption of the report 
in the full chamber. 
An important factor that accounts for such a development and provides such a result 
is the principle of perceived preference coherence (Ringe, 2010). According to it, 
MEPs choose to follow the opinion that they perceive to be closest to their 
preferences and in this case it is the one of their political group colleagues from the 
respective committee. 
Nonetheless, the number of amendments to a report in committee can also be the 
result of a badly drafted report or an unsuccessful rapporteur. For this to be the case, 
there should be as many amendments in plenary and no correlation with the final 
result of the votes. At the same time, the few changes submitted at committee and 
plenary level can indicate the absence of conflict inside Parliament on a specific issue. 
That is why, in an attempt to establish the underpinnings of the existing process inside 
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the EP, this study has carried an in-depth analysis of MEP activity during committee 
meetings, supported by an account of political group meetings in chapter 6. 
In this chapter both H2a and H2b are first tested based on an analysis of the data. 
Firstly, I calculate the correlation between the number of tabled amendments in 
committee and plenary. This will indicate if there are consistently fewer amendments 
tabled in plenary than in committee. The reports and committees selected will 
illustrate if there are any variations based on the procedure of the report or on the type 
of committee leading the work on the proposal. Furthermore, an analysis of individual 
cases supported by fieldwork observations will map the process of amending a report 
and establish if there is a link between amendments and plenary results of vote. The 
method I use is that of process tracing (Checkel, 2005), complimented by accounts 
from the fieldwork observation. 
Therefore, the following section of this chapter will analyse the reports debated in the 
sampled committees and test hypotheses H2a and H2b against quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
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Table 5.1: Correlation of committee and plenary amendments 
 
Committee Regional 
Development 
Internal 
Market 
Environment Culture  
and Education 
Budgets All 
Correlation 
committee to 
plenary AMs 
0.16 0.78 0.64 -0.01 0.64 0.65 
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5. 4.1 Amendment numbers in committee and plenary – correlations
This part of section 4 investigates the results obtained from the data on amendments 
in committee and plenary for the specific committees selected, as well as the overall 
data on amendments for all the committees of the institution. 
Table 5.1 presents these data, which are based on the number of amendments that 
each of the 169 reports analysed, debated in the period of September 2009 to July 
2011, has received in the following parliamentary committees: Regional 
Development, Internal Market, Environment, Culture and Education and Budgets. 
Section 5 of the Appendix lists the descriptive statistics from each committee that the 
data in the table are based on. 
In order to interpret these data and establish if there is a valid relationship between the 
amendment numbers on reports in committee and plenary, I have correlated the 
number of amendments on each report in committee with the number of amendments 
tabled in plenary to verify the strength of the argument. As seen in each of the five 
cases, the results vary. Correlations are strong, with the exception of the Regional 
Development Committee and the Culture and Education Committee. Procedurally, 
both of these committee deal more often with own-initiative reports and non-
legislative acts, compared to the other three legislative committees in this table. As a 
consequence, they tend to receive amendmentV only in committee and not in plenary, 
where it is only the rapporteur who can introduce additional amendments at that stage. 
This explains why there is a negative correlation for the Culture and education 
committee, where there are mostly amendments submitted in committee and almost 
none in plenary. For the Internal Market, Environment and Budgets committees the 
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correlation between the number of amendments in committee and plenary is 
significant, demonstrating that the relationship between the two arrays of numbers in 
this case is consistent. It is also in agreement with the overall committee correlation of 
0.65. The overall committee correlation is based on amendment numbers recorded for 
a total of 545 reports from all EP committees, for the same period September 2009 to 
July 2011. 
Therefore, the results from the data support the argument that there is a correlation 
between the two amendment numbers, particularly in the case of legislative 
committees. They validate the two hypotheses and emphasise that amendments in 
committee and their overall higher numbers compared to plenary are an indication 
that conflict is resolved at committee level and any policy or ideological differences 
are resolved before the plenary session debates and votes. 
Following an analysis of the quantitative data, the second part of this section will 
investigate individual reports in the sampled committees. 
5. 4.2 Committee-Plenary cohesion illustrated by amendments
The second part of this section analyses reports in each committee and maps the 
process of amendment negotiation and voting based on the fieldwork observation 
from committee meetings and plenary sessions. 
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The Internal Market committee displays a great discrepancy between the number of 
amendments submitted on reports in committee and plenary. 
The report on delivering a single market to consumers and citizens, for example, 
voted in May 2010, had 236 amendments tabled in committee but no additional 
amendments tabled in plenary. This was the result of the rapporteur incorporating 
most of the amendments tabled in committee in the final text submitted before 
plenary. The amendments were mostly uncontroversial and consensual. They referred 
to strengthening the single market (amendment 34), increasing consumer protection 
(amendment 40), while also focusing on achieving a single market capable of creating 
jobs within a green economy (amendment 35).4 This explains why no additional
amendments were tabled in plenary and accounts for the large majority vote on this 
report. The report on completing the internal market for e-commerce  (166 
amendments in committee) falls into the same category, as does the Report on the 
future of European standardization (with 118 initial amendments and only three 
additional amendments to committee ones tabled in plenary. These three amendments 
were all tabled by the rapporteur and were meant to clarify the text).4 Own-initiative
reports (INI), such as the three mentioned before, receive significant modifications at 
committee level and almost no amendments in plenary. This is in accordance with a 
previous statement from an interviewee,4 namely that in such instances, MEPs in
charge of the report try to accommodate all diverging views on the subject in order to 
avoid more changes being submitted in plenary. This view is also expressed in 
 Amendments tabled in committee to the report on delivering a single market to consumers and 
citizens, 21 April 2010. 
 Results of votes, 21 October 2010. Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/minutes.html. 
 Interview with an MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 26 November 2010. 
Internal Market Committee 
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committee debates by the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs, who ask members to 
bring their contribution to the text and suggest any changes they may like to put 
forward, so that the committee may be able to produce a complete and comprehensive 
report.4 Rapporteurs can be ensured in this way that when their report is presented to
the full chamber in plenary, there are no additional views that need to be 
accommodated to secure the swift adoption of the report. Moreover, an analysis of the 
content of INI reports in this committee reveals that they are seldom of a highly 
technical nature, thus allowing non-committee Members to bring their contribution to 
the text if they so wish. 
This is not the case, however, for the Report on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on textile names and related labelling of 
textile products, which received 100 amendments tabled in committee and 72 in 
plenary, the Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on combating late payment in commercial transactions, with 210 
amendments in committee and 48 in plenary, or the Report on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, with 
673 amendments in committee and 267 in plenary. This last report is a relevant case 
for analysis because the work carried out when it was drafted has followed a very 
sinuous path across the institution. 
The initial proposal for a directive of the EP and of the Council on consumer rights 
was meant to subsume four previous directives on consumer rights. From the 
beginning, this has been a text followed in great detail by lobby groups, industry 
 Internal Market Committee meetings:16 March 2010, 07 April 2010, 02 June 2010, 23 June 2010, 12 
July 2010. 
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associations and consumer associations that continued to lobby the Parliament at 
committee stage to ensure the representation of their interests,4 after having
previously lobbied the Commission in regards to the provisions contained in the 
initial draft phase of the proposal. As a result, many MEPs had a vested interest in 
amending this proposal in committee and almost 1,600 amendments were initially 
tabled. The rapporteur on this report was forced to limit the number of proposed 
changes that could be voted in the Internal Market Committee and resorted to 
compromise amendments that would resume and aggregate individual amendments, 
which could then be passed in committee. This meant that on amendments which 
concerned the same paragraph and shared a similar scope, a common phrase was 
sought by the rapporteur, in agreement with the shadows and amendment authors, to 
include most of the changes suggested by each amendment author, so far as possible. 
Consequently, 673 amendments were voted at this point and 267 were entered, in 
total, for a vote in plenary. This illustrates how a disputed legislative proposal, 
touching on many policy aspects, that are still significantly different across Member 
States, was after all defined in committee and not in the plenary. 
Moreover, looking at the text of amendments, a predominant line can be traced: 
contrary to the Commission proposal, MEPs did not wish to harmonise consumer 
rights to the extent where it was no longer possible for Member States to keep or 
introduce stricter measures of consumer protection (amendments 234, 235, 236).
The same is valid for amendments meant to exclude financial services and health 
services from the scope of this directive (amendments 219, 242, 244, 503). These 
 Interview with a Policy Officer from one of the leading industry associations in the field of E-
commerce, 17 March 2010. 
 Amendments tabled in committee to the report on consumer rights, 25 October 2010. 
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aspects are all included in the amendments contained in the report tabled for 
consideration by plenary, as well as in the final compromise resulting after early 
agreement negotiations. They indicate that in spite of opposing views in committee, 
members were able to isolate the main issues of interest and consolidate a committee 
line from which they could enter into negotiations with the other institutions. Here 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs played a key role in consolidating this position 
and solving dissent. As a result, many of the amendments to the proposal which were 
initially put forward to plenary were included in the final agreement. Aspects such as 
a mixed approach for harmonisation of consumer rights, the scope of the directive, the 
provision of information to consumers, the right of withdrawal of a consumer from a 
contract, which appeared in the committee report first tabled to plenary, were 
confirmed after the trilogue and were included in the final text adopted in the plenary. 
At the same time, provisions decided in committee regarding off-premise contracts, 
namely to exclude these from the scope of the directive if the payment made by the 
consumer does not exceed 40 euro, were modified after the agreement to a value not 
exceeding 50 euro. Also, regarding the provisions on delivery of goods, in particular 
the failure of the trader to deliver the goods at the time agreed upon, the initial report 
in committee offered the possibility for the consumer to terminate the contract if the 
trader failed to deliver the goods within a new period as indicated by the consumer. 
But, in  the  agreement  adopted,  the  consumer’s  options are constrained by the 
circumstances, as is the contract termination in such instances. These examples offer a 
glimpse into the outcome of the negotiations and the battles fought between the 
Commission, the EP and the Council. Nonetheless, the final agreement reached in the 
case of this directive does not depart significantly, in terms of content, scope and 
purpose from the report initially adopted in committee. Although it could be argued 
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that the initial viewpoint of the EP on this proposal was closer to that of the Council, 
thus explaining the result of the agreement, it must be pointed out that there were 
significant divisions committee and in spite of this, the agreement did not overturn the 
committee line. Such findings show that even in the case of early agreements 
committees continue to play an important part in the decision-making process and 
they prove that, unlike what Yordanova (2013) argues, the amendments contained in 
the agreement with the other institutions do not replace committee amendments as 
submitted first to plenary. In terms of content, in the case of this directive, they either 
replicate or modify them, confirming the influence of the committee. 
To sum up, the findings indicate that, depending on the procedure (own-initiative or 
ordinary legislative procedure) and the nature of a report, the number of amendments 
in plenary can increase or decrease. However, plenary amendments are still fewer 
than in committee because the latter can form a common position and pass it through 
plenary. Therefore, it seems that H2a is verified. 
Regarding H2b, for all reports in the Internal market committee, the final results of 
vote are similar to the initial ones in committee and a significant number of 
amendments on particular reports signals the similarity between the two vote results. 
In some cases, for the own-initiative reports there was a significant number of tabled 
amendments in committee, compared to a smaller number in plenary and the vote in 
the full chamber was carried by show of hands. This implies that consensus had 
already been reached on this report across political groups and the report was 
expected to gather a large majority, otherwise there would have been a request for 
roll-call vote to signal different voting options amongst political groups and control 
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how members voted. The same situation was repeated in the case of the report on 
completing the internal market for e-commerce for example, of the report on the 
future of European standardisation, of the report on the impact of advertising on 
consumer behaviour and in the case of the report on the implementation of the 
Services Directive 2006/123/EC. 
Findings show that the Internal Market committee is setting the basis for the final 
decision taken on a report in Parliament and the amendments to Commission 
proposals that the committee adopts are carried forward and adopted in the plenary as 
well. 
Environment Public Health and Food Safety Committee 
The Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee (ENVI), is, like the 
Internal Market committee, one of the main EP legislative committees, debating and 
passing regulations and directives essential for the functioning of the single market. 
Given its nature, it votes most of its acts under the ordinary legislative procedure 
(former co-decision – COD). From the sample of analysed reports for this study, it 
results that the number of amendments usually tabled on reports in this committee is 
more significant than in the case of the other four committees. 
Appendix 5.3 indicates that reports leaving this committee are faced with a higher 
number of amendments in plenary and that is usually the case with those that fall 
under the ordinary legislative procedure. Own-initiative reports, on the other hand, 
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such as the report on the implementation of EU legislation aiming at the conservation 
of biodiversity, the report on reducing health inequalities in the EU or the report on 
the analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and 
assessing the risk of carbon leakage, receive amendments in committee, but almost 
none in plenary. As stated before, this is the result of the procedure governing the 
work on the report and, as a consequence, on reports under the ordinary legislative 
procedure the difference between committee and plenary tabled amendments is 
significant. For example, the following reports have all received a large number of 
amendments in both committee and plenary: the report on the proposal for a directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending, as regards 
pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use, the report on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the restriction of the use of certain 
hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment or the report on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting 
emission performance standards for new light commercial vehicles as part of the 
Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles. 
It is, nonetheless, true that there have been fewer changes submitted to the proposals 
in plenary and this finding follows the line of H2a and of the amendment correlations 
in Table 5.1. 
There are also specific cases, such as the one of the report on the provision of food 
information to consumers, where the numbers are striking in comparison to the rest of 
the reports: 575 amendments submitted in the first stage and 351 reaching the plenary. 
These are indeed a reflection of the multiple debates and the discussions that took 
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place in the Environment Committee at the time this report was on the agenda.
Bearing in mind that this was a legislative proposal for a regulation - which is 
automatically applied in all Member States once it has been voted at the EU level, 
without having to be transferred into national legislation (as is the case with 
Directives) - it was viewed as extremely important for all parties and beneficiaries 
involved. MEPs were again increasingly lobbied, a fact that resulted in such a high 
number of amendments being tabled. Moreover, this report went into second reading 
and at this phase the Council text received 402 amendments in committee and only 
135 were tabled for plenary. At both stages, most amendments address a set of issues 
where there seems to be an overall consensus from the committee side towards the 
Council and Commission. In this case amendments concerned issues related to
origin labelling, minimum font size for the nutritional information on the packaging, 
imitation foods and nutrient profiles.5 These were eventually included in the
compromise with the Council and were accepted by the Commission as well. In spite 
of the significant number of amendments at both first and second reading in 
committee and plenary, the report shows a close similarity between the results of vote 
in committee and that in plenary under first reading, with a final roll-call vote 
gathering a large majority in the plenary session of the full chamber. These findings 
indicate that MEPs have not only followed the decision in the lead committee but they 
have also portrayed an image of unity and consensus to the other institutions, 
accepting  the  compromise  and  the  amendments  tabled  by  the  committee  to  Council’s  
position in second reading. 
 Environment Committee meeting, 15 March 2010. 
 Amendments tabled in committee to the report on food information to consumers, 22 December 
2009 and 23 March 2011. 
 EP  debate  on  ‘Food  information  to  consumers’,  15  June  2010  and  5  July  2011. 
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Regional Development Committee 
In the Regional Development Committee the reports analysed for this study are 
covered by the own-initiative and the ordinary legislative procedure, with a 
preponderance of own-initiative reports. As a consequence, results reveal that most of 
the amendments are tabled in committee and very few additional ones are submitted 
in plenary. 
Fieldwork observations from  in this committee point to a constant interest
from  the  rapporteurs’  side  in  streamlining  the  view  of  committee  members  and  
accommodating diverging opinions. The regular rapporteur and shadow rapporteur 
meetings that take place during the preparation of a report and the debates in 
committee are part of this effort. During committee meetings, MEPs are encouraged 
to put forward changes and proposals to the text of the draft report and, before the 
vote, amendments and compromise amendments are negotiated at length. These 
aspects account for the reduced number of amendments tabled in plenary. 
Furthermore, even in the case of reports such as the report on the Commission’s  Fifth  
Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy, discussed in chapters 
4 and 6, which had 569 amendments tabled in committee, the number of amendments 
tabled in plenary was limited to 10. Here, following a significant number of tabled 
committee amendments, the rapporteur, Markus Pieper, held several meetings with 
the shadow rapporteurs from the other political groups to ensure the representation of 
all views in the final draft of the report submitted to the full chamber in the plenary 
5 Regional Development Committee meetings: 2 June 2010, 21 June 2010, 12 July 2010, 27 
September 2010, 4 October 2010, 14 February 2011. 
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session. Amendments for this report dealt with various aspects linked to cohesion 
policy and future priorities, to the new programming period, to financing options and 
reducing administration.5 As a result, the report was voted with a large majority, very
few votes against but with an important number of abstentions (528 votes in favour, 
18 against and 108 abstentions). Still, this vote was in accordance with the result of 
vote in committee, where out of 44 MEPs, 31 voted in favour, 4 against and 9 
abstained. Therefore, the findings from this committee illustrate that the number of 
amendments tabled decreases significantly in plenary and the initially high number of 
committee amendments eventually lead to a cohesive vote in the full chamber similar 
to the one in committee. 
Culture and Education Committee 
In the case of the Culture and Education committee, an EP non-legislative committee, 
the results are in line with what one would expect to find based on the hypotheses of 
this chapter. Since most reports are own-initiative ones (INI), as is the case with non-
legislative committees, a significant number of amendments are tabled in committee 
and almost none in plenary. Moreover, the few amendments that are put forward in 
plenary (Appendix 5.4) are tabled on the few reports covered by the ordinary 
legislative procedure (COD). 
 Amendments  tabled  in  committee  to  the  report  on  Commission’s  Fifth  Cohesion Report and the 
strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy, 20 April 2011. 
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Based on observations from committee debates,5 findings reveal that these are
usually focused on reaching the outcome most favourable to all political groups. This 
accounts for the voting in the plenary on Culture and Education committee reports, 
which are usually voted by simple show of hands, a fact in itself indicative of 
consensus, and are carried with large majorities. One of the MEPs member in this 
committee explained that, when there are indications of strong diverging views on a 
particular issue from the members of the main political groups, the rapporteur 
organises meetings with the other shadow rapporteurs in order to negotiate a 
common line as early as possible in the process.5 The rapporteur also has the option 
to drafthe eport and negotiate the different amendments individually before the vote. 
Consequently, the findings indicate that, due to the limited legislative nature of the 
committee itself, the decisions in Culture and Education are mostly based on 
consensus, a fact also reflected in the large majority of votes expressed in the plenary 
on reports from this committee. 
Budgets Committee 
The following committee on Budgets is amongst the most important in the EP, since 
the budgetary powers are at the core of this institution. Most of the reports here fall 
under the budgetary procedure, which stipulates that Parliament is the responsible 
institution, in charge of defining the budgetary lines after having consulted the other 
institutions. The Budgets committee also counts own-initiative reports amongst its 
 Culture and Education Committee meetings: 3 March 2011, 16 March 2011, 11 April 2011. 
 Interview with a MEP from the Culture and Education Committee, June 2010 
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texts and, as in all other committees, these receive most of their amendments in the 
first stage. 
Regarding reports under the budgetary procedure, the findings show that they tend to 
see changes added in plenary more often then reports in other committees, but the 
trend points to fewer amendments being tabled in plenary. In respect of modifications 
on the draft budget, the findings in the field have underlined that MEPs are likely to 
negotiate more in order to have their amendments passed in the Budgets committee, 
than they are in the other studied committees. This is due to the budgetary subject and 
the immediate impact on voters that it engenders. Moreover, they are more inclined to 
attempt and exhaust all options provided in the EP Rules of Procedure in order for 
their amendments to pass and that includes tabling them in the plenary. In spite of 
this, results from votes cast in plenary remain similar to those from committee. This 
implies  that,  regardless  of  the  MEPs’  wish  to  override  an  unfavourable  result  in  the  
Budgets committee, the plenary session of the full chamber still follows the initial 
committee decision. One of the reasons to explain this is the perception that MEPs 
have of the committee.5 The Budgets committee is seen as highly technical and many
MEPs simply rely on the help from political group staff when drafting amendments to 
be tabled here. At the same time, the perceived preference coherence model from 
Ringe (2010), mentioned in the first section of this chapter, can, in part, account for 
the committee decision being carried forward to the plenary in such cases. 
Therefore, all of the abovementioned findings for the committees analysed so far 
validate the two hypotheses and indicate that the legislative activity on all proposals 
 Interview with Regional Development Committee MEP, November 2010. 
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that reach Parliament is based in the specialised committees. The different 
amendments introduced at committee level serve to structure the future debate in 
plenary and set its main lines. They signal the resolution of the conflict and the 
building of consensus as early in the process as committee stage, an aspect which 
validates the hypotheses of this chapter and supports the main argument of the thesis 
that, within the internal legislative process of the EP, the main decisions are reached 
in committee and then sanctioned in the plenary sessions. Such a finding has 
significant implications for the way the work inside this institution is viewed and 
these shall be developed in the conclusions section of this chapter. 
5. 5 Conclusions
The previous section of this chapter has tested the hypotheses against descriptive data 
from amendment numbers in the five committees and vote results. It has analysed 
individual cases of reports in each committee based on fieldwork observation and 
committee meeting debates. The conclusions section of this chapter will analyse the 
findings and their implications for the main argument of the study. 
Throughout the past years, research on the EP has developed to become more 
comprehensive. So far, this institution has been analysed in relation to the other two 
European bodies that play an essential part in passing EU legislation: the Commission 
and the Council. The current understanding of its internal processes, activity, 
procedures and informal rules is more thorough and has provided the possibility to 
trace the development of all the legislative procedures at different stages in 
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Parliament. Consequently, more attention has been paid to the work of EP committees 
and its implications for the final decisions on the proposals sanctioned by the 
legislature. 
As part of this research, this chapter  has  analysed  Parliament’s  activity in committees, 
namely the amendments tabled here, in an effort to identify the implications that this 
has for the overall activity and decisions reached in plenary. It has focused on a 
section  of  the  committee’s  decision-making process by analysing amendments tabled 
at this stage - their numbers, their nature and their intrinsic value – and by comparing 
them with the ones introduced in plenary. This was first done through an investigation 
of what the actual numbers can reveal about amendments tabled on a set of reports 
from a sample of five committees, and then by checking these findings against the 
observations and interviews gathered from the fieldwork. The hypotheses put forward 
in the chapter have been used to test if there is sufficient evidence indicating an 
increased role of committees and a follow up of the results of vote cast here in the 
plenary sessions of the chamber. 
The findings reveal that the initial position taken by a committee on a proposal is 
mirrored in the result of votes in plenary. The amendments introduced to the text of 
the proposed legislation, or to the text of a report at committee and plenary stage, can 
indicate this. Their decrease in number in plenary proves that, from the first steps of 
the decision-making process, the institution tries to find a solution to the possible 
conflicts and diverging views through negotiation. As illustrated by the findings on 
most of the reports presented in this chapter, a consensual solution is usually 
identified. The validation of H2a and H2b by the results of correlations of committee 
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and plenary amendments, as well as by the committee fieldwork observations, is a 
strong indication that conflict and ideological differences are internalised by 
committees and resolved at this stage rather than in plenary. The small or large 
number of amendments in committee signals the existence of divisive issues in 
committees, particularly in cases where the results of votes and the few plenary 
amendments might lead one to believe there was an a priori broad consensus in 
Parliament. Moreover, the role played by committees in finding not only a common 
committee line, but also an EP position, underlines their importance and their 
influence over the entire chamber. In this respect, they serve more than an 
informational role (Krehbiel, 1990) and they may sometimes overcome partisan 
influence (Cox and McCubbins, 2007) with the help of consensus-based policy, which 
still dominates committee activity, and due to the perceived preference coherence that 
MEPs who are not committee members retain. Committees influence the decision-
making process because of their efficiency in reaching agreement in an institution 
concerned with legitimising itself through an increased legislative output. Having 
analysed amendments, additional evidence can now be put forward to illustrate the 
influence committees have over the EP and the strength they acquired during EP7 
(2009-2014). If committees constitute the arena where different views on Commission 
proposals or EP reports collide, it is clear then why they have the ability to structure 
and delineate a Parliament opinion, which is then adopted by the full chamber. 
Furthermore, the sample of legislative and non-legislative committees investigated 
has revealed a clear pattern of similarity of results of vote in committee and plenary, 
as well as a tendency to see most changes to the text being proposed in committee. 
However, variations have been identified depending on the type of procedure 
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governing the report – own-initiative (INI) or ordinary legislative procedure – with a 
preponderance of own-initiative reports having most, if not all, of their amendments 
tabled in committee. This argument has been supported by the observations from all 
of the five committees and it leads to the conclusion that consensus and 
representativity of the full chamber can be more easily coordinated and achieved 
under this procedure. 
In the case of the proposals for legislation covered by the budgetary and the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the results indicate that plenary has, for the most part, not only 
taken note of the decision put forward by the specialised committees, but also 
followed it. Also, if under an early agreement in first reading studies until now saw 
committee amendments being overturned in plenary (Yordanova, 2010), this chapter 
has highlighted that amendments at this stage cannot be seen as competing with 
committee ones but rather as a different stage in the negotiation of the compromise 
with the other institutions. Nor does this point to a lack of committee influence in the 
case of files under an early agreement procedure (Yordanova, 2013), since the 
committee and its members continue to be involved all throughout the process. 
Moreover, if in these cases under the legislative procedure it was initially expected to 
find more dissent and conflict in plenary, as well as a higher number of amendments 
tabled as a result of diverging views, the facts did not validate this argument, since the 
other MEPs appeared to endorse the initial committee decision in their final vote in 
plenary. Indeed, this aspect could be partly explained either by the perceived 
preference coherence of Ringe (2010) or by a high degree of representativity in 
committees of the entire House, as suggested by McElroy (2006). However, both of 
these explanations applied to the daily practice in committees fail to address the issue 
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of how the committee to plenary alignment is reached. Surely there are instances 
when group views differ from committee ones, just as there are instances when MEPs, 
in spite of the trust they might invest in the colleagues who are committee members, 
might be lobbied to take a different stance. I argue that in such cases it is the complex 
series of interactions that take place in committee meetings, in the meetings of 
political groups, as well as in informal meetings held by group members, which 
ensures that a committee agreement is accepted and adopted by the full chamber. 
Nonetheless, on extremely salient reports as those mentioned for the sampled 
committees, figures show that there tend to be more amendments introduced in 
plenary, which could indicate a higher level of disagreement on the subject that 
cannot be entirely solved at committee stage and eventually surfaces in plenary. At 
the same time, it can be argued that this is a result of the increased lobbying by 
interested parties, as it was the case with the report on consumer rights, and not 
necessarily of a lack of representativity of committees. 
For the most part, the findings presented in this chapter which indicate that the 
number of amendments put forward in the plenary is significantly lower than in the 
committee, reveal that there are important negotiations taking part in committees, and 
that these structure and influence the entire course of a proposal in Parliament. This 
leads to the conclusion that committees play a central role for the EP. The interviews 
with the MEPs, Parliament’s  civil  servants and representatives of the lobby groups, 
show that all the actors involved are very aware of the essential part they play in the 
legislative process. That is also why most MEPs consider their work in the specialised 
committees as one of the most important parts of their activities, as it results from the 
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2010 MEP Survey. Similarly, representatives of the industry associations focus all 
their attention on lobbying MEPs at this stage. 
Moreover, these findings appear to describe a procedural reality that is the functional 
result of all processes, activities and constraints that are present in the EP. As such, it 
seems predictable that, given the large number of proposals that Parliament has to 
deal with, especially after the extension of its powers with the Lisbon Treaty, and the 
limited amount of time that it meets in plenary in order to vote (once a month, for 
three days in Strasbourg and one day in Brussels during the part sessions), it would be 
looking to ensure, as much as possible, the consensus and a final decision in the pre-
legislative stage, rather than in plenary. This renders the entire process more efficient 
and allows the House to pass the necessary legislation more quickly. This is a matter 
of fact situation for most of those working within EU institutions, which has been 
overlooked due to lack of sufficient data and a continuous focus on the interpretation 
of roll-call votes in the plenary. 
Still, the question remains if these committees could eventually reduce the votes in 
plenary to a mere exercise on a decision already taken. This seems unlikely at the 
moment, especially given the important part political groups and national parties play 
in the decisions taken in this institution. In the future it could be that more attention 
will be paid in following the debates and the views expressed by their MEPs in these 
committees. 
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Chapter 6 
Who matters most? – Parliamentary committee activity in the EP 
and political group interactions 
This chapter focuses on political group interactions linked to the activity of 
parliamentary committees in the EP. It analyses the way in which decisions on reports 
are made inside a political group after a committee vote and prior to a final vote in 
plenary. Based on the main argument of this research emphasising the important role 
played by committees in the EP decision-making process, this chapter illustrates the 
process through which political groups accept and integrate, during their group 
meetings, the agreements reached by their members in committee. It answers the 
question of how committees influence the EP legislative process and evaluates 
whether committees or the political groups have more impact on the overall decision-
making process. In this respect, it argues that group meetings facilitate the cohesion of 
the political group for the final vote and are another one of the instruments that allow 
for the decision in committee to be transferred through to plenary. To begin with, this 
first section of this chapter will introduce the aim and purpose of the chapter within 
this thesis and the approach it takes in analysing political group meetings. The chapter 
then presents the existing studies on EP groups, while in the next section it focuses on 
internal organisation of the political groups and on the group structure covering 
committee workload in section four. Section three provides empirical evidence for the 
analysis of political group meetings prior to the final vote in plenary and the last 
section discusses the findings of the chapter. 
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This section situates the current chapter within the framework of the study based on 
the main argument of the thesis. It summarises the hypotheses and findings of the 
other two empirical chapters and sets out the lines along which each section will be 
developed. 
 
Political groups in the EP form the basic structure of the legislature. They group 
MEPs according to their national parties’  political  affiliations  and  they are at the core 
of the Parliament. In their meetings they discuss and align the position of the group 
before each plenary session, but the substance of legislative matters in the institution 
is still mainly discussed in committees.  
 
So far, as part of this study on EP committees, their strength and central place in an 
institution eager to legitimise itself through legislative output, I have analysed in 
chapter 4 the aspects related to rapporteurs and their work on a report, which indicate 
that a direct influence on the decision-making process is being exerted from 
committee to plenary stage. This has been illustrated through an analysis of reports 
and debates held in committee and plenary, as well as of the data issued from results 
of votes. Viewing rapporteurs as the main actors who can ensure that a committee 
agreement and subsequent decision can be followed in the plenary, the findings in 
chapter 4 showed that rapporteurs constitute one of the instruments in the linking 
mechanism that ensures the transferral of decision from committee to plenary. They 
can push through agreements from committee and up to plenary. Subsequently, 
chapter 5 has analysed the number of amendments tabled in committee as opposed to 
that of amendments tabled in plenary, in order to investigate if their decreasing 
number at the plenary stage is an indication of a definitive decision on a Parliament 
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report being reached before the session of the full chamber. Findings issued from the 
data on amendment numbers in committee and plenary reveal that reports have 
consistently fewer amendments tabled in plenary, a factor which indicates an 
agreement at committee level and a decision reached before the final vote. In both 
these chapters the existence of early agreement in first reading was also analysed, as a 
possible indication of committee loss of power. The example investigated, the 
Consumer rights directive, has shown that in spite of a smaller number of actors being 
involved in these negotiations and an apparent overturn of committee amendments by 
the consolidated amendment containing the compromise, committee influence cannot 
be ruled out since the actors involved are committee members and the final 
compromise is still sanctioned by the responsible committee before the plenary final 
vote. Moreover, committee amendments in these cases are not overturned by plenary 
but replaced by the compromise text resulted from negotiations with the other 
institutions and subsequently agreed in committee. Therefore, based on the theoretical 
approach presented in chapter 3 and the findings from the two previous empirical 
chapters, the main argument underlying this research can be formulated as follows: 
without any prejudice to the variety of processes, interactions and different interests 
that exist in the EP - be it interactions between different services in the Parliament, 
between representatives of other institutions, between the interests of national parties, 
European transnational parties and EP political groups, which can sometimes be in 
conflict with one another – committees play a central part in decision-making in the 
EP. They predict and exert influence upon the final vote cast in plenary. This 
increased role for committees is the result of EP’s  relentless  institutional  policy  of  
gaining more powers and ensuring legitimacy through an increased legislative output. 
In a system of separation of powers where there is limited scope for political group 
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discipline and where MEPs seek career advancement in their national parties and 
governments rather than at EU level, the EP relies on a regular basis on building 
consensus to ensure it can prevail as a legislator, offering a more technical image 
throughout its committee system. 
 
Within this setting, discussions and negotiations inside political groups make-up a 
significant part of the legislative process and analysing these can reveal how an EP 
group position is aligned from committee debates to plenary final vote. The principal 
hypothesis of this chapter is that political groups in the EP, being subject to 
constraints imposed by a federal system, a divided government, the separation of 
powers, as well as their trans-national nature, internal structure and system of 
organisation, are less likely to impose a position to their members in committee than 
they are to follow a line previously set by them. More precisely, this chapter argues 
that MEPs assigned to their committees can ensure through their activity that the 
political group in the final vote of the full chamber follows agreements reached in 
committee. With the help of political group meetings that take place twice a month 
and the debates held here, members can work towards establishing the group line on a 
topic previously dealt with by their assigned specialised committee in the EP. Such 
work is carried out starting with a presentation of reports discussed or already voted 
in committee and set on the next agenda of the plenary. It is based on the expression 
of views of group members on any topic from the EP committee or plenary agenda 
that might be considered sensitive for the group policy line and is characterised by the 
fact that MEPs active in the specialised committee responsible for the given policy 
enjoy the recognition of their expertise by their group colleagues. From observations 
in the political group meetings, correlated with results of votes in committee and 
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plenary of reports discussed there and after an analysis of the number of amendments, 
it becomes clear that committee members influence and structure the group position 
along the committee line during political group meetings. These meetings constitute, 
along with rapporteurs’  activity and the number of amendments, the third channel 
through which committees impact the EP legislative process. 
Consequently, in this chapter, I investigate how discussions and negotiations inside 
political groupV can lead to MEPs in plenary voting along the same lines as in 
committees. To do so, I will first look at the internal organisation of EP groups, how 
their meetings are structured, how positions are expressed here and who the main 
actors present at this stage are. The chapter will then assess the involvement of 
political groups in committee activity and the group internal structure covering 
committee workload. Finally, it will investigate the internal group decision-making 
process linked to a plenary vote and the existing frameworks at group level for 
ensuring cohesion between committee and plenary vote. The main data in this chapter 
are based on fieldwork observations conducted over the course of one year (May 2010 
to June 2011) in the EP. They consist of qualitative data gathered from the group 
meetings of one of the three largest EP groups, the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), as well as from interviews with MEPs from this 
group. 
Using process tracing (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier, 2008: 703) to illustrate 
the  ‘how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism-based accounts of social 
change’  (Checkel,  2005:  5) and trace the sequence of interactions, the chapter reveals 
the linkage mechanisms of voting alignment between committee and plenary stage 
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inside political groups and presents the results of these observations. Looking at three 
different cases where debates on prior agreements in committees were held in 
political group meetings, this method helps to verify if there are established patterns 
of interactions in group meetings that explain how the decision-making process here 
links the committee stage and plenary stage voting results. The three cases have been 
selected because of the divisions present in the group on the issues covered by the 
reports, thus making it possible, for the purpose of this study, to distinguish the line of 
committee members from that of their colleagues and establish to what extent the 
debate in the group influenced their position. The divisive issues were: the bailout 
funds (the Greek crisis case), the distribution of funds in cohesion policy (the report 
on the Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report) and copyright enforcement (the report 
on cultural and creative industries). With the presentation of the decision-making 
process in these three cases, the chapter will offer a detailed, descriptive account of 
the activity inside an EP group. 
 
 
6.1          Political groups in the EP 
 
This section of the chapter will look at the existing literature on political groups in the 
EP and establish the position that the current work holds within that body of research.  
 
So far, studies of the political groups in the EP have been either descriptive or 
informative in regards to the daily activities that these groups have had since the 
creation of the institution (Costa, 2001) or have tried to explain the causal link 
between the activity of the MEPs and the influence of political groups, in particular 
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the indications that the former might receive from national parties or European parties 
(Hix and Lord, 1997). In a very comprehensive account of the work and mechanisms 
of decision-making inside the EP, Olivier Costa (2001) argues that MEPs stand to 
gain more from their affiliation to a political group than from being independent, 
since  this  “association”  can  offer  them  access  to  logistical, informational and 
institutional facilities that are available to groups. Apart from access to resources, 
however, there is also the ideological dimension, which accounts for MEPs choosing 
one political group over another in the EP. Moreover, Maurer et al. (2008), in an 
article aiming to identify the reasons behind political group membership in the EP, 
examine the case of the British Conservatives in 2006, who attempted to leave the 
EPP  group  they  were  part  of  at  the  time,  and  conclude  that:  ‘national parties acting in 
unitary fashion tend to belong to the party group that maximizes their opportunity to 
realize  office  and  policy  goals  in  the  Parliament’  (Maurer  et al. 2008: 259). They 
believe  that  ‘in  most  cases  this  is  best  achieved  by  joining  the largest possible group 
which  shares  the  delegation’s  socioeconomic  (and,  to  a  far  lesser  degree,  EU  
integration-related)  policy  preferences’  (Maurer,  et al. 2008: 259). This is to say that 
apart from resources, ideological or socio-economic preferences, there are also strong 
office seeking and policy goals that account for the political group membership in the 
EP. 
 
Consequently, the political groups play an important role within the different layers of 
the decision making process of this institution (Costa, 2001) and they form the tissue 
that connects the institutional activities. It would be difficult, if not almost impossible, 
for an independent MEP, part of the non-attached members of the EP to obtain a 
rapporteurship in the Parliament or a chairmanship in any of the committees. They 
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have to belong to a political formation if they hope to advance their careers in any 
way in the EP. Lindberg (2008), in a paper analysing the rapporteur appointment for 
the Services Directive, finds evidence of the importance of political group influence 
in  the  case  of  rapporteur  selection  and  concludes  that  ‘it  could  not  be clearly 
determined whether the involvement of the party group leadership or the national 
party  delegation  was  more  decisive  in  the  appointment  process’  (Lindberg,  2008:  
1200).  Indeed,  in  the  EP,  a  constant  interplay  between  the  national  delegations’  policy  
preferences  and  the  group’s  preferences continues to prevail and this characterises 
most debates that take place during the group meetings. 
 
Still, such aspects linked to membership of a political group are pivotal for an MEP 
mostly when it comes to matters related to the organisation of daily activities and less 
when it comes to political and technical decisions at committee stage. More precisely, 
I argue that in such instances MEPs in committee are more likely to be the ones 
setting out the guidelines for the group position, rather than just actors in a process 
responding to a certain request for vote and respecting the partisan line imposed.  
The ability of political groups to influence votes of MEPs, as opposed to the national 
party instructions, has been questioned for obvious reasons linked to the existing 
electoral systems and the selection of candidates for the European elections (Hix, 
2005; Hix, Raunio and Scully, 1999; Hix, 2005). The main argument is that when 
votes with great implications at domestic level are on the agenda in the EP, national 
parties tend to issue voting indications, and these will more frequently be followed 
than the EP group ones (Hix and Lord, 1996). Indeed, domestic parties hold a number 
of  important  resources  that  allow  them  to  ensure  members’  loyalty,  the essential one 
being the monopoly they hold over the re-election of the MEPs and their presence on 
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the party lists on an eligible position. The episode of the nomination of Jacques Santer 
as President of the European Commission illustrates the extent of this influence as 
Hix and Lord point out. After an analysis of the parliamentary sessions, their research 
concluded that MEPs had followed the voting instructions of their national parties to 
the detriment of the EP group line (Hix and Lord, 1997:60). 
Furthermore, the existing body of research has looked at political groups either in the 
framework of establishing where the preferences of an MEP lie – with the EP group 
or the domestic party – or in an attempt to isolate the position of the MEPs at the 
centre of this triangle (Raunio, 2000). At the same time, the internal cohesiveness of 
EP groups has been analysed and explained by the strict discipline imposed, with the 
help of roll-call votes (individual recorded votes of MEPs), and the resources that the 
groups hold to advance the individual careers of members, such as nomination as 
chair of a committee, awarding them rapporteurships on important pieces of 
legislation or key position within the internal structure of the group (Hix, 2005: 189). 
Nonetheless, there are alternative compelling explanations to the existing party 
discipline in the EP groups, apart from the use of roll-call votes and the promise of 
important offices in the legislature for MEPs. This is the case with the  ‘perceived  
preference coherence’  principle (Ringe, 2010) arguing that MEPs across committees 
judge the preferences of their political group colleagues, members in other 
committees, to be the closest to their own policy preferences. This perception explains 
why they accept and follow the position of a colleague  – or the decisions taken by a 
committee – when there is a group debate or a vote in the plenary session. Ringe 
(2010) even stresses that most of the MEPs, respondLQJ in a survey carried out as part 
of  his  study,  speak  about  ‘trust’  (Ringe,  2010)  in  another  colleague’s  opinion  or  
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indication of vote as long as he is member in the responsible committee or he is 
recognised as a specialist in a particular field by the rest of the group. His main 
argument is that within the confines of such specialised institutional work, MEPs have 
to acknowledge that they cannot have a full grasp of the implications of every 
legislative proposal that Parliament has to vote on and this explains why they consider 
the view held by one of their group colleagues, member in the respective committee, 
to be the one closest to their preferences. Consequently, when the report comes up for 
a final vote in plenary, most members follow their colleagues from the responsible 
committee and the voting list established by the rapporteur of their group. This 
explanation accounts for the high degree of cohesion inside the group and it reveals 
the pattern of influence of the committee decision over the plenary. However, it does 
not fully grasp the entire spectrum of interactions that exists between the two stages: 
committee and plenary. Indeed, an MEP is very likely to follow at the final vote in 
plenary the agreements reached by his group colleagues if he considers their policy 
preferences to be closest to his, but this aspect is only the result of a series of 
interactions based on exchanges of information through debates in group meetings, 
where committee members define the group line. The same committee members can 
be considered to perform a so-called lobbying activity by their group colleagues in 
support of committee agreements, pushing through a committee decision in the group 
policy  position.  The  distinctive  difference  to  Ringe’s  model  here  is  that,  under  these  
circumstances,  the  ‘perceived  preference  coherence’  model  only serves to explain the 
end result in a process of transferral of information from committee members to the 
group members, who subsequently come to perceive their preferences as being similar 
to those of their committee colleagues after a sequence of interactions between the 
group and committee members. 
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Within this framework, group debates and negotiations help to express and justify 
different views of MEPs on a particular subject or report, for the purpose of 
streamlining them into a common group position before the plenary vote. This is what 
makes their analysis important for this study, since it can explain how decisions taken 
by group members in the specialised parliamentary committees are transferred at the 
plenary stage. 
However, there is a need to give a clearer account of the actual functioning of these 
groups in practice, to analyse the results from their meetings and debates and the way 
in which they affect the activity of the Parliament as a whole, since the focus so far 
has been more on the political group and how it can ensure representativity 
throughout  the  Parliament’s  legislative  process.  
Therefore, the next section of this chapter takes a first look at the political groups 
within the institution and then presents in detail the organisation of the group chosen 
for study: the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). 
6. 2 Internal organisation of a European political group
This section presents the structure of political groups currently active in the EP and 
the main components that form the basis of their internal organisation and working 
procedures: the Vice-presidents, the Bureau and the Secretariat of the political group. 
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There are two different types of party structures at European level, the EP political 
groups being one of them and the European transnational parties being the other. The 
national parties that were represented in the institution in the beginning have 
established the EP groups, which have since evolved into organisations with complex 
structures, rules, designated offices and permanent staff  (Hix, 2005:186). The 7th EP
countHG seven political groups and each of these groups haG a structure of organisation 
that allowHG it to coordinate and supervise, in as far as possible, the activity of its 
members. They ZHUH: the group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) 
(EPP), the group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the 
European Parliament (S&D), the group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE), the group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the 
group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, the Confederal Group of the European 
United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE), the group Europe for Freedom and 
Democracy (EFD). Apart from these, there are also MEPs that do not belong to any of 
the groups in the EP and they are referred to as non-attached Members. 
The transnational parties make up the other party structure at European level and they 
are umbrella organisations that group various parties at national level according to 
their ideologies and affiliations. The EU Regulation number 2004 dating from 2003 
(OJ 2003 L 297) sets out the main requirements for establishing a trans-national party 
and the ways in which they can be funded.5 An important condition mentioned in the
Regulation is that such a party 'must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member 
States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or 
regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least 
 Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 of the EP and of the Council of the European Union of 4 November 
2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their 
funding. 
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one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of 
those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections' (OJ 2003 L 
297). Hix explains that transnational parties are in close connection with the political 
groups  in  the  EP  and  that  after  1993,  ‘instead  of  being  simple  transnational  umbrella  
organisations for fighting EP elections, the new Euro-parties began to develop as 
extra-parliamentary organisations at the European level, much like the extra-
parliamentary  central  offices  and  central  committees  of  parties  in  the  domestic  arena’  
(Hix, 2005: 187). 
Both these European party structures have been partly created out of necessity, out of 
a need to coordinate and ensure representation, and have developed alongside the EP. 
Their internal organisation, whilst maintaining its particularities from one group to 
another, follows mainly the same lines for all EP political groups. The structure 
comprises a president, supported by a number of vice-presidents of the group and the 
activity is coordinated through a set of general group meetings and working groups 
that analyse the work in parliamentary committees. There is also an internal structure 
that groups the leaders of the national delegations inside the group, as is the case with 
the Bureau of the ALDE group.  In addition, there are policy advisers that offer 
assistance to MEPs during the drafting of reports and in their daily committee work. 
There is no specific cross-party account of the duties and general tasks that policy 
advisers must have since such aspects are usually foreseen in the internal rules of 
procedure of each political group. However, from observations carried out during the 
fieldwork and interviews, it is clear that the advisers ensure MEPs responsible for 
drafting a report, a resolution or an opinion are familiar with and aware of the 
political group policy on a particular subject. They also constitute a first point of 
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contact for any member wishing to obtain more information on the committee or on 
the latest parliamentary initiatives in a particular field. Subsequently, all of the staff 
involved in the daily running of a political group, as well as in the management of the 
resources, is part of the Secretariat of the group. 
The three main EP groups – the EPP, the S&D and the ALDE – have more organised 
working procedures and accountable structures, with a clear set of internal duties for 
each administrative staff and an appointed number of policy advisers for each of the 
specialised committees in the EP. The same cannot be said about other groups, such 
as the GUE/NGL group or the EFD group. Due to what may be a lack of human or 
financial resources, their organisation structures are reduced, sometimes lacking the 
advisory staff, leaving the MEP that holds the membership in the parliamentary 
committee to coordinate the representation of the group views with the help of his 
staff. This can be explained, to a certain degree, by the small number of MEPs that
are part of these groups, 34 in the case of GUE/NGL and 27 in the case of EFD, 
compared to the 264 members from the EPP or the 185 Members of the S&D (figures 
which were valid in November 2011). Also, for the non-attached members that do not 
have stable group structures, there is, however, a Secretariat General that represents 
them at EP internal meetings and the Conference of Presidents. This minimal form of 
organisation is imperative in order for the independent MEPs to be able to exert their 
functions within the institution. 
So far, the first section of the chapter has provided an overview of the political groups 
in the Parliament. In terms of the organisation, they seem to follow the same pattern 
58 Interview with MEP Assistant from the Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic 
Green Left, 23 September 2010. 
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and internal working procedures that can be found in any political party. There are 
indeed variations in the structure of the groups across the political spectrum in the EP, 
but these appear to be mostly a consequence of the limited resources some have at 
their disposal in order to manage their activity in the legislature. 
However, in order to be able to account for the results from the group meetings and 
the involvement of political groups in committee decisions, I shall present in the 
following section an account of the debates inside one of these groups: the ALDE. 
The choice for this specific EP group is, in part, motivated by its position in the 
institution during EP7, as one of the three largest political groups, and by its potential 
to become a coalition partner of one of the other two: the EPP and the S&D. 
Observations carried out for this study indicate that this particular feature of ALDE, 
of being able to vote with either one or the other of the largest groups in the EP has 
led, in turn, to dynamic series of group meetings, where the expressed views are very 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, for the entire duration of the fieldwork, this was the 
political group that allowed me to attend its group meetings and working groups. For 
the other groups I have looked at the data regarding their internal structure that is 
publicly available or I have obtained additional information from interviews carried 
out with members of the group staff or assistants. 
6. 3 Organisation of political group internal structure covering committee
workload 
EP political groups each have an internal form of organisation that is created to 
manage the flow of activity related to the legislative process inside the institution. For 
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the three largest groups in the 7th EP, the EPP, the S&D and the ALDE this appears to
be similar. 
The EPP, which groups 271 members (situation in November 2011), has as its main 
political  organ  the  Bureau.  This  consists  of  ‘the  Presidency,  the  heads  of  national  
delegations, the President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors of Parliament that are 
members of the group, the chairmen of parliamentary committees, the coordinators in 
the parliamentary committees, the chairman and the Secretary-General of the 
European People's Party if they are Members of the European Parliament, as well as 
one co-opted Member for every 10 Members of a national  delegation’. In addition to
this, there are four working groups, which are each divided according to policy areas 
and are chaired by Vice-Presidents  of  the  group.  They  ‘coordinate  the  members’  
parliamentary  work  in  the  20  committees’  and  as  a  result,  ‘their conclusions are made 
known to the Group, which then decides what position to adopt in plenary sessions of 
the European Parliament.’Consequently, the meetings of the working groups are the
first arenas where the group discusses the activities, negotiations and decisions 
reached in committee. 
There is also the Secretariat of the party. The latter is formed of group staff, such as 
policy advisers, and has as its main responsibility that of assisting MEPs in their daily 
parliamentary work. 
As mentioned previously, the internal organisation follows the same pattern with the 
other political groups. Therefore, in the case of the S&D group, the organisation is 
 Group  structure  of  the  European  People’s  Party,  source:  www.eppgroup.eu. 
 Group structure  of  the  European  People’s  Party,  source:  www.eppgroup.eu. 
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also made up of a Presidency, a Bureau and a Secretariat of the EP political group.6
There is also a coordination of policies through the working groups and their 
meetings, one difference being that the S&D have five working groups. However, the 
principles behind their functioning remain the same, each group dealing with a set of 
committees, organised horizontally across a policy area. This is the case, for example, 
with one of the working groups that follow matters related to the Foreign Affairs, 
Security and Defence, Development, International Trade and Human Rights 
committees, all of which are analysing and deciding on matters of EU external policy. 
One, possibly two, of the group Vice-Presidents chairs the working groups. Again, it 
is clear that the legislative process within the EP has had an impact on the way 
political groups have decided to set up their internal framework and coordination, 
since it is becoming increasingly evident that there are clear similarities amongst 
them. 
The ALDE political group is the third largest group in the EP, after the EPP and the 
S&D. The group has 85 Members in total and its structure is formed of a presidency, 
a Bureau and the Secretariat of the group. As part of the ALDE Presidency, the 
President, together with the other six Vice-Presidents, manages the organisation of the 
group and the Bureau. They also chair the ALDE group meetings and the working 
groups of the political group.  The Bureau is formed of the Vice-Presidents along with 
the leaders of each national delegation present in the EP. The party line is established 
during group meetings, in general, and working group meetings (where policy is 
discussed), in particular. The political group meetings take place before each plenary 
session of the EP. 
6 Interview with a MEP Assistant from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 13
January 2011. 
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One interesting fact that can be observed here, just from the scheduling perspective, is 
that such meetings are always planned before the plenary sessions of the full chamber, 
a fact that is also valid for the other two political groups previously mentioned. 
In regards to the follow-up of committee workload, the ALDE Working Groups, three 
in total (simply referred to as Working Group A, B and C and covering the work of 
six to seven committees each) are divided by policy areas and committees and they 
meet to discuss reports that are on the agenda. Here, the rapporteurs (MEPs in charge 
of drafting the Parliament’s  position  on  a  commission  proposal,  a  resolution  or  a  
consultative act), the shadow rapporteurs (the representative of the political group 
responsible for following the report in question, as well as with seeking compromise 
within the committee on behalf of the group) or the group coordinators present the 
results of their activity in their respective committee. The group coordinators play a 
particularly important part in the political group policy coordination. While Rule 192 
of the EP Rules of procedure  states  that  ‘coordinators  prepare  decisions  to  be  taken  by  
the committee, in particular decisions on procedure and the appointment of 
rapporteurs’,6 the ALDE Rules of Procedure seem to provide a clearer explanation of
the essential role these play in  committee  activities.  As  such,  coordinators  ‘shall  
provide a political steer for the entire Group through the range of policies that will be 
dealt with by the particular committee, according to the policy line taken by the 
Group. They will advise the Bureau  on  policy  matters.  […]  The  coordinators  shall,  in  
particular, co-ordinate the activities of the Members of their committee and shall 
ensure that the Group is both coherent and well represented in the respective fields of 
62 Rules of procedure of the European Parliament, EP7, September 2011. 
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competence  of  their  committees’6. From here it could be concluded that the group is
in effect monitoring the activity of its members in committees and ensuring cohesion 
with the help of the group coordinator. Moreover, according to the EP Rules 
of procedure6, committee members are first nominated by political groups 
and,following the decision of the Conference of Presidents, the highest decision making 
body in the Parliament, they are validated by the full chamber through a vote cast in 
the plenary session. Since political groups appear to be pivotal in deciding which 
MEPs will be appointed to the most influential committees, usually those working 
consistently on EU legislative acts, there is scope for acknowledging the existence of 
an ex-ante control from groups towards their members resulting in a significant 
impact on decisions taken in committees. Groups can rely on group coordinators to 
exercise  control  over  members’  committee  activity  and  continue  to  have  an  impact  
after the assignments have been secured. However, their potential influence is 
constrained by the actual working procedures, by the existence of a common 
understanding and shared preferences between committee members from the same 
group and their coordinator, while at the same time it has to be stressed that the 
coordination of the decision-making process at this stage is more complex. 
In practice, reports discussed in the Parliament are put on the agenda of the group, 
either Working Groups or general group meetings, should the rapporteur or the 
shadow rapporteur consider there are contentious issues that would need to be 
discussed before the final vote takes place. This might also be done following a 
suggestion from the policy adviser responsible or the group coordinator. If the report 
 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Rules of Procedure, 4 February 2009, available at: 
www.alde.eu/alde-group/alde-rules-procedure/ . 
 Rule 186: Composition of Committees, Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 2012. 
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in question has met no objections from the other members active in committee, if the 
vote cast at this stage has been unanimous, then the group will have no need to 
discuss it further. The observations gathered from the ALDE group meetings in the 
second half of 2010 and first half of 2011 have indicated that, unless there are 
particular issues, the report might simply be flagged as another resolution that will be 
voted in plenary. At the same time, the Working Group A, B or C, after hearing the 
comments from the members of the specialised committee may decide to consider a 
debate on a report closed, not requiring further discussion inside the group. This also 
implies  that  voting  instructions,  which  are  usually  presented  in  a  ‘voting  list’,  remain  
the same as those established at the time the voting took place in committee, only to 
be reviewed to accommodate additional instructions in the event there are 
amendments tabled in plenary. 
Implications of internal group procedures, as the abovementioned one, bear evidence 
for the fact that group meetings and their decisions rely on the expertise, accounts, 
preferences and perceptions of members (either rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs or 
group coordinators) in the committee that is in charge of the respective policy. The 
flow chart below illustrates the internal decision-making process for the three political 
groups in question. It tracks the steps that a decision on a report follows from 
committee stage, where MEPs and the group coordinator discuss, amend and 
negotiate  Parliament’s  position  on  a  Commission  proposal,  up  to  the  stage  where  this  
is voted in committee. If the file is a sensitive one, the rapporteur or the coordinator of 
the group, after the vote in committee, brings it to the attention of the responsible 
working group at its next meeting, where it is discussed and where the group position 
on the final vote in plenary is decided. If, however, no decision is reached at this 
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point, then the working group chair can send the file for debate in the political group 
meeting prior to the final vote in plenary. This is the last step in this process at which 
the group has the chance to align the views of its members. Here, the group rapporteur 
and coordinator play an essential role in the debate. From this point onwards, any last 
minute changes and plenary amendments that might be requested to the report by 
other groups prior to the vote, but after the discussion in the group meeting, remain at 
the discretion of the rapporteur, with the assistance of the policy advisor. 
Figure 6.1: The decision-making process from committee vote to plenary vote 
Therefore, the political group relies and may ultimately follow the preferences of 
committee members, a factor which explains the high level of voting cohesion in 
plenary and the likelihood of a reduced degree of variance, as presented in chapter 5, 
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between the votes in committee and the final votes in the House. From here the 
hypothesis of this chapter and third hypothesis of the thesis can be derived: 
H3:   Through their activity, appointed group members ensure committee majority 
decisions are supported and followed by their political group in the plenary session. 
This implies that committee members are not just simple representatives of the 
political group that appointed them, but rather that, through a set of interactions in 
group debates and internal negotiations, members bring expertise from the committee 
policy area to inform the opinion of the group. In addition to this, they have the 
possibility to steer the group position to a line that is in agreement with the decisions 
already  reached  in  committee.  In  practice,  this  involves  committee  members’  ability  
to agenda-set,  thus  gathering  support  from  their  colleagues  by  informally  ‘coercing’  
them to back agreements already achieved in committee. Members do more than just 
disseminate information (Krehbiel, 1990) and establish their position as experts 
colleagues  can  ‘trust’  (Ringe,  2010).  They  impact  on  their  non-member group 
colleagues’  policy  preferences  during  these group meetings. From the field 
observations and case studies it is clear that committee members and national 
delegation leaders are the ones that take the floor during these meetings. This entire 
practice is justified to a lesser extent by an informational rationale, but more 
significantly by a need to ensure coherence of the political group line in both 
committee and plenary. The result is that members in the plenary vote the same as 
their colleagues in committee not because there is overall agreement in the group 
(although this might sometimes be the case with files that do not touch on group 
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divisive issues), not because of coincidence (the data on the results of votes in 
committees, as presented in Chapter 4 indicates that there is a significant correlation 
between the results of the two votes), but because committee members, are able to 
guide the group towards the common line initially established by them in committee. 
However, should the hypothesis not be verified, then evidence should be found of a 
position and preferences of MEPs in committee differing from those of the group as a 
whole. Also, as a result of that, there may not be much similarity between results of 
votes in committee and plenary, since committees and their MEPs would be acting as 
outliers. 
The  analysis  of  groups’ internal organisation in the EP has shown that the structures 
of the three largest political groups resemble each other to a great extent. This appears 
to be the direct result of developments related to the organisation of legislative 
activity inside the institution and, in turn, influences the way in which negotiations are 
carried out and decisions are taken within the EP. But, most importantly, it has 
illustrated how an  EP  ‘opinion’  on  a  Commission  proposal  is formulated and 
delineated at committee stage and subsequently adopted by the House with minor or 
no changes. This particular point is where committee members and group 
coordinators bring their contribution to the alignment of plenary and committee vote, 
since they are the main actors able to align the position of the group in regards to a 
proposal through the internal mechanisms based on the meetings and negotiations that 
have been presented in the case of the three political groups. 
Therefore, the following section of this chapter will present a sample of different 
debates in group meetings, using as reference the reports included in chapter 4 and 
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chapter 5. This will help test the hypothesis and identify the role that groups and their 
internal negotiations play within the process as a whole. Moreover, the analysis will 
shed light on the question of whether or not committee decisions are replicated in the 
final votes of the plenary. 
6. 4 Existing frameworks at party group level ensuring cohesion between
committee and plenary 
The previous section has presented the framework based on which a position reached 
in committee may be consolidated inside the group, with the influence of the group 
rapporteur and the coordinator. The next section concentrates on three key debates 
inside the ALDE group in order to see how the process is implemented. Moreover, 
with the help of this analysis, the hypothesis will be tested and the results will be 
verified against the data on the votes on reports in committee and plenary from the 
previous two chapters. 
To begin with, the ALDE group in the EP enjoys a very advantageous position in 
terms of policy bargaining and coalition formation, since it constitutes the main viable 
coalition partner for any of the other two big groups. Simon Hix analyses the coalition 
formation in the EP between the main party groups during the 1999 – 2001 period and 
points  to  a  pattern  of  coalition  that  he  refers  to  as  the  ‘grand  coalition’  (Hix,  2002:  
96), between the EPP and the Party of European Socialists – PES – (the previous 
name held by the group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats – 
S&D). Hix argues that this coalition is the result of specific voting rules of the 
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legislature that uses either simple majority or absolute majority. He notes that  ‘with  
the growing use of a simple majority in most rounds of the legislative process, and 
with further consolidation of the size of the PES and EPP compared with the smaller 
groups,  there  is  more  scope  for  competition  between  these  two  groups.’(Hix, 2002: 
99). In such cases, the Liberals gain more power and become the decisive actor at the 
centre of coalition formation and the passing of a piece of legislation (Hix, 2001). 
Moreover, in an article investigating differences in voting behaviour of political 
groups in EP5 (1999 – 2004) and first part of EP6 (2004 – 2006) Hix and Noury 
(2009) discover differences in the ALDE voting behaviour. If in EP5 ‘the Liberals 
voted approximately the same amount of time with the Socialists as they did with the 
Conservatives’  (Hix  and  Noury,  2009:172),  during  the  first  two  years  of  EP6 ‘the  
Liberals voted significantly more often with the Conservatives than with the 
Socialists’  (Hix  and  Noury,  2009:172). In EP7 beginning in 2009, there was a greater 
chance that ALDE sides with either one of the two largest groups, rather than the two 
forming a grand coalition. This can be the result of the increased number of own-
initiative reports, which require simple majority to pass, in comparison to the 
legislative reports that have been drafted by the Parliament, during EP7, and which 
require absolute majority.  Consequently, a report6 from Votewatch, an organisation
monitoring the votes of MEPs in the EP, trying to identify the most influential 
political groups in this institution, pointed out that ALDE was, most of the times, a 
winner in terms of bargaining and coalition formation. ALDE appears to be the group 
that manages to have its interests best represented in the EP. In spite of all this, the 
national delegations (formed by MEPs from the same national party in a specific 
country) that are part of the group share different views and find themselves in almost 
 Votewatch Report ‘Voting  in  the  2009-2014  European  Parliament:  Who  Holds  the  Power?’, July 
2011. Source: www.votewatch.eu. 
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constant opposition to each other. This statement is the result of observations obtained 
from group meetings over the course of several months with the ALDE group and out 
of these, three particular cases have appeared to be more prominent. 
Table 6.1:  Case studies 
Case Committee responsible 
on this topic 
Divisive issues in the 
group  
Greek crisis and use of EU 
funds 
Economic and Monetary 
Affairs  
Budgets 
Use of EU funds for 
bailout 
Commission’s  Fifth  
Cohesion Report 
Regional Development Expenditure and increase 
in EU structural funds for 
the next programming 
period 
Unlocking the potential of 
cultural and creative 
industries 
Culture and Education Copyright enforcement in 
the case of cultural and 
creative industries 
The same three case studies have been analysed from the perspective of the 
rapporteurs involved and the number of amendments in chapterV 4 and 5 respectively. 
As previously mentioned, the selection has been based on the intra-party divisive 
nature of some of the issues they dealt with (bailout funds, structural funds, copyright 
enforcement) and the debates that took place in committee. Moreover, in all three 
cases I have been able to map the decision-making with the help of process tracing 
from the initial stages of the draft report until the final vote in plenary. 
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6. 4.1 The Greek Crisis and use of EU funds
The first of the abovementioned group debates6 focused on the Greek crisis, future
measures of financial control and sanctioning of Member States, as well as 
management of EU funds. The discussion in the group was meant to establish the 
ALDE line before the debate that would take place, the next day, in plenary on the 
subject of the Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 17 June 2010. At this 
group meeting, the observer could witness at least five different points of view put 
forward by national delegations: the German delegation was of the view that 
immediate control and sanctioning measures must be implemented at EU level in 
order to stop EU funding from going, in the future, to any Member State that does not 
follow the provisions of the stability and growth pact and does not limit its deficit 
levels; the Italian delegation was of the opinion that control measures could be 
implemented but that the sanctioning should not involve any reduction or stop in EU 
funding, for fear this might damage the already slim premises for economic growth; 
the Finnish delegation was supportive of a mechanism that would allow for a 
limitation in the budget destined for EU funds for countries that were not keeping to 
the provisions of the stability and growth pact, in order to avoid a situation where EU 
money would be spent on a member state economy that is already failing. 
Furthermore, MEPs from new Member States, such as Bulgaria and Romania, were of 
the opinion that more should be done in terms of funding, regardless of the financial 
discipline of the countries involved, in order to offer support to EU states that were 
less secure, compared to others, in their economic position and dependent on funds 
from the European Union to try and bridge the economic gap. Finally, the Swedish 
 ALDE Group Meeting, 22 June 2010. 
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delegation saw the need for more fiscal discipline as extremely important to the EU 
economic recovery and argued that funds should not be stopped for countries with 
high levels of public debt but their distribution should be subject to them fulfilling the 
provisions of the stability and growth pact. At the same time, the committee members, 
mainly group coordinators, from the Budgets, Budgetary Control and Economic and 
monetary affairs committees, were of the opinion that in order to be able to control 
and impose a financial discipline on Member States failing to respect the stability and 
growth pact, an independent supervisory authority had to be established. This view 
was in line with that of the Commission and the Report of the High-Level Group on 
financial supervision in the EU6 (European Commission, 2009) and it was based on
technical debates that had previously taken place in committee meetings. In his
speech in plenary the next day, the leader of the ALDE, Guy Verhofstadt, integrated 
the views of committee members in the group line he presented and, instead of 
focusing on the sanctioning aspects, aspects which were clearly divisive for the group, 
he stressed the importance of an independent control authority with potential 
sanctioning attributions. He was careful not to expose the differences of opinion 
voiced in group meetings by members and chose to debate a more neutral aspect, that 
of the independent control authority, which was not as contentious as the topic of 
sanctions itself. 
‘It  is  an  evidence  that  the  Member  States  of  the  Union  have  to  play  an  important  role,  
a vital role I should say, in the economic strategy of the Union and of the Eurozone in 
the next years. But the most important question is another. The most important 
question today is who will do the control and who shall do the sanctioning if some of 
the Member States are not fulfilling the conditions? That is the key question. Will the 
 Report of the High-Level Group on financial supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
European Commission, Brussels, 25 February 2009. 
 Economic and Monetary Affairs committee meetings: 22 February 2010, 22 March 2010 and 14 
April 2010; Budgets committee meetings: 7 April 2010 and 27 April 2010; Budgetary Control 
committee meetings: 26 April 2010. 
241 
control be in the hands of the Member States themselves, of the Council, and will the 
Member States sanction themselves? Or will it be an independent institution, a 
communautarian institution of the European Union? That is the key question of today 
and  I  have  to  tell  you:  I  don’t  think  that  there  is  anybody  here  in  this  House who 
believes that the Members States shall sanction themselves. They did not do it in the 
past,  why  should  they  do  it  in  the  future?’  (Guy  Verhofstadt,  speech  in  the  plenary  
session of the EP, 23 June 2010) 
He went on to stress the importance of an independent body ensuring fiscal control at 
EU level: 
‘The  national  supervision  did  not  work  in  the  crisis.  There  was  not  one  national  
supervisor who alarmed the politicians at the moment of the financial crisis. And now 
they  are  explaining  that’s  a  good  system, that they have simply to coordinate 
themselves. So what we need in the Council now is that there is pressure from the 
Member States on themselves to go in the direction of a European supervision 
authority  based  on  the  proposal  of  the  Commission.’  (Guy  Verhofstadt, speech in the 
plenary session of the EP, 23 June 2010) 
The account of these different views inside the group and the process through which a 
group line came to be constructed (Chart 6.2) and finally expressed in the speech of 
the group leader is edifying. It shows how diverging opinions can co-exist inside an 
EP group and it illustrates the multitude of interests that each national delegation 
represents, while also being an intrinsic part of an EP group. In this case, it was the 
personality of the group leader, Guy Verhofstadt, his experience and strong views 
together with the expertise of prominent committee members calling for the creation 
of an independent supervisory authority, which account for the construction of the 
group line. The interventions made in the group meeting by group coordinators were 
influential here in moving MEPs preferences towards a common line. 
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Figure 6.2: Decision-making process in the case of the Greek crisis debate 
Still, voting records, for example those gathered by Votewatch for each plenary 
session, as well as research on the voting of MEPs, have all stressed the important
levels of cohesion present the group votes (Attina, 1990; Brzinski, 1995; Hix, 2005: 
187). This implies that diverging views are ultimately structured towards a common 
group line. Therefore, it remains an issue to establish if indeed, the group discipline 
imposed by calling for a record of individual votes of MEPs, can account for such 
voting cohesion. I argue that this type of explanation only offers an answer to a part of 
the question, while the rest can be accounted for with the help of the link that group 
 Votewatch is a website set up to collect data from the voting lists, attendance lists and activity of 
MEPs,  taken  from  the  European  Parliament’s  website  after  each  plenary  session.  
Source: www.votewatch.eu   
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activity has with the committee activity through its appointed members. More 
precisely, even in the case of the debate presented above, the majority of speakers 
taking the floor during the meeting were members from parliamentary committees 
with policy areas relevant to the subject. It was their opinion on the necessity to create 
an independent control authority that was voiced by the group leader in his speech 
and then integrated by other group members. Such patterns of negotiations and 
alignment of views, as presented in this case, describe a set of interactions taking 
place within the policy space situated between committee and group policy preference 
areas. Within this space, MEPs from specialised parliamentary committees, also 
members that are group coordinators, mediate a link between the group, its decisions 
and the position of the committee. 
6. 4.2  The  Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013
cohesion policy 
Another important debate that took place in the ALDE group was focused on the 
Report  on  the  Commission’s  Fifth Cohesion Report and the strategy for post-2013 
cohesion policy. The rapporteur Markus Pieper, an MEP from the EPP group, had a 
difficult task in the main committee leading this report, the Regional Development 
Committee7. As mentioned in chapter 5, the initial draft of this report received 569
amendments proposed by all members in committee from different political groups. 
These amendments were centred around the idea that future projects and programmes 
should be focused on bringing European added value and targeted on areas where an 
 Regional Development Committee meeting on 12 April 2011. 
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integrated European approach would be necessary to ensure economic growth and 
development. Amendments7 tabled by S&D, Greens and GUE/NGL members
stressed the importance of a social dimension of cohesion policy (amendmentV 75 and 
77) where the involvement of social and economic actors, together with local and
regional stakeholders, in partnerships would be mandatory. Amendments co-signed 
by the rapporteur, the EPP group coordinator in committee and the ECR shadow, 
stressed the importance of the subsidiarity principle in cohesion policy and called for 
additional  responsibility  to  be  taken  by  the  actors  involved  ‘by  introducing  detailed  
binding provisions in a Territorial Pact to be decided  in  each  Member  State’  
(amendment 78). So, as is usually the case with own-initiative reports in the EP, this 
report received amendments covering a wide variety of issues, be they social, 
economical, regional or financial and, while the views expressed had a common core, 
they differed in terms of the emphasis they placed on strengthening certain aspects of 
the future cohesion policy. Prior to the final vote in plenary, the main ALDE group 
meeting7 had the task of looking at the proposed report and aligning the position of
the group. One of the main aspects dealt with in the text was also the subject of 
creating a new category of intermediate regions for those regions that have a GDP 
between  75%  and  90%  of  the  Union’s  GDP.  According  to  this,  Member  States and 
some of their 40 regions could benefit from significant investments from funds 
distributed through the future EU cohesion policy. Countries such as France, Spain, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium were the ones that stood to gain 
most from the creation of this new category. The rapporteur from the EPP, as well as 
the shadow rapporteur from the ALDE group, opposed the creation of an additional 
 Amendments tabled in committee to  the  report  on  Commission’s  Fifth  Cohesion  Report and the 
strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy, 20 April 2011. 
 ALDE Group Meeting, 22 June 2011. 
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category but, in order to reach a compromise in committee,7 they agreed to only
mention in the text of the report that there was concern about this initiative. These are 
regions such as the Bavaria region or Lower Saxony region in Germany or the 
Basilicata region in Italy, which might transition from a higher level of finance due to 
a low GDP per capita, to a new less financed category of regions for the following 
financial programming period post 2013. 
Finally, negotiations in committee7 reached a consensus and certain thresholds were
established for the definition of intermediate categories that regions could belong to.7
The committee passed the report with 31 votes in favour, 4 votes against and 9 
abstentions. Furthermore, in one of the interviews with a /iberal MEP from the 
Regional Development Committee, the MEP mentioned that the members who chose 
to vote against or abstain were not colleagues from his group, since on the day they all 
voted according to the voting instructions issued by the shadow rapporteur.7
Subsequently, the ALDE shadow rapporteur, together with the group coordinator 
from the Regional Development Committee presented the conclusions of the report to 
the group. In the course of the meeting, the German, Swedish and Finnish delegations 
expressed their views and called for funding that is part of cohesion policy to also be 
focused on supporting intermediate regions, thus limiting the amount of investment 
for the other categories. They did not see a need for Parliament’s  report  on  the  
Commission’s  proposal  to  express  concern  about  the  initiative  of  creating  an  
intermediate category in its final text. The interventions from the shadow rapporteur, 
explaining the negotiation process and results attained in the parliamentary 
 Regional Development Committee meeting of the 26 April 2011. 
 Regional Development Committee meeting, 26 April 2011. 
 Interview with MEP policy adviser in the Regional Development Committee, March 2011. 
 Interview with ALDE MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 24 May 2011. 
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committee, as well as that of the group coordinator, were essential at this point. The 
statement made by the group coordinator in which she assured the group that the 
conclusion reached in the pre-legislative stage was in fact in accordance with the 
ALDE line on cohesion policy, led the chair of the meeting to accept the position set 
out by the group members in committee. What can be seen in the case of this report is 
that group members from north European states made the initial demand to support 
the creation of intermediate regions based on economics. They later on changed their 
views because of a cost-benefit analysis in political terms and the advantages they 
might achieve later from receiving support from their colleagues on other issues. Such 
behaviour from the Finnish and the Swedish delegation in the group is evidence of 
perceived preference coherence with their group colleagues from the responsible 
committee, but also of political considerations. Consequently, the voting instructions 
for the report that were initially issued in committee were now resubmitted in plenary 
and the final report had the support of the political group members. The text was 
passed with a significant majority (506 in favour, 48 against and 101 abstentions) and 
only a small number of amendments (10) were tabled in the plenary7 Moreover, an
analysis of the result of roll-call votes on this report for the MEPs from the ALDE
political group indicated that out of all members only one voted against the report, a 
Finnish MEP, and amongst the other MEPs who had expressed views opposed to that 
of their colleagues from the Regional Development Committee during the group 
meeting, in particular the German and the Italian members, only three chose to 
abstain. There is no explanation of vote for the MEPs who chose to diverge from the 
group line. To what concerns their other group colleagues, they voted in favour of the 
 A detailed account of the option of vote made by ALDE MEPs can be found in the Explanation of 
vote section of the EP Strasbourg debate from the 5 July 2011. Source: www.europarl.europa.eu 
 Minutes of proceedings - Results of roll-call votes, EP Strasbourg, 5 July 2011. Source: 
www.europarl.europa.eu  
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report, as the committee members initially had, and later issued statements in support 
of decisions comprised in the report in their oral and written explanations of vote. 
Therefore, the observations from this case point to the existence of a linking 
mechanism between committee decisions and the ALDE group coordination of the 
group line on a report and have mapped the functioning of the process of decision-
making ()LJXUH 6.3) at this stage. 
Figure 6.3: Decision-making process in the case of the Fifth Cohesion Report 
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As predicted by the hypothesis, MEPs from the Regional Development Committee, 
including their group coordinator, have succeeded in negotiating a group line in 
committee and subsequently secured the support of their other colleagues, in view of 
achieving in plenary the concessions already obtained in committee. Such a result 
provides another clear indication in support of a strong link between committee 
activity and the final plenary stage of the legislative process in the EP than previously 
thought.  MEPs’  policy  options  and  decisions  are  transferred from the initial 
committee stage agreement to the final plenary vote through a series of processes and 
negotiations that are central to understanding decision-making in the EP. 
Additionally, findings from this case study, as well as those from the previous one, 
reveal that committee members are part of the linkage mechanisms that ensure 
committee agreements are taken over by the group and followed in plenary. 
6. 4.3 The Report on unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries
The next case examined in this chapter concerns the report on unlocking the potential 
of cultural and creative industries. The rapporteur, Marie Therese Sanchez-Schmid, 
from the EPP, was in charge of passing the text through the leading committee on 
Culture and Education. ALDE members in committee had different views on the 
matter of intellectual property rights, their enforcement and their influence on the 
cultural and creative industries. MEPs from different Member States supported a 
greater level of enforcement of intellectual property rights, others, on the contrary, 
saw enforcement as being obsolete and supported the creation of a new business 
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model for the development of cultural and creative industries The issue was settled
in committee and a line was established between members when the report received 
the opinion of the Legal Affairs committee (JURI). The latter is also responsible for 
all matters relating to EU policy on intellectual property rights and their enforcement. 
The decisive aspect in this case, which united the group line in the Culture and 
Education committee, was the fact that the MEP responsible in the Legal Affairs 
Committee for drafting the opinion was an ALDE member. This committee was 
tasked with giving an opinion specifically on the matters where the Culture and 
Education committee ALDE members were divided: intellectual and property rights 
and their enforcement. The ALDE MEP who was rapporteur for this opinion in the 
JURI committee, Cecilia Wikström, was recognised by her other colleagues as having 
more expertise on the matter and the main points expressed in the opinion drafted by 
her in JURI were retained in the draft report submitted to plenary. Subsequently, the 
voting results of members from the lead committee followed the indications set out in 
the opinion of their colleague from the Legal Affairs committee. At the time, the 
ALDE shadow rapporteur on this report decided to follow the indications set out in 
the respective opinion8 recognising the expertise of the political group colleague
and, automatically, assuming a perceived preference coherence between the two 
policy positions. The report was then voted in committee with 26 votes in favour and 
only two abstentions.8
 Interview with ALDE Policy Adviser responsible for the Culture and Education Committee in the 
European Parliament, March 2011. 
 Interview with ALDE MEP from the Culture and Education Committee, March 2011. 
 Culture and Education Committee meeting of the 17 March 2011. 
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Figure 6.4: Decision-making process in the case of the Cultural and Creative 
Industries Report 
At a next stage, the report was included on the agenda of the ALDE group meeting8
mainly because it dealt with issues on which ALDE committee members were 
divided. This was done to ensure that all national policy positions and preferences 
have the chance to be expressed before a final plenary vote8 However, the
intervention of the ALDE shadow rapporteur stating that the text had already reached 
a consensus amongst committee members and other political groups in committee and 
that it followed the provisions listed in the opinion drafted by the other ALDE 
colleague in the Legal Affairs committee, was sufficient for the group to accept the 
 ALDE Group Meeting, 11 May 2011 
 Interview with ALDE Policy Adviser responsible for the Culture and Education Committee in the 
European Parliament, 22 March 2011. 
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text passed in committee without any further debate. In this case, members were 
aware of the different views national delegations in the group held in regards to 
intellectual property rights and their enforcement, as were policy advisers. The fact 
that this report was not uniquely concerned with intellectual property rights but with 
cultural and creative industries, a topic where there was general consensus in 
Parliament and committees on their importance for economic growth, coupled with 
the lack of a common group line on enforcement of intellectual property rights 
doubled by the expertise of ALDE members in both committees concerned, led to a 
swift acceptance in the group. Consequently, the final voting instructions for the 
plenary followed those initially set in committee. Also, as presented in chapter 5, the 
result of votes in plenary on this report can be interpreted as corresponding with that 
in committee, since the voting was done by simple show of hands, with a large 
majority, as it happens when there are no contentious issues nor any doubts from 
political groups causing them to ask for a roll-call vote. In addition to this, an analysis 
of the explanations of vote expressed, as well as those tabled in writing, belonging to 
ALDE MEPs points to a great level of support for this text and arguments in line with 
the position of the shadow rapporteur and committee members. 
As seen in all three cases analysed here, decisions taken by political groups before a 
plenary vote rely partly on the information they receive from committee and partly on 
the group line that members of committee have already set for the entire group debate. 
They have more knowledge on the matter, they are more familiar with the report and 
they are perceived as having more expertise than their other group colleagues. These 
findings are in line with Ringe (2010), in particular that MEPs from the same political 
group tend to have a set of ‘shared  preferences’  (Ringe,  2010:  5),  which explains why 
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there is such a high degree of cohesion inside the EP groups in the absence of clear 
mechanisms for sanctioning. In many policy areas that require specialised knowledge, 
most MEPs have a general overview of the existing information and practices, while 
there are others more familiar with the issue (Ringe, 2010: 5). Their colleagues 
acknowledge the latter as experts and their preferences are perceived to be similar or 
representative of those of the entire group. This is the case with committee members 
who, as representatives of the group in committee have already defined and delineated 
the group position on the subject. Consequently, the three debates presented in this 
section are in accordance with the arguments put forward by Ringe, and the 
comparative analysis of committee and plenary votes on these reports illustrates the 
principle of perceived preference coherence. 
However,  in  addition  to  the  results  that  might  be  expected  based  on  Ringe’s model, 
findings from these three case studies reveal that the process of decision-making 
inside a political group, and in the EP in general, is more complex. While the 
perceived preference model might explain the voting behaviour at the last stage in the 
decision process in the EP, it fails to address the issue of how the process functions 
and what policy exchanges take place inside a political group, inside a committee to 
form a group position, before the final vote in plenary. Through the cases presented in 
this chapter and throughout the thesis, it is shown that during the debates held in 
preparation of a report or a group line there are a series of interactions that take place 
between the group rapporteur, group coordinator, committee members and the rest of 
the group colleagues. I argue, based on the findings from the case studies, that it is in 
the course of these interactions that committee decisions are internalised by the group 
and that committee members form the linkage mechanisms that ensure this process. 
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The findings from the three case studies indicate that the hypothesis has been verified 
and together with the results of the data gathered from interviews and fieldwork 
observations reveal that political group preferences are structured and modelled by 
committee decisions through the group activity of committee members. The results 
illustrate that, before an MEP might judge his policy preferences to be similar to those 
of his committee member colleague at the time of the final vote on a report, he goes 
through a process of group policy position alignment during which committee 
decisions and committee member views impact the most on the final group line. It is 
during these meetings that committee agreements are internalised and adopted by the 
group. At a general EP scale, MEPs from different political groups forge a common 
line in their respective committees, which is then transferred into plenary results with 
the help of the group meetings and negotiations. The latter form the linkage 
mechanisms enabling committee decisions to be reconfirmed in the plenary. 
6. 5 Conclusions
During the course of EP7 (2009-2014), political groups became more organised and 
streamlined their working procedures. They had to account for a greater amount of 
legislative proposals and non-legislative texts in committee and plenary after the latest 
increase  in  Parliament’s  powers  with  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  As  a  consequence  of  this,  
throughout the different sections, this chapter has analysed aspects of the interplay 
present between committees, MEPs and the EP political groups. The first section 
provided an overview of the existing research on EP groups, while the second 
analysed their organisation. These groups tend to have similar structures and are 
254 
guided by the same principles to what concerns following the EP agenda and its 
decision-making. In addition to these matters, section 3 has presented the particular 
aspects linked to group structure covering the activities in the parliamentary 
committees, while section 4 has tested the arguments and the hypothesis of the 
chapter in three case studies chosen from the political group meetings. 
Therefore, together with V 4 and 5, this chapter has provided an insight into the 
workings of parliamentary committees, in order to test whether or not this is, in fact, 
the main space where decisions are reached in the EP. It has put forward the idea that 
political groups rely on the opinion of their expert MEPs in committee and that of the 
group  coordinator.  These  are  the  actors  that  delineate  the  group’s  position  for  the  final  
vote in plenary. Furthermore, this argument implies that, just as political groups, 
parliamentary committees are the instances that matter most within the decision-
making process, while the plenary impacts on the activity of the EP to an even lesser 
extent. It shows that this is the stage where the main conclusions are reached and 
these go on to influence the final result in plenary. The fact that groups have proven to 
be so well organised in terms of covering committee workload is yet another 
indication that parties have recognised these patterns of decision-making. 
The existing research on the committees in the EP has so far focused on the role that 
the political groups play in the decision-making of this institution (Hix, 2005; Hix, 
Noury and Roland, 2007; McElroy, 2006; Whitaker, 2010). This chapter is part of a 
research trying to shift the focus away from political groups, without denying their 
importance, in order to orient it towards the essential part that committees have in 
influencing the final results of the legislative process in Parliament. Based on the 
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findings in chapters 4 and 5, the analysis in this chapter has centred on EP groups, 
their organisation, their involvement in committee works and the existing frameworks 
present at this level, which are capable of ensuring cohesion between committee and 
plenary vote. Through process tracing, using observations from group meetings in the 
ALDE group and interviews with MEPs, staff and policy advisers, the findings in this 
chapter have indicated that there are a series of processes and mechanisms that link 
the work of members in committee with that of the group as a whole. These, in turn, 
explain why the data and the findings on the field show a significant level of 
correspondence between the results of votes in committee and plenary. 
Following a detailed presentation and analysis of group debates on reports, including 
the data discussed in the previous two chapters, the observations in this chapter 
support the argument that MEPs’  activities  in  groups  and  in  committees are essential 
to the adoption of cohesive committee and plenary votes on specific reports. As the 
findings show, groups are organised in such a way to allow for the decision on reports 
in committee, as expressed by its group members, to be followed by all other 
members. In the first case studied in section 4 of the chapter, the observations showed 
how members from the responsible specialised committee dominated the debate and 
were able to define a line corresponding not only to their committee but also to the 
entire political group. In the second and third analysed cases, the views and policy 
positions expressed by MEPs from the specialised committees were adopted by other 
MEPs from their group and subsequently followed in the votes cast in plenary. 
Moreover, the findings show that the current decision-making process in the EP is 
organised to incorporate not only the information resulting from committee sessions, 
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but also the decisions and the consensus reached by MEPs at this stage. The group 
meetings, which take place in the ALDE group, as well as in the EPP and the S&D 
groups, form the linkage mechanisms with the committee that allow for the transferral 
of decisions from one legislative stage to the next. The consequence of that is a 
correspondence between committee and plenary results, which I argue, is ensured by 
the daily activity of members in committee and the communication of this work 
through the group channels. From the cases presented in this chapter it is clear that 
group meetings become, in certain instances, arenas where policy lines delineated in 
committee are presented and incorporated by the group. It is true that the EP group is 
ensured representation of its political views in committee through its members. 
However, findings show that, within this process, the committee view is reclaimed 
and integrated in the political group through its meetings, debates and negotiations. 
Consequently, having in mind the main theory underpinning this study that highlights 
the central role of committees in the decision-making and decision taking process, it 
can be concluded that the current chapter reveals how groups organise their structure 
to account for this aspect. The three cases show that the committee decision plays a 
decisive role in shaping the group position and is ultimately adopted by the plenary. 
Also, the great involvement of committee members in group debates on the topic 
corresponding to their committee assignments is evidence that these MEPs close the 
gap between committee and plenary decision. Through their work, they manage to 
streamline their groups’ positions. Furthermore, this explains the high level of 
cohesion inside the political group, but also the reason why there are such similarities 
between the votes in committee and in plenary. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
This chapter concludes that committees in the EP drive the decision-making process 
in the institution, sometimes to a greater extent than political groups do; they are 
essential to the running of the legislature and instrumental in passing a decision that 
they have already reached through the full plenary of the Parliament. They not only 
inform the opinion of the EP, but they also structure, delineate and ultimately impose 
it on the House. However, this is always done with the political groups' knowledge 
and tacit approval, since the institutional constraints imposed by the large number of 
acts, the high number of MEPs, the legislative challenge of working with 24 official 
languages in a supranational environment, have given political groups limited means 
to ensure cohesion in the Parliament. Furthermore, in spite of the increased use of 
early agreements in first reading in EP7, as documented by recent studies (Reh et al., 
2011; Héritier and Reh, 2012), committees have not been marginalised and continue 
to impact on the legislative process. Through an analysis of the work of rapporteurs, 
amendments submitted to reports at committee and plenary level, as well as political 
group meetings, this study has identified channels that allow the transferral of the 
decision from committee to the full plenary where it officially becomes the EP 
opinion. 
The sections of this chapter present the main theoretical aspects framing this study 
and summarise the conclusions of each of the empirical chapters. They will look at 
the findings and the way in which they contribute to the image of committees in the 
EP, debating the place these hold within this institution and the existing relationship 
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between their work and that of political groups. The significance of the findings will 
then  be  analysed  in  the  context  of  the  legislature’s  policy  output  and  political  
positioning within the decision-making triangle of the other institutions – the 
European Commission and the Council, but also in that of parliaments at national 
level. Finally, the chapter will investigate pathways for future research in this field 
and ways of advancing it. 
7. 1 A summary of the findings
Stressing the differences between the organisation of the US Congress and that of the 
EP, chapter 2 concluded that models used so far in order to analyse it, drawn from the 
American literature, provide only some of the explanation for the work of EP 
committees. The body of literature that has based its findings on this particular 
approach has presented a somewhat incomplete image of the activity and the place 
that committees hold in the EP. The distributional and informational perspectives do 
not account entirely for the running of the decision making-process in this legislature. 
They do, however, offer a basis for a more in depth account of what happens in the 
Parliament, if they are complimented by qualitative data gathered through process 
tracing from within the institution, interviews and quantitative data from voting 
results in committees and plenary. An initial appreciation of the studies on the subject 
reveals that the significant contribution and influence of political groups has been 
linked to committee activity in the EP. This points to a system of committees that 
follows the will of political groups but, at the same time, it ignores the interactions 
that take place in the time that a report is prepared, drafted and voted in committee 
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and the negotiations and meetings that are linked to committee work. Also, the 
literature has not offered sufficient explanation, apart from political group influence 
over all legislative stages in the Parliament, of the high level of cohesion registered 
(Hix, Noury and Roland; 2007), bearing in mind that groups have few political tools 
available to discipline members on a regular basis. Thus, chapter 2 highlighted the 
relevance of investigating whether the centre of decision might not be located 
elsewhere than with political groups and expressed through such cohesive voting 
results at both committee and plenary level due to institutional mechanisms used to 
solve divisions earlier in the legislative process, which were not visible in the full 
plenary session of the Parliament. 
Chapter 3 identified committees as the centre of the decision-making process in the 
EP, an aspect expressed in the main argument of the research, which maintains that it 
is the parliamentary committees that form the opinion of the EP and they do this by 
securing the transfer of the decision reached in committee to the plenary of the full 
Parliament. They do so by solving possible divisions through a set of institutionalised 
interactions in meetings and negotiations on specific reports. While stressing the fact 
that the existing body of literature does not account for such interactions, the chapter 
has investigated, on a sample of committees, the correspondence between the 
committee and plenary votes, finding a significant degree of correlation between the 
two. This has helped frame the hypothesis and identify existing channels through 
which the transferral of the decision can be secured, in order to then test their impact 
upon this process, their involvement and thus the validity of the main hypothesis. 
Subsequently, based on the data, the chapter identified rapporteurs, the number of 
amendments and the political group meetings as aspects that can account and explain 
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how the opinion of the EP is constructed in committees. Appreciations were made in 
reference to each of them and assumptions were expressed in relation to the impact 
exerted by them over the transferral of the decision. This was done based on sub-
hypotheses verified in each of the empirical chapters. 
Chapter 4 identified rapporteurs as key actors that are part of the decision-making 
process in committees, and most importantly, who can ensure that the full plenary of 
the EP internalises the consensus reached in committee and recognises the committee 
decision as that of the Parliament. The observations and the data from the results of 
votes in this chapter have revealed that rapporteurs are essential in ensuring that a 
committee agreement is followed in plenary. After detailing the different stages 
linked to committee activity, rapporteurship assignment, as well as the procedures and 
steps followed by a report in the parliamentary committee, in its path towards the final 
vote in plenary, the chapter has presented three case studies in order to illustrate the 
processes active at this level. Two of these were also analysed from different angles in 
chapter 5 and chapter 6, in an effort to portray the various aspects that are part of 
developing a draft for a report, amending it, negotiating it and finally voting it in the 
plenary session. The cases were necessary in order to illustrate the decision-making 
process and the existing interactions. They revealed the significant role that 
rapporteurs, as well as group coordinators and committee members, play in the 
transferral of committee decision to the full EP plenary. Along with descriptive data 
on votes in committee and plenary, expressed through proportions and the strength of 
correlations, the overlap of the voting results at committee and plenary stage has been 
supported by evidence, while the process-tracing in the case studies has contributed to 
testing the hypothesis of the chapter. The latter has been verified and the findings 
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reveal that rapporteurs provide one of the main links necessary for the transferral of 
decision from committee to plenary. Their activity, their negotiations and drive to 
build consensus provide sufficient evidence of a viable transferral channel allowing 
for a committee and plenary vote alignment, a fact which confirms the expectations 
comprised in the central hypothesis of this study. 
In order to test another transferral channel and verify the hypothesis, chapter 5 
analysed whether the number of amendments in committee is lower than that in 
plenary and the extent to which the EP will follow the committee decision. The 
evidence provided by the case studies and the comparison of the number of 
amendments at both stages has allowed for the two hypotheses to be verified. By 
looking at amendments in the EP from a different perspective than that used in other 
extensive studies on this subject, like that of Kreppel (2001) which analyses 
amendments  in  view  of  establishing  the  Parliament’s  capacity  to  influence  the  other  
two institutions – the Commission and the Council – chapter 5 has investigated the 
significance of amendments to a report from an intra-institutional perspective. This 
was done in order to highlight their relevance in describing the EP decision-making 
process. Most importantly, it has identified amendments as an indication for 
committee to plenary correspondence and resolution of divisions in committee as 
opposed to plenary, which is what the lower number of such amendments submitted 
at the plenary session stage indicates in the presented case studies. If in these 
instances a higher number of amendments to the text of the report in plenary would 
have indicated more involvement from political groups and more influence from their 
side on the results coming from committee, the verification of the two hypotheses 
supported an image of parliamentary committees structuring and defining the EP 
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opinion, instead of one of political groups securing control and guiding the decision-
making process. The findings have, again, pointed to a series of interactions and 
negotiations in committees, which delineate the Parliament’s  position  on  a  legislative  
proposal or on a resolution of own-initiative. 
After highlighting the influence exerted by committees over the EP position, as 
opposed to that expressed by political groups, chapter 6 has concluded that it is in fact 
the internal organisation of political groups that ensures the replication of committee 
decisions by the full House. Most importantly, it has stressed the role played by 
rapporteurs, shadow-rapporteurs, group coordinators and committee members in 
group meetings, particularly in aligning the position of the political group and 
illustrating the manner in which committee-established agreements can be passed in 
plenary with the secured support of the group. This aspect can provide an explanation 
for the increased party cohesion displayed in the EP in spite of the limited tools 
available to political groups for disciplining their members. Moreover, the chapter has 
presented in detail the manner in which political groups organise internally in order to 
follow the committee workload. Through three case studies taken from committees, 
two of which have also been presented in the other empirical sections of the thesis, 
and with the use of process tracing, the chapter has illustrated the process which 
enables a committee opinion to be accepted and followed by all members of a 
political  group  and  then  voted  in  plenary.  This  has  also  been  explained  with  Ringe’s  
principle of perceived preference coherence (2010), which stresses that MEPs follow 
the view of their committee member colleagues whose preferences they perceive to be 
closest to their own, accounting for similar circumstances where they would hold the 
necessary technical knowledge and the overall informational monopole on a particular 
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report. Such aspects complHmented by the evidence have led to findings identifying 
political group negotiations and meetings covering committee workload as a factor 
active in aligning the committee and plenary decisions. Within this framework, the 
case studies have shown that committee members are the actors driving the political 
group agreement and consensus towards the median line agreed in committee, thus 
verifying the hypothesis of the chapter. Therefore, the findings in the chapter have 
revealed that political groups are to an extent aware of the importance of committee 
decisions, of the informational advantage they display and rely on their committee 
members  to  structure  the  group’s  position  based  on  the  agreements  already  reached  in  
the pre-legislative stage. Subsequently, evidence from the field sheds more light on 
the institutional mechanisms that have led to the consolidation of a position on a 
proposal and a Parliament opinion on a report to be constructed in the parliamentary 
committees of the EP and validated in the full plenary sessions that take place every 
month in Strasbourg and sometimes in Brussels. 
7. 2 Parliamentary committees or political groups: Who structures the EP’s
position? 
Following the institutional developments brought about by the treaties, the EP has 
achieved greater powers and a more prominent role in the decision-making triangle of 
the institutions in the EU. The higher number of legislative acts that it has had to deal 
with has transformed this institution, requiring it to present itself as an efficient body 
capable of acquiring legitimacy through the legislative output created. This output has 
been analysed up until now mainly by looking at results in the plenary sessions, 
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relying on roll-call vote data and asserting the control of political groups and cross-
party consensus in the Parliament. Within this framework, parliamentary committees 
have been described as internal structures providing an informational support and the 
specialised knowledge necessary for the efficient work of the EP. Through the 
empirical chapters this thesis has shown that committees in the beginning of EP7 were 
not  informing  but  rather  forming  and  defining  the  EP’s  opinion  more  so  than  political  
groups. The latter rely on their committee members to represent the views of the 
entire group and in so doing they finish by internalising a committee agreement and 
validating it in plenary. The work drawn on US Congressional scholarship has 
limitations in explaining the legislative processes in the Parliament due to differences 
in the representational models. In the framework of a committee description, MEPs 
apart from representing a constituency with targeted externalities also represent a 
country in the EU, which corresponds to a model of committee displaying uniform 
externalities. This factor coupled with the fact that members in this Parliament are 
agents of two Principals (Hix, 2002) – the national party they represent, the views of 
which are internalised by the national delegation, and the political groups in the EP – 
renders any comparison more difficult to establish and affects the model by making it 
less applicable. Therefore, the thesis contributes to the existing literature by 
highlighting some inadequacies engendered by the use of US Congress models in 
explaining committee activity in the EP; but also by revealing the central place held 
by committees in this legislature, which gives them prominence over political groups, 
as well as in structuring the EP opinion on Commission proposals and EU policies in 
general. 
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The conclusions contained in this chapter find their explanation in the sequence of 
institutional changes that the Parliament has had to implement. Faced with a high 
volume of work, the EP has organised internally to be able to manage the increase in 
its political and legislative powers efficiently, a factor which has led to the 
development of a stronger committee system. The technical nature of proposals linked 
to the single market, of those looking to advance the degree of harmonisation across 
different policy systems in the Member States, has turned committees into the main 
arenas where such acts could be analysed in detail. More precisely, the technical 
nature of EU policy in general has strengthened EP committees and increased their 
role. Anticipating these effects and being confronted with difficulties in reaching 
speedy decisions, political groups have organised internally in response to such 
developments to support this workload, but also because they were aware that apart 
from the ex-ante control exercised on committee decisions by controlling committee 
assignments and chairmanships, they were lacking the tools to exercise a stronghold 
on decisions reached at this level. The result has led to a set of group meetings, 
negotiations and interactions between committee members and their colleagues, all of 
which account for the pivotal role played by committees and for the transferral of the 
decision reached by them at the plenary level. 
Moreover, faced with constraints brought about by the number of MEPs after 
enlargement, the additional official languages that it has had to work in, the EP has 
had to streamline plenary sessions, so as to render them more efficient as a whole. 
This  has  involved  Parliament’s  capacity  to  pass  decisions  on  legislative  proposals  
quicker and in spite of all existing circumstances, mentioned before, that could impact 
on the proceedings in the plenary sessions. In such circumstances, the EP has 
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managed, over time, to take a strong position towards the other institutions in an 
attempt to influence the EU decision-making process, guide inter-institutional 
negotiations and increase its institutional profile – all these being amongst the core 
motivations that have driven the EP in its fight for more powers. 
However, bearing in mind these developments, more precisely the need to have a fast-
track plenary to vote on legislative proposals, amend them and restructure them, 
while presenting a common unified and coherent position to the other EU institutions, 
the centre of decision in the EP has had to shift. In order to allow for such a course of 
events and for this plenary model to exist, the main decision on reports containing the 
Parliament’s  position  has  had  to  be  somehow  agreed  in  committee.  Had  this  not  been  
possible, then the plenary would have had the task to debate extensively the main 
issues addressed by the proposals to the point where a common position would be 
formed. So far, this has not happened. On the contrary, the committees are now 
working to a greater extent on legislative acts, on resolutions, on aligning 
Parliament’s  view,  on  bridging  consensus  and  reaching  agreement  in  order  to  ensure  a 
swift passage of all decisions through the full House. They are well organised, benefit 
from the input of specialised staff and have brought about changes in the procedures 
inside the legislature. The Rule 138 of the Rules of Procedure (2012), is just such an 
example, and it stipulates that: 
‘Any  proposal  for  a  legislative  act  (first  reading)  and  any  non-legislative motion for a 
resolution adopted in committee with fewer than one tenth of the members of the 
committee voting against shall be placed on the draft agenda of Parliament for vote 
without amendment. The item shall then be subject to a single vote unless, before the 
drawing up of the final draft agenda, political groups or individual Members who 
together constitute one-tenth of the Members of Parliament have requested in writing 
that the item be open to amendment, in which case the President shall set a deadline 
for  tabling  amendments.’  (Rules  of  Procedure  of  the EP, 2012).  
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Such modifications in the internal procedures provide strong evidence in support of 
the argument placing the aggregation of EP decisions inside its parliamentary 
committees. Apart from asserting  the  legislature’s  effort to contribute in a timely 
manner to the EU integration process and all its developments, this Rule also stresses 
that the Parliament itself, including the political groups, has recognised the value and 
impact of parliamentary committee work and the decisions resulting from it. Indeed, 
this organisation of the decision-making process inside the EP renders the output of 
the institution more significant and it increases its legitimacy and influence. 
7. 3 Significance and relevance of the findings
The majority of the findings in this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of 
the organisation of the EP and of its decision-making process. They underpin a shift 
in the localisation of decisions, by resolution of division and coalescing agreement, 
from the full plenary of the legislature to its parliamentary committees, an aspect 
which has a significant influence on the way the Parliament has been viewed until 
now. It puts into perspective the relevance of roll-call vote analysis of the EP and 
underlines the importance of carrying out studies that use qualitative tools. Most 
importantly, it highlights the necessity to use process tracing as a research tool in 
order to identify the lines along which the EP position is structured on a proposal 
from the Commission or on an own-initiative resolution and to finally locate where 
and at which point in the process consensus is reached. This is relevant to the entire 
study of the Parliament and to the analysis of its legislative output. It shows that it is 
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not sufficient to only look at the final result of votes cast in the plenary session on an 
act in order to understand the opinion of the EP and how it will influence that of the 
other institutions in the decision-making triangle – the European Commission and the 
Council. Moreover, it provides evidence that under such circumstances as those 
present in a supranational environment, political groups may trade their ability to 
control all decisions with that of being able to provide a structured common position 
on most policy initiatives at EU level, all this in view of a greater gain in legislative 
output and EU institutional influence. In addition to all this, the findings point to the 
fact that a legislature coming under strong pressure to render itself more efficient has 
to rely on a strong system of committees, particularly in such instances where the 
partisan feeling is so divided amongst members who belong to different national 
parties and are organised into trans-national political groups along broad ideological 
lines. 
Furthermore, the relevance of these findings to other national legislatures is also 
significant and they can be applied to the analysis of legislatures with strong 
parliamentary committees, such as the German Bundestag or the US Congress. This 
can be done in order to illustrate decision-making patterns and underpin existing 
interactions that occur within its processes. At the same time, the findings can be 
applied to legislatures that are constrained by a variety of factors, such as language, 
party identification of their members and representation of constituencies with a large 
spectrum of both targeted and uniform externalities.  Indeed, there are underlying 
specificities that characterise the EU as a whole and the EP in particular, which might, 
at first glance, diminish the relevance of the findings for the study of national 
legislatures. Looking past those, however, one can identify aspects that can be applied 
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to an analysis in the framework of any federal system, such as the political group 
organisation in a weak party system environment, the negotiation patterns and the 
informal structures established to support and increase parliamentary committee 
influence. 
7. 4 Future research
In the process of establishing the importance of EP parliamentary committees as 
opposed to that of political groups in the decision-making process of this institution, 
this thesis has answered some of the questions posed by the study of committee 
versus plenary results. At the same time, it has highlighted other areas of study that 
can be addressed in future research. 
First of all, the fieldwork observations and the descriptive data gathered have only 
focused on half of the EP7 reports, until June 2011. In future, the research could look 
at the work carried out by committees for the duration of the entire term and compare 
it to that in the previous periods ranging from 1999 to 2004 and 2004 to 2009. This 
should allow for differences to be highlighted between the committee systems based 
on the level of workload acquired and illustrate the developments that these have 
undergone in parallel with the increase of powers of the EP and the effect of EU 
enlargement in 2004. 
Secondly, bearing in mind the new provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 
regards to the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, a procedure under 
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which the Parliament is co-legislator and on an equal footing with the Council, the 
parliamentary committees have seen their workload increase. As mentioned in this 
study, this has impacted on their position inside the institution but it would hold added 
value to assess the manner in which they have reorganised internally and procedurally 
to deal with the additional number of legislative proposals they receive. 
Thirdly, following the extensive comparisons between the committee and plenary in 
the EP, and based on the results of the proportions between committee and plenary 
results, another study could assess the changes that the plenary sessions have seen 
from the time of their conception, within several legislative terms and under the 
impact of several Treaty modifications and EU enlargements. Therefore, in the 
framework of future research, the developments in the attitude of political groups 
towards the plenary could be investigated to assess if this image of an instance where 
MEPs go to vote on as many legislative proposals as possible in a short period of time 
has always been present amongst its members. Also, it would be important to 
establish if at the beginning of parliamentary committee activity the plenary sessions 
were deemed to hold more relevance for the decision-making of the EP as a whole. 
Finally, the research could be extended in the area of comparative studies, by 
analysing traits from committee systems in the national parliaments of the Member 
States, as well as the US Congress, and comparing them against the EP parliamentary 
committee system in an effort to identify the main features that this institution shares 
with national parliaments, but also the differences that it presents. It will then be 
important to verify whether these differences result from the particular supranational 
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nature of the EP or if they have been influenced by inter and intra-institutional 
developments. 
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Appendix: List of interviews 
1. MEP political advisor from the Culture and Education &ommittee, 29 September
2010 
2. MEP assistant from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 22 March 2011
3. ALDE policy advisor from the Employment and Social Affairs and Culture and
Education &RPPLWWHH, 9 February 2011 
4. ALDE policy advisor from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 20 September
2010 
5. ALDE group assistant from political group secretariat, 27 October 2010
6. ALDE MEP from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 9 February 2011
7. ALDE MEP from the Foreign Affairs &RPPLWWHH, 8 October 2010
8. ALDE MEP from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 25 May 2011
9. ALDE MEP from the Employment and Social Affairs &RPPLWWHH, 24 May 2011
10. ALDE MEP from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 8 February 2011
11. MEP assistant from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 22 March 2011
12. MEP assistant 2 from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 22 March 2011
13. ALDE MEP from the Legal Affairs &RPPLWWHH, 23 March 2011
14. MEP assistant from the Legal Affairs &RPPLWWHH, 23 March 2011
15. S&D MEP from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 16 February 2011
16. MEP assistant from the S&D group, 16 February 2011
17. MEP assistant from the EPP group, 17 February 2011
18. ALDE MEP from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 20 April 2011
19. MEP assistant from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 20 April 2011
20. MEP assistant 2 from the Culture and Education &RPPLWWHH, 20 April 2011
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21. EPP MEP member of Budgets &RPPLWWHH, 4 May 2011
22. MEP assistant from the EPP group, 4 May 2011
23. S&D MEP member of Budgets &RPPLWWHH, 5 May 2011
24. MEP assistant from the S&D group, 5 May 2011
25. EPP MEP member of Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, 6
July 2011 
26. S&D MEP member of Regional Development Committee, 20 April 2011
27. ALDE policy advisor from the Regional Development Committee, 20 April 2011
28. ALDE policy adviser from Regional Development Committee and Employment
and Social Affairs Committee, 22 September 2011 
29. MEP assistant from the Regional Development Committee, 20 April 2011
30. MEP political advisor from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee, 21 June 2011 
31. ALDE MEP assistant, 10 May 2011
32. ALDE MEP assistant responsible for communication policy and press, 30 June
2011 
33. ALDE MEP assistant, advisor on copyright issues, 30 May 2011
34. ALDE policy advisor from the Budgets &RPPLWWHH, 6 September 2011
35. EP official from the Budgets &RPPLWWHH, 6 September 2011
36. EP official from the Regional Development Committee, 9 May 2011
37. EP official from the Culture and Education Committee, 30 March 2011
38. ALDE MEP, from the Regional Development Committee, 24 May 2011
39. MEP assistant from the Regional Development Committee, 24 May 2011
40. Interest group representative following the Internal Market and Consumer
Protection Committee, 16 March 2011 
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41. Policy officer from one of the leading industry associations in the field of E-
commerce, 17 March 2010 
42. Policy  officer  from  an  association  representing  consumers’  interests,  23  June  2011
43. MEP Assistant from the GUE/NGL political group, 23 September 2010
44. MEP assistant from the EFD political group, 24 June 2011
45. EP senior official from the Plenary Directorate, 7 December 2011
46. EP official from the Plenary Directorate in the Tabling office, 8 December 2011
47. EP official responsible for legislative coordination, 15 February 2012
48. EP official responsible for legislative planning, 7 March 2012
49. EP official responsible for legislative acts, 12 March 2012
50. Commission official following parliamentary &RPPLWWHH activity, 23 June 2010
51. S&D MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 25 May 2011
52. EPP MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 25 May 2011
53. ALDE political group administrator, 11 May 2011
54. ALDE MEP from the Regional Development Committee, 5 July 2011
55. ALDE MEP from the Environment Committee, 23 November 2010
56. MEP assistant from the Environment Committee, 23 November 2010
57. ALDE MEP from Transport Committee, 24 November 2010
58. MEP assistant from Transport Committee, 24 November 2010
59. EP official responsible for inter-institutional relations, 7 March 2012
60. EPP policy advisor on Budgets Committee, 6 September 2011
61. ALDE policy advisor on Environment, 15 February 2011
62.ALDE policy advisor on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, 15 February 
2011 
63. ALDE policy advisor on International Trade issues, 16 February 2011
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64. EPP policy advisor on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, 15 February 
2011 
65. EP senior official in charge of plenary debates, 11 April 2012 
66. EP official in charge of political group coordination, 11 April 2012 
67. Official from the EFD group in charge of legislative coordination, 28 March 2012 
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Appendix 4.1  
Allocation of points for each political group in the Culture and Education Committee 
Situation on 24th of January 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Total 
available 
points 
Points 
taken for 
reports 
Points taken 
for opinions 
Total of 
points taken 
Points still 
available 
EPP-ED - 12 Members 30 14 2.5  16.5 13.5 
S-D - 8 Members 20 6.5 5  11.5 8.5 
ALDE - 4 Members 10 4 4 (-0.5) 7.5 2.5 
Verts/ALE - 2 Members 5 2 0.5 2.5 2.5 
ECR - 2 Members 5   - 5 
GUE/NGL - 2 Members 5  0.5  0.5 4.5 
EFD - 1 Member 2.5   - 2.5 
NI - 1 Member 2.5   - 2.5 
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Appendix 4.2 
Allocation of points for each political group in the Culture and Education Committee 
Situation on 1 December 2010 
 
Group Total 
available 
points 
Points 
taken for 
reports 
Points taken 
for opinions 
Total of 
points taken 
Points still 
available 
EPP-ED - 12 Members 30 14 2.5 16.5 13.5 
S-D - 8 Members 20 6.5 5 11.5 8.5 
ALDE - 4 Members 10 4 4 8 2 
Verts/ALE - 2 Members 5 2 0.5 2.5 2.5 
ECR - 2 Members 5   - 5 
GUE/NGL - 2 Members 5  0.5  0.5 4.5 
EFD - 1 Member 2.5   - 2.5 
NI - 1 Member 2.5   - 2.5 
 
Points attributed during the meeting on 1 December 2010 
 
Reports Points 
Groupe/ 
rapporteur 
The European Schools' system in 2009 COM (2010) 595 final 0 EPP 
Opinions Points 
Groupe/ 
rapporteur 
-   
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Appendix 5.1: Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee – Amendment numbers and results of votes 
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Internal Market Scoreboard 36 0 22 15 0 530 85 3 INI 
Consumer protection 87 0 34 0 3    INI 
SOLVIT 44 0 34 2 1    INI 
Delivering a single market to consumers and citizens 236 0 32 0 3 578 28 16 INI 
New developments in public procurement 130 1 28 0 8    INI 
EEA-Switzerland: internal market 11 0 32 2 0    INI 
Completing the internal market for e-commerce 166 0 32 0 0    INI 
Future of European standardisation 118 3 36 0 1    INI 
Impact of advertising on consumer behaviour 132 0 30 1 2    INI 
Implementation of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC 80 1 32 1 5    INI 
Revision of the General Product Safety Directive and market surveillance 77 0 36 0 2 628 11 7 INI 
A Single Market for Enterprises and Growth 237 0 24 0 13 570 44 28 INI 
A Single Market for Europeans 266 9 21 3 13 600 48 27 INI 
Governance and Partnership in the Single Market 122 0 24 1 12 595 61 10 INI 
A more efficient and fairer retail market 155 0 32 3 0    INI 
Universal service and the 112 emergency number 84 0 33 0 1    INI 
Repealing of Council Directives regarding metrology 56 10 30 3 0 656 0 2 COD 
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Textile names and related labelling of textile products 100 72 30 1 6 528 18 108 COD 
Late payment in commercial transactions (recast) 210 1 30 0 6 612 12 21 COD 
Second reading: Regulation laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of 
construction products  
183 84 36 1 0 390 4 6 COD 
Consumer rights 673 265 32 16 1    COD 
Textile fibre names and related labelling and marking of fibre composition  43 35 30 2 4 528 18 108 COD 
Enforcement of consumer protection laws 6 3 33 0 0    COD 
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Appendix 5.2: Regional Development Committee – Amendment numbers and results of votes 
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Contribution of Cohesion policy to the achievement of Lisbon and the EU2020 objectives 99 9       INI 
Implementation of the synergies of research and innovation earmarked Funds  74 0 39 1 1 559 18 36 INI 
Transparency in regional policy and its funding 54 0 34 1 2 629 6 26 INI 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the role of macro-regions in 
cohesion policy 
109 0 43 1 0    INI 
Contribution of EU regional policy towards fighting the financial and economic crisis - 
Objective 2 
68 0 42 0 2 609 46 14 INI 
Good governance with regards to the EU regional policy 61 0 35 0 0    INI 
Achieving real territorial, social and economic cohesion within the EU 103 0 38 5 1 491 117 13 INI 
Objective 3: a challenge for territorial cooperation  134 0 45 1 0    INI 
Report 2010 on the implementation of the cohesion policy programmes for 2007-2013 105 0 40 1 0    INI 
Increased effectiveness between the ERDF and other structural funds 36 0 43 1 0    INI 
European Urban Agenda and its Future in Cohesion Policy 103 0 36 0 2    INI 
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Commission’s  fifth  Cohesion  Report  and  the  strategy  for  post-2013 cohesion policy 569 10 31 4 9 506 48 101 INI 
Regulation on the ERDF as regards the eligibility of housing interventions  17 9 34 3 1 588 57 16 COD 
Regulation concerning general provisions on the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund 27 23 36 4 1 519 33 83 COD 
Regulation on EU financial contributions to the International Fund for Ireland (2007-
2010) 
0 1 42 0 1 630 9 25 COD 
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Appendix 5.3: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee– Amendment numbers and results of votes 
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Commission White Paper: 'Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for 
action' 
171 4 49 3 2    INI 
Action plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation (2009-2015) 33 10 58 0 1    INI 
Action Against Cancer: European Partnership 81 0 56 0 0    INI 
Management of bio-waste in the European Union 81 0 55 3 0    INI 
A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters 72 0 42 6 2    INI 
Implementation of EU legislation for the conservation of biodiversity 194 1 55 0 0    INI 
European  initiative  on  Alzheimer’s  disease  and  other  dementias 188 0 48 0 1 646 6 6 INI 
Reducing health inequalities in the EU 96 0 52 1 7 379 228 49 INI 
Evaluation of the management of H1N1 influenza in 2009-2010 in the EU 172 1 58 2 1    INI 
Forest protection and information in the EU: preparing forests for climate change 298 0 53 6 0    INI 
GDP and beyond – Measuring progress in a changing world 26 0 59 1 1    INI 
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EU legislation on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) and related feed and food 
controls 
36 0 56 0 1    INI 
Options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions  241 8 44 14 1    INI 
Animal health requirements applicable to the non-commercial movement of pet animals 6 4 35 0 1 618 17 5 COD 
Importation of certain live animals and their fresh meat 0 0 36 0 0 533 9 16 COD 
Standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation 203 106 53 0 1 643 16 8 COD 
Provision of food information to consumers 575 351 33 6 1 559 54 32 COD 
Second reading: industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) 353 77 40 13 4 402 189 54 COD 
Prevention of the entry into the legal supply chain of medicinal products which are falsified in 
relation to their identity, history or source 
374 120 46 0 2 500 12  COD 
Second reading: obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market ? 94 49 6 2 465 22 187 COD 
Second reading: novel foods 150 120 49 2 3 667 16 9 COD 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human 
and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency 
86 41 52 0 0 559 7 12 COD 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 270 74 49 0 5 569 8 15 COD 
Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment 
(recast) 
339 106 53 0 1 640 3 12 COD 
Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (recast) 273 107 51 1 3 580 37 22 COD 
Placing on the market and use of biocidal products 226 361 24 3 9 553 20 83 COD 
Setting emission performance standards for new light commercial vehicles  313 58 35 25 1 520 122 13 COD 
Information to the general public on medicinal products for human use subject to medical 
prescription 
31 13 51 2 3 564 41 45 COD 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 313 96 46 1 3 558 42 53 COD 
Second reading: application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare 227 107 47 2 1 297 120 152 COD 
European environmental economic accounts 52 46 40 4 4 616 26 24 COD 
Provisions for engines placed on the market under the flexibility scheme 114 24 51 5 2    COD 
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Provisions for tractors placed on the market under the flexibility scheme 12 25 45 5 6 402 218 11 COD 
Possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their 
territory 
114 51 34 10 16    COD 
Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, ? 137 57 4 1    COD 
Fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption 64 0 41 9 4    COD 
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Appendix 5.4: Budgets Committee– Amendment numbers and results of votes 
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Financial Regulation as regards the European External Action Service 34 34 59 3 0 578 39 28 COD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Cataluña automoción/Spain 3 0 36 2 0 579 59 10 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Qimonda/Portugal 3 0 36 2 0 580 60 9 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Nordjylland/Denmark 3 0 36 2 0 567 59 8 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: NXP/Netherlands 3 0 36 2 0 581 54 9 BUD 
Council's position on Draft amending budget No 3/2010, Section III - Commission 1 0 41 2 0 0 0 0 BUD 
Council's position on draft general budget for the financial year 2011 - all sections and 
Letters of amendments No. 1/2011, 2/2011 and 3/2011 to the draft general budget  
   0 36 2 4 0 0 0 BUD 
Council's position on Draft amending budget 6/2010, Section II - European Council and 
Council, Section III - Commission, Section X - European External Action Service 
0 0 38 2 0 608 41 11 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Ireland - SR Technics 0 0 19 0 1 459 54 8 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Noord Brabant and Zuid 
Holland , Division 18/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 558 69 17 BUD 
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Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Noord Holland and Utrecht 
Division 18/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 555 68 22 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Noord Holland and Zuid 
Holland Division 58/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 559 66 21 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Gelderland and Overijssel 
Division 18/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 558 68 20 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Drenthe Division 
18/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 562 66 19 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Limburg Division 
18/Netherlands 
1 0 19 1 1 560 67 20 BUD 
Council's position on Draft amending budget No 8/2010, Section III - Commission 0 0 22 0 0 596 5 2 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: Ireland – floods in November 2009 0 0 22 0 0 538 20 3 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: SI/Mura, Slovenia 2 0 13 1 1 489 51 19 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: Portugal - floods; France - Xynthia 
(storm) 
0 0 13 1 0 476 7 2 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen AG/Germany 
2 0 13 1 1 502 57 15 BUD 
Council's position on Draft amending budget No 9/2010, Section III - Commission 0 0 14 1 0 519 8 5 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Noord Holland 
ICT/Netherlands 
1 0 20 1 0 567 46 10 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: H.Cegielski-Poznań  from  
Poland 
0 0 18 2 0 566 49 23 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Lear from Spain 0 0 18 2 0 554 62 25 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Comunidad Valenciana - 
natural stone from Spain 
0 0 18 2 0 547 63 22 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Comunidad Valenciana 0 0 18 2 0 521 47 21 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Spain 0 0 18 2 0 524 57 21 BUD 
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Mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for the Lifelong Learning Programme, for the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme and for Palestine 
0 0 36 2 0 525 20 13 BUD 
Draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2011, all sections 4 4 27 5 1
0 
508 141 19 BUD 
Granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under loans and 
guarantees for projects outside the European Union 
7 7 20 2 1 538 37 37 COD 
Guidelines for the 2012 budget procedure, Section I – European Parliament, Section II – 
Council, Section IV – Court of Justice, Section V – Court of Auditors, Section VI – 
European Economic and Social Committee, Section VII – Committee of the Regions, 
Section VIII – European Ombudsman, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor, 
Section X - European External Action Service 
7 7 34 1 1 574 74 29 BUD 
General guidelines for the preparation of the 2012 budget 25 24 32 4 3 0 0 0 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: PL/Podkarpackie machinery 
from Poland 
5 0 35 3 0 514 50 16 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: CZ/Unilever from the Czech 
Republic 
1 1 35 3 0 553 53 19 BUD 
Estimates of revenue and expenditure of Parliament for the financial year 2012 - Section I - 
Parliament 
18 14 33 7 0 479 176 23 BUD 
Draft amending budget No 1/2011, Section III – Commission 1 0 24 2 1 591 22 53 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: Floods in 2010 in Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia and Romania 
4 0 24 2 1 647 17 5 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: BE/General Motors 
Belgium from Belgium 
3 0 26 4 1 560 81 17 BUD 
Mandate for the trilogue on the 2012 Draft Budget 32 31 25 7 7 379 128 94 BUD 
Draft amending budget No 2/2011, Section III – Commission 1 1 35 1 0 619 39 11 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: DK/LM Glasfiber from 
Denmark 
1 0 20 4 0 575 60 25 BUD 
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Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: DK/Odense Steel Shipyard 
from Denmark 
10 0 19 4 0 575 61 30 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: flooding in Slovenia, Croatia and the 
Czech Republic in 2010 
1 0 32 1 0 644 16 5 BUD 
Draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 
2007-2013 
1 0 25 1 0 445 39 18 APP 
Draft amending budget No 3/2011 of the European Union for the financial year 2011, 
Section III – Commission 
3 3 24 0 2 625 14 29 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: technical assistance at the 
initiative of the Commission 
0 0 28 3 0 557 76 23 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: AT/Steiermark and 
Niederösterreich from Austria 
3 0 29 1 1 558 64 23 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 0 0 37 1 1 578 26 12 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund 0 0 34 1 0 581 23 6 BUD 
Draft amending budget No 7/2009, the Klaus Storm in France 0 0 33 1 0 605 23 14 BUD 
Draft amending budget N° 9/2009, earthquake in Italy, Section III - Commission 0 0 29 0 0 654 4 15 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Germany 0 0 30 0 0 598 49 30 BUD 
Mobilisation of the EU Solidarity Fund: Italy, the Abruzzo earthquake 0 0 29 0 0 620 4 14 BUD 
Draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section I - 
European Parliament, Section II - Council, Section IV - Court of Justice, Section V - Court 
of Auditors, Section VI - European Economic and Social Committee, Section VII - 
Committee of the Regions, Section VIII - European Ombudsman, Section IX - European 
Data Protection Supervisor 
3 2 35 1 0 0 0 0 BUD 
Draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section III 
Commission and Letter of amendement No 1/2010 to the draft general budget of the 
European Union for the financial year 2010 
13 8 39 0 0 483 48 32 BUD 
Transitional procedural guidelines on budgetary matters in view of the entry into force of 8 8 36 1 1 576 39 20 INI 
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the Lisbon Treaty 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Belgium - textile industry; 
Ireland - Dell 
1 1 35 4 0 591 55 28 BUD 
Mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument 0 0 34 2 1 544 18 14 BUD 
Draft amending budget No 10/2009, Section III - Commission 0 0 30 1 0 559 25 10 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: SE/Volvo, AT/Steiermark, 
NL/Heijmans 
8 8 28 1 0 531 61 18 BUD 
Draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010 as modified by the 
Council (all sections) and Letters of amendments Nos. 1/2010, 2/2010 and 3/2010 to the 
general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010 
8 8 37 0 1 483 48 32 BUD 
Amended proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound 
financial management as regards the multiannual financial framework: Financing projects 
in the field of energy in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan 
0 0 34 2 1 536 18 22 ACI 
Estimates of revenue and expenditure for Amending Budget 1/2010 (Section I, European 
Parliament) 
5 0 31 2 3 430 117 58 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Lithuania - construction of 
buildings 
0 0 25 0 0 557 43 14 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Germany - redundancies 0 0 26 0 1 525 52 15 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Lithuania - redundancies 0 0 28 0 0 546 45 14 BUD 
Report on the proposal for a Council decision on the allocation of financial intermediation 
services indirectly measured (FISIM) for the establishment of the gross national income 
(GNI) used for the purposes of the European Communities' budget and its own resources 
2 2 28 0 0 534 4 20 CNS 
Report on the guidelines for the 2011 Budget procedure, Section I - European Parliament, 
Section II - Council, Section IV - Court of Justice, Section V - Court of Auditors, Section 
VI - European Economic and Social Committee, section VII - Committee of the Regions, 
Section VIII - European Ombudsman, Section IX -European Data Protection Supervisor 
4 4 33 0 0 0 0 0 BUD 
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Report on Priorities for 2011 budget - Section III - Commission 28 28 31 0 4 558 48 16 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Lithuania/Manufacture of 
wearing apparel 
0 0 30 1 1 562 34 17 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Lithuania/Manufacture of 
furniture 
0 0 30 1 1 558 33 23 BUD 
REPORT on the estimates of revenue and expenditure of Parliament for the financial year 
2011 
6 6 35 4 0 0 0 0 BUD 
Report Council's position on Draft Amending budget No 1/2010 of the European Union for 
the financial year 2010, Section I - European Parliament 
1 1 31 3 2 509 111 31 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 0 0 26 0 0 562 55 40 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: ES/Castilla - La Mancha 0 0 26 0 0 580 50 24 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: ES/Region of Valencia 0 0 26 0 0 575 51 25 BUD 
Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Ireland/Waterford Crystal 0 0 26 0 0 573 48 25 BUD 
Draft mandate for the trilogue on the 2011 Draft Budget 34 33 38 2 1 571 45 41 BUD 
Draft amending budget No 4/2010, Section III - Commission 0 0 29 0 0 652 18 1 BUD 
Funding and functioning of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 71 0 27 9 1 0 0 0 INI 
Draft amending budget No 2/2010 of the European Union for the financial year 2010 0 0 30 0 0 618 25 17 BUD 
Draft amending budget n° 7/2010, Section III- Commission 0 0 35 2 0 467 41 19 BUD 
Draft amending budget n°5/2010, Section III - Commission 0 0 36 1 0 554 21 21 BUD 
Interim report on the proposal for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2007-2013 
0 0 30 2 3 581 27 74 APP 
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Appendix 5.5: Culture and Education Committee– Amendment numbers and results of votes 
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Europeana - the next steps 0 1 30 0 0    INI 
University-business dialogue 109 0 29 1 0    INI 
An EU Strategy for Youth - Investing and Empowering 204 0 31 0 0    INI 
Key competences for a changing world: implementation of the Education and Training 2010 work 
programme 
133 0 26 1 2    INI 
Journalism and new media - creating a public sphere in Europe 185 1 24 3 1    INI 
Public service broadcasting in the digital era: the future of the dual system 155 0 19 5 1 522 22 62 INI 
Early Years Learning in the European Union 91 0 27 0 0 506 27 55 INI 
Cultural  dimensions  of  the  EU’s  external  actions 189 0 26 0 0 519 46 25 INI 
Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries 182 0 26 0 2    INI 
Youth on the Move: - a framework for improving Europe's education and training systems 225 0 27 0 2    INI 
European Union action for the European Heritage Label 146 62 28 0 0 497 18 41 COD  
